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 1 Introduction and Overview 
In the course of a lifetime, people usually chose to or have to deal with several domains 
on which they concentrate their efforts, in which they build up and deepen skills and in 
which they enquire larger and larger amounts of knowledge. These domains, which can 
be professions as well as areas of private interest, thus become their areas of expertise. 
In the course of several years, the thorough occupation with a domain causes an expert-
specific restructuring of knowledge in that domain; the resulting expert way of knowl-
edge organization enhances and facilitates cognitive functioning in the field.   
People do not, however, only dispose of knowledge in their areas of expertise. On the 
contrary, people generally know something also in a great many other areas. This lay 
type of knowledge is acquired through different sources; often, it is picked up uninten-
tionally through the media or as a consequence of hearsay or personal experiences. 
Also, knowledge basics from school education are remembered to a certain degree 
throughout adult life. Lay knowledge has certain characteristics; thus, laypersons dis-
pose of a wealth of assumptions and (so-called naïve) theories which are often errone-
ous. With regard to technical concepts of a domain, laypersons often have a divergent 
term understanding, which even holds for seemingly simple terms like stomach (see 
section 2.1).  
In many situations in everyday life, laypersons are confronted with a situation in 
which they need the advice of an expert. Thus, an older citizen might need help with a 
newly bought computer, a tenant might be in a situation with her1 landlord in which 
she would want to consult law counseling or a patient might need advice on an impor-
tant medical decision. It is evident that experts and laypersons every so often need to 
communicate with each other; hereby, their communication is characterized by their 
systematically divergent knowledge backgrounds. As a consequence, expert-layperson 
communication is a conversational setting in which interlocutors approach a subject 
matter from very divergent perspectives; hereby, experts have the difficult task of 
‚translating’ some of their knowledge in a way that makes it understandable for their lay 
interlocutors. How and under which circumstances can successful knowledge commu-
nication be accomplished? These are questions which are addressed from a psycholin-
guistic perspective in the research project “Rezipientenorientierung in der 
netzgestützen Gesundheitsberatung” [Recipient orientation in net-based health coun-
seling] that was granted to Prof. Dr. Rainer Bromme and Prof. Dr. Regina Jucks at the 
                                                        
1 To enhance readability, I refrain from using the pronouns s/he, hers/his, etc., whenever referring to a singular person 
of either male or female gender. After flipping a coin in order to decide which gender to adhere to, I consistently use 
the female form throughout the dissertation. This does not mean, however, that the group of which the female person 
is a representative would consist only of women. 
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University of Muenster, Germany, within a Special Priority Program (SPP) funded by 
the German Research Foundation (cf. Bromme & Jucks, 2004).  This dissertation is 
affiliated to the research project and the presented studies were conducted in its con-
text. 
It is, however, not only in everyday counseling contexts (so-called informal learning 
contexts) that experts and laypersons engage in conversation. Also in the formal educa-
tional settings of schools and universities, experts and laypersons communicate one-to-
one in the setting of tutoring (see section 2.2).  
In this dissertation, it will be argued that expert-layperson communication in these 
informal and formal settings can be regarded as structurally equivalent: For one thing, 
tutoring in formal settings can be conceived of as a special case of expert-layperson 
communication. For another thing, the counseling activity of the experts in the infor-
mal settings can also be called a tutoring activity in a broader sense of the term.  
As a result of this parallelism, the two research strands of (i) tutoring research 
(which focuses on formal educational settings) and (ii) research on expert-layperson 
communication (which focuses on informal tutoring) can and will fruitfully be enriched 
by consideration of the respective other perspective. Thus, for instance, the results that 
are obtained in this dissertation on the tutoring behavior of experts in an informal 
counseling setting will be compared to results from formal settings, hereby enriching 
the body of research on tutoring.  
In order to interpret the conversational behavior of the experts, several theoretical 
accounts will be applied (cf. section 2.3). By doing so, the impact of generic mecha-
nisms from everyday human conversation on expert-layperson communication will be 
examined. While this endeavour can help shed more light on what shapes the tutoring 
behavior of experts in tutorial settings, it also refines the psycholinguistic accounts with 
regard to the specifics of expert-layperson communication.  
 
The main focus of this dissertation is put on the impact of lay understanding (which 
is, as described above, often erroneous) on informal tutorial dialogue. Hereby, espe-
cially the ways in which experts respond to a display of such erroneous understanding 
will be of interest. In research on tutoring in formal settings, one of the tutorial moves 
that has been investigated is how tutors react to false understanding that their tutees 
utter spontaneously in conversation. This dissertation aims at investigating how tutors 
react to uttered lay false understanding in the informal learning context of email health 
counseling.  
Email health counseling was chosen as applied research context for two reasons: 
Firstly, the option to consult experts via email is a service that is used more and more 
frequently by laypersons who seek advice on the Internet (see section 2.4). Also in for-
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mal learning settings, computer-mediated tutorial interaction is a form of instruction 
with growing importance. Secondly, the medical domain is especially suitable, since 
laypersons hold assumptions and theories about medical issues from childhood. How-
ever, more research is needed to describe lay understanding for different medical fields. 
This research desideratum is addressed in study I (chapter 4) which explores lay knowl-
edge for the topic of the metabolic syndrome.  
Based on the results of study I, studies II (chapter 5) and III (chapter 6) will address 
the question of how medical experts react to a display of false understanding in a lay-
person’s email. Hereby, study II investigates the impact of a display of false under-
standing on experts’ assessment of lay knowledge. Study III, then, will focus on the im-
pact on the actual communicational behavior of the experts. The results will be com-
pared to research from formal, face-to-face tutorial settings. Hereby, the impact of the 
characteristics of computer-mediated expert-layperson communication will be consid-
ered.  
As a consequence of the results of studies II and III, the last study presented in this 
dissertation will put a special focus on the conversational principle of politeness (cf. 
Brown and Levinson, 1987). As Person, Kreuz, Zwaan and Graesser (1995) point out, 
politeness plays a crucial role in formal tutorial settings, interfering with successful 
knowledge communication. Thus, for instance, tutors often disguise the correction of 
false understanding through politeness, even though direct error feedback is an impor-
tant and useful tutoring strategy. Study IV (chapter 7) will address the question of 
whether a relation exists between the medical experts’ demonstrated conversational 
behavior and an obeyance of the everyday conversational principle of politeness in 
email health counseling. For this aim, an instruction is developed and administered 
that aims at enabling the experts to ignore politeness in favor of a more effective 
knowledge communication.  
 
 
In a nutshell, this dissertation aims at investigating the impact of false beliefs in lay 
email queries on experts’ knowledge anticipation and answering behavior and at dis-
cussing it from a psycholinguistic perspective. On a theoretical level, the dissertation 
wants to make contributions to expert-layperson communication research and to tutor-
ing research. Hereby, the question of how pragmatic principles from everyday conver-
sation impact on expert-layperson conversation will be discussed. Last but not least, 
implications for future research shall be formulated that arise from the four studies 
presented in the dissertation.   
 
 
 2 Theoretical background  
In the following, the theoretical foundations of the dissertation will be presented. Sec-
tion 2.1 will start with providing some psychological research backgrounds on the spe-
cific characteristics of experts’ and laypersons’ knowledge, both with regard to knowl-
edge in general as well as in the domain of medicine. Also, the impact of these charac-
teristics on communication between experts and laypersons will be discussed. In sec-
tion 2.2, research findings from tutoring research will be presented and a parallel will 
be drawn between expert-layperson communication and tutorial dialogue in formal 
instructional settings. Section 2.3., thereafter, will present the psycholinguistic founda-
tions of this dissertation. Hereby, basic principles of human communication will be 
introduced. In section 2.4, the conversational setting of email health counseling will be 
depicted, which is the applied setting of this dissertation.  
2.1 Experts and laypersons – a systematic knowledge divergence 
2.1.1 Expert knowledge 
Expert and expertise  
Before turning to a description of what characterizes the knowledge of experts, the 
terms expert and expertise need to be given some attention, as in research on expertise 
several different definitions are taken as a basis.   
Beyond the simplistic statement that the term expertise refers to an above-average 
performance of an individual in a certain area, Gruber (2001) differentiates between 
different definitions used in expertise research, and suggests a classification system 
using the following dichotomies:  
• Explanation of expertise through dispositional constructs (e.g., intelligence) vs. 
through abundant practice and development of a structured knowledge base  
• Focus on expert knowledge vs. on expert performance as central component of 
expertise 
• Expertise as a general competence vs. as a domain-specific competence 
 
This dissertation focuses on the domain of medicine. Based on Gruber’s dichoto-
mies, the following remarks shall be made about expertise in this domain: Medical ex-
perts have gone through several years of professional, academic formation in their do-
main, rather than distinguishing themselves by a special giftedness. As a consequence, 
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medical expertise is characterized by a structured, domain-specific knowledge base. 
The systematic knowledge formation of several years is a prerequisite for the experts in 
order to exert their domain-specific expertise, i.e. to successfully cope with complex 
tasks which are a characteristic of professions that require a long formation (cf. 
Bromme & Rambow, 2001). During expert knowledge formation, knowledge is restruc-
tured; this process has been described for different knowledge domains. In the follow-
ing, this process will be delineated in more detail for the domain of medicine.  
 
Expertise development in the domain of medicine 
Henny Boshuizen and Henk Schmidt (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992; Schmidt & 
Boshuizen, 1992) describe the process of medical expertise development as follows: In 
the beginning of their formation, medical novices2 acquire knowledge about the normal 
functioning of the human body (its anatomy, physiology and so forth), thus developing 
an extensive body of biomedical knowledge. As the formation continues (including con-
tact with actual patients), knowledge restructures and is encapsulated (i.e. clustered 
together) under higher order, clinically relevant concepts. At last, medical knowledge is 
organized in so-called illness scripts. These illness scripts are “precompiled packages of 
diagnostic and clinical knowledge describing a general sequence of events that may be 
expected to occur when someone suffers from a particular disease” (Custers, Boshuizen 
& Schmidt, 1996, p. 385). They comprise several components of knowledge, such as 
patient factors and contextual factors which contribute to the development of an illness, 
the malfunctioning that occurs in an illness on a biomedical level, possible conse-
quences of an illness and knowledge about the kind of action required to cure it 
(Boshuizen, 2003) and are activated as a whole. 
 
Research findings on expert knowledge 
What is characteristic of expert knowledge and thinking? Research on expertise has 
accumulated a substantial amount of evidence that points to the particularities of ex-
perts’ cognitive organization and functioning (cf. Boshuizen, Bromme, & Gruber, 
2004). The reorganization of knowledge during the process of expertise development 
leads to highly integrated and interconnected expert knowledge. Experts have a specific 
representation of their domain, in that they “organize their knowledge around deep 
principles of a domain” (Hmelo-Silver & Green Pfeffer, 2004, p. 128). In the sorting 
procedure reported in the much-noticed study of Chi, Feltovich and Glaser (1981), for 
instance, physics experts and novices sorted a number of physics problems into groups 
based on similarities of solution. While there were no differences in the number of 
                                                        
2 In the following, the term novices will be used when referring to a group of people that are apprentices in a certain field 
and only recently started their formation. 
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categories produced by experts and novices, a qualitative analysis of the categories re-
vealed that the novices grouped the problems mainly with regard to their ‘surface struc-
tures’ (p. 125), such as objects referred to in the problem or relations among these ob-
jects. Experts, on the contrary, grouped the problems with regard to physics principles 
that were required for their solution. The organization of expert knowledge around 
deep principles has been shown also for a variety of other expertise domains (e.g., 
Anderson & Leinhardt, 2002; Halpern & Wai, 2007). 
The organization of expert knowledge influences all stages of expert information 
processing from perception and integration of new information to an efficient applica-
tion of knowledge in cognitive activities. Experts can condense more information into 
one meaning unit – a so-called chunk – and store it in long-term memory (Anderson, 
2000). As a consequence, knowledge is retrieved with less effort (Chase & Simon, 1973; 
cf. Kluwe, 1990). Also, experts recognize the relevant aspects of a situation faster, which 
enables them to more effective problem solving3 (e.g., Larkin, McDermott, Simon & 
Simon, 1980). Anderson and Leinhardt (2002), for instance, compared geography ex-
perts (geography professors) and three different groups of geography novices; these 
were advanced novices (i.e. undergraduate geography students who participated in 
their first cartography class), novices (i.e. undergraduate geography students that had 
already had at least two cartography classes) and preservice social studies teachers 
without formal geographic education but who were supposed to teach geography at  
middle or high school or both in the future. Participants were given a map in which 
different cities were labeled and were asked to draw a line on the map to indicate the 
shortest distance between two cities as it would be on the surface of the earth. This task 
was repeated for several city pairs and with different maps (a map of the world and a 
map of North and South America). Experts were more successful in solving the task 
than novices and preservice teachers. An analysis of participants’ talk-aloud protocols 
revealed that experts and advanced novices used their understanding of a map’s repre-
sentational system and of the relations among certain aspects of the map as well their 
knowledge of the surface of the earth to apply successful problem-solving strategies. 
Novices and preservice teachers, on the contrary, lacked an understanding of how maps 
are distorted as a result of projection and thus drew curved lines under application of 
misconceptions about why the lines should be curved or drew straight lines in the ab-
sence of any understanding of projection.  
Also for the medical domain, several studies have illustrated how the structure of 
expert knowledge influences experts’ information processing and reasoning. For in-
stance, van de Wiel, Boshuizen, and Schmidt (2000) instructed participants of four 
                                                        
3 Note that under certain circumstances, high knowledge interferes with effective problem solving (e.g., Adelson, 1984). 
However, such findings do underpin the influence of expertise on information processing.  
Experts and laypersons – a systematic knowledge divergence 7 
medical expertise levels to study four case descriptions, to produce a diagnosis for each 
case and to explain the pathophysiology underlying the respective symptoms. The ex-
planation protocols were then rewritten as semantic networks and the networks ana-
lyzed. Expert’s diagnostic accuracy increased as a function of the level of expertise. 
Also, experts provided qualitatively better explanations in that they produced lines of 
reasoning that better matched canonical explanations. At the same time, their explana-
tions were less extensive and less detailed. The authors also assessed the impact of time 
constraints on participants’ explanations. While the quality of the experts’ explanations 
was not affected by time constraints, they gave longer and more detailed explanations 
when they had had more time to read the case study. Results suggest that experts use 
high-level clinical concepts under time constraints to get to a correct diagnose in little 
time; when they spend more time on studying a case, however, intermediate concepts 
that are otherwise by-passed with links leading directly from one high-level concept to 
another also become activated.   
 
As the above elaborations have shown, experts dispose of abundant knowledge 
structures that enable them to recall knowledge as well as store new information effec-
tively. Taken together, we can say that experts approach their field of expertise from a 
specific (expert) perspective. In the next section, I will explore the perspective of lay-
persons, that is, people without a background of knowledge formation in a field. There-
after, in section 2.1.3, the characteristics of expert-layperson communication as a con-
versational setting in which these two perspectives confront each other will be outlined.  
2.1.2 Lay knowledge 
Research findings on lay knowledge 
With regard to a great variety of knowledge domains, people acquire knowledge in the 
course of everyday life. Therefore, rather than being blank slates, laypersons do dispose 
of some knowledge in most subject areas. Thus, for instance, medical laypersons have 
medically-related beliefs from childhood, and lay theories (so-called intuitive theories) 
on illnesses are developed early in life (Keil, Levin, Richman, & Gutheil, 1999). On a 
local, propositional level, lay knowledge can be described as containing both correct 
and erroneous beliefs (Chi, Siler, & Jeong, 2004).  
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These beliefs are often poorly connected (e.g., Jones & Read, 2005) and contradictory 
beliefs4 are held simultaneously (Furnham, 1988). Apart from these single beliefs, lay-
persons also dispose of mental models that are erroneous but quite coherent; these are 
often called intuitive theories or naïve theories (Anderson & Lindsay, 1998; Rozenblit & 
Keil, 2002). Laypersons use these theories in order to predicate and explain the social 
and physical world. Also, the theories guide lay perception and information processing 
(Murphy, 2002). Intuitive theories are persistent and resistant to change (Dole & Sina-
tra, 1998).  
 
In cognitive-psychological expertise research (cf. section 2.1.1 on expert knowledge) 
the characteristics of expert knowledge are compared with lay knowledge of persons 
who have only recently started their expert formation or with knowledge of persons 
who have gone through parts of their expertise formation (so-called intermediates). 
Thus, for instance, Jones and Read (2005) report that when asked to describe specific 
political conflicts, experts tied states, events and actions together in tight, extensive and 
complex networks, while laypersons’ descriptions of the conflicts were much less inter-
connected. Hmelo-Silver and Green Pfeffer (2004), for instance, investigated expertise 
on aquatic systems and describe the organization of expert knowledge around deep 
principles of a domain and lay knowledge around superficial aspects: In their study, the 
laypersons’ representations of an aquatic system mainly comprised the elements of a 
system - particularly those that were perceptually salient, while the processes in which 
these elements were engaged and their purpose within the system as a whole were less 
known (cf. Hmelo, Holton, & Kolodner, 2000).  
While thus, expertise research has provided important insights into the unconnect-
edness and organization around surface characteristics of lay knowledge, concept re-
search has described lay beliefs that are associated with certain concepts. Hereby, re-
search studies have shown that lay concept definitions are often unclear and blurry, 
and that the representations of a concept differ considerably between different people 
                                                        
4 As for ‘belief’, it is important to bear in mind that the term ‘belief’ actually contains both the notion of knowing a cer-
tain fact and the notion of being convinced of a certain fact. With regard to the terms knowledge and beliefs, several 
authors have pointed out a confusion in the use of these terms in educational-psychological literature (e.g., Pajares,  
1992; Southerland, Sinatra, & Matthews, 2001); also, these constructs overlap (Murphy & Mason, 2006). Hereby, it is 
difficult to differentiate between the two constructs especially in those instances in which laypersons dispose of cor-
rect beliefs, because then, they dispose of correct knowledge and at the same time are convinced of that knowledge. 
Where laypersons are confronted with knowledge that contrasts with their own beliefs, however, the difference in the 
meaning of the terms is more evident. Thus, the term ‘belief’ stresses the subjectivity of the layperson’s knowledge. 
For instance, Chinn and Samarapungavan (2001) point out that even if new and plausible information is understood 
and represented cognitively, the held beliefs are often retained and preferred. In order to be able to distinguish be-
tween lay beliefs that are more and those that are less resistant to change, Chi, Siler and Jeong (2004) provide the fol-
lowing distinction: Beliefs that are not difficult to correct per se (but are often not detected in instructional contexts) 
are called false beliefs, while beliefs that persist even when confronted with instruction and refutation are referred to 
as misconceptions.   
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(e.g., Murphy, 2002). Also, real life experiences and encounters have an effect on the 
ways in which concepts are represented (e.g., Barsalou, 1993).  
Research on naïve theories, then, particularly focuses on students’ intuitive theories 
in different domains of science (e.g., naïve physics, naïve biology; cf. Mähler & Ahrens, 
2003; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). Studies in this area have shown that these theories 
constrain the acquisition of knowledge: Information that aims at teaching a scientific 
explanation to students is often integrated into the already-existing (erroneous) under-
standing, and consequently, the intended scientific understanding is not reached. As a 
consequence, conceptual change research has focused on the question of how naïve 
concepts can be changed to a scientific understanding of science phenomena (cf. Vos-
niadou, 2007). Hereby, the term conceptual change is used to describe a process in 
which existing naïve understanding is altered qualitatively (and not just enriched quan-
titatively). While conceptual change studies have mainly focused on naïve theories of 
children, also adult learners have been investigated (e.g., Slotta & Chi, 2006).  
 
Lay knowledge in the domain of medicine 
Also for the medical domain, the expertise domain in this dissertation, lay beliefs and 
theories have been investigated. For instance, Martin, Gordon and Lounsbury (1998) 
conducted a series of studies in which they presented vignettes with patient descrip-
tions to the participants. In the vignettes, a person was described that suffered from 
symptoms consistent with a myocardial infarction. Participants were asked to rate the 
likelihood that the described symptoms were caused by a heart disease. The person in 
the vignette was either experiencing stressful life events or not. The authors found that 
when the patient in the vignette was female, the participants estimated the risk of a 
heart attack lower when the person was stressed. When the patient in the vignette was 
male, however, there was no such a stress-discounting effect. These results point to the 
naïve belief (held by both women and men) that women are especially likely to manifest 
stress in terms of physical symptoms.  
In addition to providing insights into widely spread naïve beliefs and theories, re-
search has shown that physicians and patients have a quite divergent understanding of 
commonly used medical concepts, including even simple terms such as stomach (Boyle, 
1970). Thus, in 1945, Redlich was one of the first to recognize the importance of an em-
pirical investigation of patients’ knowledge of medical terminology, stating that it was 
less the terms unknown by the patient than those understood divergently by doctor 
and patient that caused a serious misunderstanding in doctor-patient communication. 
Since then, numerous studies in both Europe and the United States have addressed the 
topic, focusing on healthy lay individual populations (e.g., Anderson, Chad & Spink, 
2005; Tring & Hayes-Allen, 1973) as well as on laypersons affected by a certain disease 
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(e.g., Lobb, Butow, Kenney & Tattersall, 1999; Samora, Saunders & Larson, 1961). Re-
search has been done on different kinds of concepts, focusing on terms in common use 
in doctor-patient-communication (e.g., Thompson & Pledger, 1993) as well as on terms 
of particular interest in a specific context, as in cancer consultations (Chapman, Abra-
ham, Jenkins & Fallowfield, 2003), genetic counseling (Chapple, Campion & May, 
1997) or orthopedic consent forms (McCormack, Envoy, Mulcahy, & Walsh, 1997).  
Such research pieces demonstrate that laypersons have a rather vague or wrong under-
standing of what medical terms mean. In Gittelman, Mahabee-Gittens and Gonzales-
del-Rey’s study (2004), for example, 64 % of guardians of children defined an ear infec-
tion as a “red, swollen ear”, while only 12% knew that an ear infection involved fluid 
within the middle/inner ear.  
2.1.3 Systematic knowledge divergence and conversation 
In the previous sections, the characteristics of systematic knowledge differences be-
tween experts and laypersons have been outlined. Hereby, expert knowledge was de-
scribed as being highly integrated and interconnected. Therefore, when conversing 
about a certain issue within their domain, experts can easily retrieve a great amount of 
knowledge that is organized according to domain-inherent principles. Laypersons, on 
the contrary, dispose of domain knowledge that often consists of isolated bits of knowl-
edge; they also hold wrong theories and beliefs.  
What conversational implications do these knowledge characteristics have? When 
experts converse with experts, their knowledge organization enables them to exchange 
information efficiently. When layperson converse with laypersons, their lay type of 
knowledge organization generally does not hinder successful communication either. 
However, when experts and laypersons converse with each other, they enter conversa-
tion from very divergent perspectives (in that they have quantitatively and qualitatively 
very diverging knowledge prerequisites). Hereby, laypersons cannot anticipate the ex-
perts’ perspective, because they have not gone through the formation which has shaped 
that perspective. Experts, on the other hand, also have difficulties in understanding or 
anticipating the layperson’s perspective (cf. Jucks, 2001). Thus, as Bromme, Rambow 
and Nückles (2001) have shown, experts often have difficulties in estimating the 
knowledge of a lay population (cf. Rambow, 2000). Hayes and Bajzek (under review), 
in a recent study, presented their participants with lists with a total of 85 technical 
terms (like Aurora Borealis or Cephalic). The participants had to estimate the under-
standing of the terms in two lay populations (college freshmen and college graduates). 
The authors found that when the participants themselves were very familiar with the 
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terms (and were thus ‘concept experts’, so to say) they substantially overestimated the 
percentage of laypersons that would know this term.  
In addition to the fact that experts have difficulties in estimating lay knowledge, lay-
persons also often overestimate their own knowledge and do not realize the incom-
pleteness of their theories (Ahn & Kalish, 2000). In a study series conducted by Rozen-
blit and Keil (2002), laypersons initially overestimated their knowledge on complex 
phenomena (e.g., how a heart pumps blood). After having to explain or answer knowl-
edge questions, however, their self-estimations dropped substantially. As other studies 
have shown, laypersons also tend to overestimate how well they have understood new 
information (Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982).  
 
Taking the above-described knowledge divergence and the difficulties that both ex-
perts and laypersons have in estimating lay knowledge into account, it becomes evident 
that in expert-layperson communication, successful knowledge communication is put 
at a considerable risk. Hereby, the experts have the difficult task of consulting their 
expert knowledge but transforming it in a way that is understandable for laypersons 
(Jucks, Schulte-Löbbert, & Bromme, 2007). In order to accomplish this adaptation, and 
to bridge the knowledge divergence, the expert needs to use all available information 
about her interlocutor’s knowledge. One of these sources of information is those in-
stances in the lay collocutors’ diction where lay (erroneous) understanding becomes 
evident. To what extent do experts take this information into account when formulating 
an utterance for a lay interlocutor? This will be addressed in two of the presented stud-
ies (studies II and III), and will be discussed in more detail at later points of this disser-
tation.  
 
The conversational situation of systematic knowledge divergence that has been de-
scribed in this section holds for expert-knowledge communication in informal settings 
(e.g., medical laypersons consulting medical experts); however, it does also apply to the 
formal educational settings of schools and universities, where experts communicate 
with laypersons on a one-to-one basis in the setting of tutoring. Considerable research 
has been dedicated to this instructional method. In the next section, tutoring research 
will be introduced, with a focus on those research results in that field which are rele-
vant in the current context. 
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2.2 Human tutoring 
Pickering: 
You should have heard the ooh's and ah's; 
Ev'ry one wond’ring who she was.  
Higgins: 
You'd think they'd never seen a lady before... 
Pickering: 
[…] They thought she was ecstatic 
And so damn’d aristocratic, 
And they never knew  
That you did it! 
From My Fair Lady 
 
 
In My fair lady, phonetics professor Higgins successfully refines the speech and man-
ners of poor flower girl Eliza Doolittle into those of an upper-class lady. This outcome 
not only surprises his fellow linguist Pickering, but also illustrates the beneficial effects 
of tutoring, that is, of an interaction between a knowledgeable tutor and a less knowl-
edgeable tutee in order for the tutee to learn about a subject matter . Not only in litera-
ture, though, but also in empirical Educational Psychology, human one-to-one tutoring 
has been demonstrated to be a very effective form of instruction (Bloom, 1984). In a 
meta-analysis of findings from 65 independent evaluations of tutoring programs, 
Cohen, Kulik and Kulik (1982) found that in far the majority of the studies, students 
that had participated in a tutoring program outperformed students taught in a conven-
tional classroom setting in terms of achievement; they also developed a more positive 
attitude towards the respective subjects in which they were tutored. As Lepper and 
Chabay (1988) point out, tutoring also enhances the students’ motivation and feeling of 
competence.  
In school and university settings, tutoring is often done by so-called novice tutors, 
that is, by individuals that are highly knowledgeable about the content domain but have 
no formal education in instructional skills (Cohen et al., 1982; Fitz-Gibbon, 1977; cf. 
Chi, Siler, Jeong, Yamauchi, & Hausman, 2001; cf. Graesser & Person, 1994). However, 
notwithstanding the fact that tutors very often are not trained pedagogically, tutoring 
is, as described, rather effective. Therefore, it is not surprising that a substantial 
amount of research has been dedicated to studying the repertoire of different moves 
that tutors undertake while tutoring a single tutee as well as while fostering learning in 
peer tutee groups. Hereby, a variety of different domains have been investigated, like 
for instance programming (Merrill, Reiser, Merrill, & Landes, 1995) or reading (Crom-
ley & Azevedo, 2005).   
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The research on tutorial moves was also driven forth by the fact that developers of 
intelligent tutoring systems were in need of promising tutoring moves that could be 
emulated by intelligent systems (cf., Chi et al. 2001; Cromley & Azevedo, 2005; 
McArthur, Stasz, Zmuidzinas, 1990; Shah, Evens, Michael, & Rovick, 2002; Van Lehn, 
Siler, Murray, Yamauchi, Baggett, 2003). Consequently, studies did not only scrutinize 
human tutors and their actions, but also used different versions of computer tutors to 
investigate the impact of different tutoring moves on learning outcomes. Corbett and 
Anderson (1991), for instance, compared four different versions of their intelligent tu-
tor CMU Lisp tutor. This tutor is an instructional program that assists students in 
learning programming skills in the computer language Lisp. The four compared ver-
sions differed in the type of error feedback that they provided: In the standard imme-
diate feedback and correction condition, the tutor immediately interrupted the student 
when an error was made, presented a feedback message, deleted the error, and asked 
the student to try again. In the error flagging condition, the tutor immediately flagged 
an error by displaying it in bold on the computer screen; students could choose when to 
go back and fix the error. Also, they could ask for a comment on the error. In the third 
condition, the feedback on demand condition, the Lisp tutor did not provide any com-
ment on the student’s activities unless the student asked the tutor to check over the 
code. The tutor then provided feedback on whether or not an error was found. Last, in 
the no feedback condition, the tutor did not provide any feedback to the students at all. 
Only after the student indicated that she had finished an exercise, the tutor reports 
whether or not the solution was correct. If not, the student was allowed to go back and 
try again. All participants worked through five tutoring lessons, with programming 
tests after the second and the fifth lesson. Results showed that there were hardly any 
differences in performance on the tests (and thus in learning gain) between the three 
groups that received feedback (standard immediate feedback and correction, error flag-
ging, and feedback on demand). Students in the no feedback condition, however, per-
formed consistently worse. The results suggest error feedback to be a useful tutoring 
strategy (cf. Corbett, Koedinger, & Hadley, 2001, who also stretch the importance of 
error feedback for tutoring). This is of high relevance in the current context, which fo-
cuses on the tutorial moves of medical experts especially with regard to the reaction to 
layperson’s displayed erroneous thinking. Also, it is important to note that error correc-
tion is more effective if the tutees realize (metacognitively) that they made an error (Chi 
et al., 2001).  
 
While such experimental comparisons of different tutoring techniques provide use-
ful information on the efficiency of tutorial moves (for instance error feedback), mere 
descriptions of what human tutors do need to be considered with caution. According to 
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Chi et al. (2001), research studies that focus on the identification and analyses of tutors’ 
moves take a tutor-centered approach, that is, they tacitly assume that it is the tutors’ 
effectiveness which makes tutoring superior to other forms of learning: 
“By and large, research programs that study human tutoring 
take this tutor-centered approach in tacitly assuming that tu-
toring effectiveness derives from the tutors’ skill. That is, it is 
what the tutors say and when they say it that causes tutor-
ing to be more effective than unaided studying or classroom 
instruction. The conception is that tutors are agile at tailor-
ing and microadapting their instruction to the students’ un-
derstanding.” (p. 474, original emphasis) 
Such a conceptualization of the tutors’ activities entails that tutors choose their tuto-
rial moves according to what they deem best for their current tutee in a concrete situa-
tion, and adapt their behavior accordingly. A number of research studies, however, 
have found that tutoring is not as adaptive to the concrete tutee as one might think. Or, 
as Chi et al. (2004) put it, “the mere fact that tutors tend to dominate the tutoring ses-
sions and undertake numerous tutoring moves does not necessarily lead to the conclu-
sion that their tutoring tactics are skillfully executed. […] In other words, are tutors in 
fact adaptive?” (p.364). 
 
Paucity of adjustment in human tutoring 
Putnam (1987) investigated six female mathematics tutors (in this case experienced 
teachers) in live and simulated tutoring sessions. In the live sessions, tutors and tutees 
were seated side by side at a table while they carried out two 20-minute tutoring ses-
sions. Tutors were told to use any procedures or techniques that they thought to be ap-
propriate for tutoring addition operations. In the simulated sessions, each teacher tu-
tored six computer-simulated tutees consecutively in one 2.5-hour session. Hereby, 
tutors interacted with the simulated students in that they generated and presented ad-
dition problems and selected instructional moves from a predetermined set of moves. 
Both live and simulated tutoring sessions were recorded and analyzed.  
In live tutoring, almost all tutee errors and incomplete responses were corrected by 
the tutor. In only 7 percent of the cases in which an error occurred, however, the tutors 
went into the cause for the tutee error, i.e., did they ask the tutees about their reasoning 
(as for instance “What were you thinking when you added that”, p.27). In all other 
cases, the teachers did not make any move to determine the nature of the errors or in-
complete responses more precisely. After 41 percent of tutee errors the tutors taught 
the tutee any content (i.e., a fact, procedure or response); in all other cases, they 
seemed to content themselves with having arrived at the correct response. As for error 
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correction in the simulated tutoring, the tutors had the option of choosing additional 
problems for the simulated student to work on before trying to correct the source of the 
error. However, only after two out of the many errors that the simulated students 
made, the teacher reacted with choosing another problem for the student to work on. In 
all other cases, after an error occurred, the teachers immediately reacted with instruc-
tional moves designed to correct the error. With regard to the sequence in which prob-
lems for the students were chosen, the results indicated that in both live and simulated 
tutoring, the tutors seemed to move through a systematic sequence of problems. Thus, 
while tutoring different students, the way of tutoring was rather consistent.  
From the results, the author concludes that “rather than a thorough diagnosis of the 
students’ misconceptions or faulty procedures providing the structure for the topics to 
be covered, a sequence of problem types – the curriculum script – appeared to be the 
primary determinant of the agenda for tutoring sessions” (p. 35). These results are fur-
ther strengthened by the work of McArthur et al. (1990), whose expert algebra tutors 
asked only very general diagnostic questions (as for instance “Do you understand”, p. 
211) which did not refer to concrete errors made by the respective students.   
As a consequence of these results, Putnam (1987) formulates the curriculum script 
model (see figure 2-1): Each tutor disposes of a so-called curriculum script (in this case 
one for addition) that resides in long-term memory; this script provides the overall 
structure (or the macrostructure) of the tutoring session. Upon this foundation, the 
concrete agenda (or the microstructure) of a session can vary according to student per-
formance and the tutor’s model of the student, the latter rather being – as the results 
suggest - a fuzzy impression built up during the tutorial session than a highly detailed 
representation of the student’s correct and incorrect conceptions and procedural 
knowledge.  
 
With the curriculum script model, Putnam (1987) provides an interesting account 
which considers several important components that influence tutors’ actions and the 
tutorial process. Thus, as the illustration shows, the concrete agenda of a tutoring script 
is predetermined by the tutor’s internal representation of an ordered set of problem 
types, by the tutor’s overall goals for tutoring, as well as by a general representation of 
likely tutee misconceptions. These components embody the curriculum script, which 
determines the overall structure of a tutoring session. To these, another important as-
pect can be added which is suggested in by McArthur et al. (1990), and that is the peda-
gogical knowledge of the tutor, which also influences tutorial planning and thus, tutor-
ing. The resulting agenda for a tutorial lesson is then only modified (and not deter-
mined) by the concrete tutee’s performance. 
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 Figure 2-1. Curriculum script model (adapted from Putnam, 1987, p. 40)  
 
Other and more recent studies have confirmed that tutoring is often not tailored to 
the tutee. In an analysis of protocols of tutoring interactions between a tutor and a col-
lege student on physics problems via telephone and computer, Chi (1996) puts the fo-
cus on the student’s misconceptions and on how they are handled by the tutor during 
the tutorial process. In the protocols, the author found seven different tutee misconcep-
tions. These were not necessarily displayed in written equations or utterances, and they 
were also not necessarily elicited by the tutor. Rather, they were deduced from in-
stances of absence of what the student ought to say and by alternative actions that the 
student took. For instance, the tutee had the problem of confusing mass with weight; 
also, she did not realize that the F in ‘F=ma’ was the sum of forces and not a single 
force. Out of the seven knowledge pieces, only three were learned in the sense that the 
tutee exhibited the correct application of the knowledge piece in relation to how she 
had used it before (e.g., while she initially confused mass and weight, she then used and 
applied the correct conceptions on various occasions).  
The tutorial protocols were scrutinized with regard to which tutorial moves had 
caused learning and which had not. In terms of an adaptation to the tutee, three results 
should be pointed out in particular. Firstly, there were many occasions in which the 
tutor ignored the student’s openly exhibited confusion: Out of the 41 tutorial actions 
coded for one of the problems, the tutee manifested confusion on six occasions. In five 
of these cases, the tutor ignored the confusion rather than clarifying it. Secondly, in-
stead of diagnosing and addressing the tutee’s misunderstanding, the tutor mostly 
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seemed to pursue his own plan respectively his own two subplans – which were identi-
fied as making the tutee (a) draw all forces on a diagram and (b) sum the forces – dur-
ing the tutorial session. In contrast to the tutor’s problems with diagnosing misunder-
standing that the tutee had exhibited, he was quite competent at assessing those in-
stances of knowledge problems that the tutor himself had represented as difficult for 
students. He then assessed whether the tutee had the knowledge also when the tutee 
had not exhibited any lack of knowledge or misunderstanding. Thirdly, the tutor gave 
several long-winded didactic explanations that were not tailored to (i.e., that did not 
address) the misunderstanding of the tutee.  
While Chi (1996) concentrates on just one tutor/tutee dyad, Chi et al. (2004) analyze 
the tutoring process of eleven tutor/tutee pairs. In the one-to-one tutoring sessions, 
novice tutors and their tutees engaged face-to-face in a tutorial dialogue on passages of 
a textbook on the human circulatory system. The tutorial sessions were audiotaped and 
transcribed. Overall, there were 191 incidents where students self-initiatedly (i.e. not 
prompted by tutors’ questions or scaffolding) exposed their knowledge deficits. Of 
these 191, only 91 were addressed by the tutors (in that they gave a content-related re-
sponse). To investigate tutors’ monitoring of and assumptions about the tutee’s knowl-
edge, every tutoring session was interrupted twice and the tutee was asked to draw and 
describe her view of the circulatory system. In addition, the tutors separately drew and 
described their perception of their tutee’s understanding at that point. Analyses of 
these tutors’ contributions showed that tutors overestimated the tutees’ correct under-
standing. Furthermore, tutors did not acknowledge false beliefs that tutees held about 
issues not mentioned in the textbook.  
 
Thus, Chi et al. (2004) assess tutors’ representations of tutee knowledge by analyz-
ing how tutors describe their tutee’s knowledge during the interruptions of the tutorial 
dialogue. This description, however, does address the tutors’ anticipation of the tutee’s 
knowledge in general. It does not focus specifically on those tutee knowledge deficits 
that are expressed self-initiatedly during the tutoring session; the tutors’ representa-
tion of these knowledge deficits is, as described above, assessed indirectly by analyzing 
to which degree these knowledge deficits are addressed immediately by the tutors. 
Hereby, not only the direct feedback about the incorrectness of the knowledge deficit 
was rated as addressing the knowledge deficit, but also a mere provision of the correct 
knowledge. From the fact that many of these incidents are not addressed, the authors 
conclude that the tutors have difficulties in detecting these displayed, unexpected 
knowledge deficits. From such an analysis of tutors’ reactions to a tutee’s uttering of 
knowledge deficits, however, the effects of uttered knowledge deficits on the tutors’ 
knowledge representation are not measured directly and differentiatedly; this also 
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holds for the other studies described in this section that analyze the tutors’ representa-
tion of their tutee’s knowledge. 
In study II of this dissertation, these effects will be measured more directly for the 
informal tutorial setting of email health counseling with the help of a knowledge antici-
pation questionnaire. Due to the fact that in this study, the participating expert tutors 
will be confronted with the same self-initiated tutee knowledge deficits, the question-
naire can measure the effects of the display of knowledge deficits on the tutors’ knowl-
edge anticipation separately for both beliefs-related and not-related issues (cf. chapter 
5).  
 
 
To sum up, we have seen that while tutoring is a very effective form of instruction, 
the presented tutoring studies have described that tutors often do not build up an 
elaborate mental representation of their tutee’s knowledge. Also, they often ignore 
when a tutee voices confusion during the tutorial process. Frequently, they do not trace 
and correct tutee errors. The tutor’s moves are often not tailored to the tutee; instead, 
tutors seem to follow a preconceived tutoring plan, which Putnam (1987) called ‘cur-
riculum script’. In addition to these results, it needs to be pointed out that tutors seem 
to be fairly convinced of their own tutoring efficiency (DeSmet, Van Keer, & Valcke, 
2007).  
 
However, if it is not a skillful adaptation to the tutee that makes tutoring so effective, 
what is it then? Some authors have argued that often in tutoring, in contrast to class-
room instruction, active knowledge construction processes are triggered (e.g., Graesser 
& Person, 1994). Thus, as Chi et al. (2001) point out, tutors often tutor in a way that 
encourages students to self-correct their line of reasoning. Thus, a tutor would for in-
stance ask Now tell me how you got that answer rather than directly stating that the 
answer was wrong and providing the correct answer; or, she would give hints that pave 
the way towards a self-generated answer rather than providing it. In one-to-one tutor-
ing, there is more room for student activities that foster active knowledge construction, 
such as self-explaining, question asking, forming hypotheses and testing them, forming 
analogies, exploring different strategies etc.; these activities foster deep understanding 
and enhance learning (c.f., Chi, 1996; Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & Lavancher, 1994; Renkl, 
1997). This constructive and more self-regulated learning on part of the student, how-
ever, requires a longer and more turn-taking interaction between tutor and tutee which 
is the case in most face-to-face tutoring settings. In many settings of written online 
tutoring, however, the interaction is restricted to very few turns. As a consequence, the 
adaptivity of the tutorial moves and contributions to the tutee are vitally important; 
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and errors have to be corrected instantly. Computer-mediated tutoring is a relevant 
phenomenon which needs to be focused on in educational science: 
 
Written online tutoring 
As a response to the fast rise of the importance of information and communication 
technology, the computer-mediated tutorial support (often via online devices) has also 
become increasingly important and popular in many educational settings, such as 
school classrooms (Kramarski & Ritkof, 2002), open and distance education (Zhang, 
Perris, & Yeung, 2005) and university seminars (Paechter, Schweizer, & Weidenmann, 
2000). Thus, for instance, big lectures often have a tutor for student support and the 
students write an email to the tutor when they have a question about certain contents of 
the lecture. There are many advantages to online tutorial support; thus, online tutorial 
support might enhance a learner’s motivation. Also, flexibility is gained as students can 
get support also outside of the time and space constraints put by classroom settings and 
set office hours. The forms in which tutors can support their tutees online are various; a 
common, asynchronous kind of one-to-one assistance being tutorial support via email 
(Hampel & Stickler, 2005).  
 
In the previous sections, the characteristics of expert-layperson communication have 
been depicted (section 2.1). Also, tutoring research has been described (foregoing parts 
of this section 2.2). As already announced in the introduction of this dissertation, the 
two conversational settings of expert-layperson communication in informal settings 
and of tutorial dialogue in formal learning settings will be viewed as being in principal 
structurally equivalent. In the next section, some remarks shall be made on the reasons 
why these two conversational settings can be viewed as structurally equivalent. While 
thus, for the current purpose, the similarities between written tutoring and written ex-
pert-layperson communication will be emphasized, it certainly has to be kept in mind 
that there are also important differences (see Bromme & Rambow, 2001, who draw a 
distinction between expert-layperson communication and more “classic” instructional 
settings; cf. section 8.2). 
2.2.1 Tutoring and expert-layperson communication 
On the one hand, tutoring in formal educational settings is a communicational situa-
tion in which an expert who has gone through a long formation (as desecribed in sec-
tion 2.1.1) converses with a layperson that is approaching dialogue from a naïve per-
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spective (see section 2.1.2). As a result, we can say that tutorial dialogue is a form of 
expert-layperson communication.  
On the other hand, when experts converse with laypersons in a counseling situation, 
they do interact with the layperson with the aim of conveying knowledge to that layper-
son by means of one-to-one interaction. Even though this one-to-one interaction does 
not take place within the frame of an institutional, formal learning context, we can thus 
say that the expert tutors the layperson in a broader sense of the term.  
 
By drawing this parallel5 between tutoring and expert-layperson communication, the 
theoretical approaches and empirical results of the two research strands can be related 
to each other. Concretely, in this dissertation, the conversational behavior of medical 
experts will be investigated in the context of email health counseling (cf. studies II and 
III), the results will then be compared to the behavior of tutors as described in litera-
ture on formal tutoring. The results will be discussed from a psycholinguistic viewpoint. 
Hereby, also the implications for tutoring research will be discussed (see chapter 8). 
 
While for an analysis of experts’ conversational behavior it is important to take into 
account the particularities of conversational settings (e.g., the systematic knowledge 
divergence), it is, as will be shown, also necessary to consider the impact of generic 
mechanisms of human communication. Therefore, in the next section, two basic con-
versational principles will be introduced.  
                                                        
5 Despite the described parallel, it needs to be pointed out that there are also differences between formal and informal 
tutoring who also exert a certain influence on the tutorial dialogue: In the counseling setting, the expert’s task is to 
explain issues to the layperson; these are issues that the layperson had asked for and that are relevant to her in her 
current situation. Thus, the layperson is not so interested in gaining in-depth knowledge of the domain, but rather 
needs information in a rather limited area. In formal tutoring, however, the tutors need to convey important princi-
ples and broad basic knowledge from a knowledge domain to their tutees. For this aim, tutor and tutee need to dive 
deeper into the domain than in informal tutoring. Also, tutors in formal tutoring need to obey the restrictions of the 
curriculum in the respective educational setting, while the tutors in informal counseling can chose freely which con-
tents they deem relevant and want to explain.  
Pragmatic principles in conversation  21 
2.3 Pragmatic principles in conversation 
In the 1970s, pragmatics emerged as a subfield of linguistics emerged that concentrated 
on speakers’ utterances and intentions under consideration of the concrete linguistic 
and situational contexts (cf., Katz, 1977; Levinson, 1983). One of the basic ideas of this 
view on language is that interlocutors follow certain principles when communicating to 
each other. In line with this idea, two important principles that speakers follow when 
producing utterances will be depicted in the following: First, the cooperative principle, 
introduced by Herbert P. Grice in 1975 (section 2.3.1) will be described. This principle 
deals with the adaptation of a speaker’s messages to her addressee. More recent ac-
counts which also address this mechanism will be described in section 2.3.2. Section 
2.3.3, then, will focus on the principle of politeness, concentrating on the politeness 
theory of Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson (1987).  
2.3.1 Cooperative Principle  
In his seminal theory, Grice (1975) states that interlocutors follow a principle when they 
communicate that makes it possible for them to communicate effectively: The coopera-
tive principle (p.45, original emphasis): 
„We might then formulate a rough general principle which 
participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, 
namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted pur-
pose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are en-
gaged. One might label this the COOPERATIVE PRINCI-
PLE”.  
Grice formulated four conversational maxims6 in order to describe how interlocutors 
produced and understood conversational outcomes in accordance with the cooperative 
principle. These maxims that specify the cooperative principle are:  
• Maxim of quantity:  
o Make your contribution as informative as is required.  
o Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
• Maxim of quality:  
o Do not say what you believe to be false.  
                                                        
6  Strictly speaking, Grice (1975) distinguishes the Cooperative Principles into four categories (Quantity, Quality, Rela-
tion and Manner), listing specific maxims under each. As in scientific literature, however, his four categories are gen-
erally being referred to as maxims, I shall stick to that label as well.  
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o Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.  
• Maxim of relation:  
o Be relevant.  
• Maxim of manner:  
o Be perspicuous, or specifically: 
1. Avoid obscurity. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
4. Be orderly. 
 
According to Grice (1975), people generally adhere to these maxims; this makes 
communication efficient in the first place: By adhering to these conversational conven-
tions, interlocutors become able to interpret one another’s utterance, which means that 
they do not only to grasp the semantic meaning of the utterance, but also its so-called 
conversational implicature (Grice, 1975). This conversational implicature is the impli-
cation that a message contains that can only be deduced from the concrete linguistic 
and extra-linguistic context. Thus, for instance, when friend A has come to visit friend 
B in the countryside7, and enters the house commenting that she has run out of petrol, 
friend B might tell her that “there is a garage round the corner”. Hereby, rather than 
only informing about the fact that there is a garage round the corner, friend B’s mes-
sage implicates that the garage might be open and likely to sell petrol. By doing as he 
did, friend B has adhered to the conversational maxims: In the given context, his mes-
sage was relevant, perspicuous and informative to the right degree.  
 
In a nutshell, speakers, according to Grice, have a communicative intention when 
speaking, and design their utterances under consideration of the concrete situation and 
their concrete addressee.  
 
Also more recent linguistic accounts have focused on the adaptation to the ad-
dressee. In the following, the communicational theory of Herbert H. Clark (e.g., 1992, 
1996) will be introduced, which – based on the idea of a cooperation in dialogue as 
proposed by Grice – focuses specifically on the impact of knowledge, or more precisely 
of knowledge that each conversation partner has and assumes the interlocutor to have, 
on conversation. This makes this account especially relevant for the current context, 
since in conversation between experts and laypersons, the speech partners’ knowledge 
is a crucial factor (see section 2.1.3). The account also describes the cognitive processes 
which underlie an adaptation to the knowledge of one’s addressee. 
                                                        
7 Example adapted from Grice (1975), p. 51. 
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Sharing common ground- Clark’s theory of communication 
In his communicational theory, Clark (1996) describes language use in conversation 
not only as an individual, but also as a social process. As such, communication is a joint 
action that requires coordination between the communicational partners on both a 
semantic as well as a linguistic level (e.g., with regard to the way that utterances are 
sequenced).  
 
In order to be able to understand each other and to do this coordination, the interlocu-
tors need a shared referential framework, a so-called common ground8. This common 
ground entails knowledge about „surroundings, activities, perceptions, emotions, plans, 
interests” (Clark 1996, p. 92) that the communicational partners believe they share. 
Hereby, the interlocutors only assume and do not know as a fact that the information is 
shared; „when [we] act 'on the basis of our common ground', we are in fact acting on 
our individual beliefs or assumptions about what is in our common ground” (Clark, 
1996, p. 96, original emphasis).  
As it is impossible to be exhaustively informed about the interlocutor’s knowledge 
and exchange information on the knowledge of the respective other explicitly and con-
tinuously during conversation, speakers use heuristics to estimate common ground 
(and then adapt their messages accordingly). Hereby, relevant information is obtained 
from both communal common ground as well as personal common ground (cf. Clark & 
Marshall, 1981).  
 
Communal Common Ground. Speakers use information about the cultural communi-
ties that the interlocutor belongs to (e.g., nationality, religion, political convictions, pro-
fession, gender, or interests). Each person belongs to a multitude of cultural communi-
ties, whose members share a common ground in that they share a certain amount of 
“facts, beliefs and assumptions about objects, norms of behavior, conventions, proce-
dures, skills and even ineffable experiences” (Clark 1996, p. 112). Knowledge about the 
cultural communities of the collocutor helps estimate the common ground by applica-
tion of the so-called community membership heuristic.  
 
Personal Common Ground. In conversation, interlocutors also share experiences; these 
can be used to estimate common ground with the help of two heuristics. When applying 
the physical copresence heuristic, interlocutors assume that what is perceived during 
                                                        
8 In addition to the term common ground, a variety of other terms are used by researchers to label shared meaning in 
conversations of two or more individuals; this creates a certain conceptual confusion. In a literature review, Akker-
man, Van den Bossche, Admiraal, Gijselaers, Segers, Simons and Kirschner (2007) analyzed the terminology used in 
22 studies to bring some structure into the ways terms are being used and operationalized.   
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conversation (auditorily, olfactorily or visibly) is also perceived by the other(s) and that 
it therefore constitutes common ground. The linguistic copresence heuristic, on the 
other side, implies that terms and semantic content already mentioned in a conversa-
tion can be considered common ground.  
 
Thus, as described, heuristics enable interlocutors to make assumptions about the 
knowledge of their collocutor. These assumptions are helpful in order for the interlocu-
tors to make the necessary adaptations of their utterances to the communicational 
needs of their addressees. This adaptation is called audience design (Clark & Murphy, 
1982): „We don’t expect our utterances to be understandable by just anyone. They are 
intended for particular listeners with particular momentary thoughts and beliefs. Let us 
call this feature of utterances audience design” (p. 287, original emphasis; cf. recipient 
design in Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974)). By tailoring one’s utterances to the ad-
dressee, lengthy and unnecessary explanations can be avoided, which increases com-
municational effectiveness. While both community membership and physical co-
presence heuristics can be used from the very beginning of a conversation, that is, from 
the first utterance made, the linguistic copresence plays a role only after the first com-
municational turn.  
As the adaptation is based on heuristics, therefore on estimations and not on actual 
knowledge about what the interlocutor knows, speakers need some feedback on 
whether their utterances have been understood. Hereby, a process is central that Clark 
has called grounding: „The hypothesis is that people try to ground what they do to-
gether. To ground a thing, in my terminology, is to establish it as part of common 
ground well enough for current purposes” (Clark, 1996, p. 221, original emphasis). 
Grounding is based on two principles: When two (or more) individuals engage in com-
munication, they will look for indications of whether their joint action is successful 
(principle of joint closure). While doing so, they will try to do this with the least joint 
effort possible (principle of least collaborative effort; cf. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).  
As Clark and Schaefer (1989) point out, the grounding process entails two phases: in 
the presentation phase, the speaker sends a signal (i.e. an utterance) to the addressee 
and waits for feedback on its understandability for the addressee. In the ensuing accep-
tance phase, the addressee sends a feedback signal which contains information on 
whether the utterance has been understood or not. Thus, if an utterance has been un-
derstood, the speaker will find pieces of evidence in the addressee’s feedback signal, for 
instance nodding, smiling, paraphrasing, frowning or utterances like „uh huh“, „I see“ 
or „yeah“. The acceptance of an utterance does not need to be explicit, however; one 
can also implicitly accept an utterance by going on with the next relevant turn (Bren-
nan, 1991).  
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In a nutshell, Clark describes that both communicational partners seek and provide 
evidence of their understanding; they want to get to the joint conviction of understand-
ing each other.  
 
Just like the Gricean account, Clark’s view on communication is a collaborative one; 
the communicational partners use heuristics to build up a mental representation of the 
other’s knowledge, which in turn is used to audience-design one’s utterances. While 
this is an intriguing view on dialogue, there has been a substantial controversy on the 
cognitive processes that underlie adaptation in communication.  
 
Audience design vs. automatic alignment 
On the one hand, a substantial amount of empirical evidence shows that interlocutors 
take into account their addressees’ perspective in utterance production and compre-
hension. Thus, for instance, New York City connoisseurs label city sights differently 
when talking to non-locals than when talking to New Yorkers (Isaacs & Clark, 1987) 
and medical experts give linguistically and contentually differing answers when an-
swering the same question to a medical layperson vs. to a physician of a different exper-
tise domain (Jucks, Bromme, & Runde, 2003). In a study by Fussell and Krauss (1992), 
participants adapted their messages to the estimated degree of recognizability for their 
collocutors9. In an experimental study of addressee’s eye movements, Hanna, Tanen-
haus and Trueswell (2003) found that addressees in a referential communication task 
were more likely to look at and spent more time looking at objects when they were part 
of common ground than when they were not. These and many other studies clearly 
demonstrate that interlocutors can and do take into account the perspective of the re-
spective other in communication. Sometimes, as Hanna et al.’s (2003) work shows, 
they seem to be doing this very early in language processing (cf. Nadig & Sedivy, 2002).   
On the other hand, however, empirical evidence has shown that often, the perspec-
tive of the interlocutor is left out in both utterance comprehension and production (e.g., 
Brown & Dell, 1987; Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). Thus, for in-
stance, Horton and Keysar (1996) showed that participants adapted their utterances to 
whether their interlocutors also saw a series of aside objects that were presented in line 
with objects that had to be described. When put under time pressure, however, the ef-
fect disappeared. Jucks et al. (2003) described that when experts were provided with 
either a keyword list or an illustration in order to aid them in formulating their answer, 
experts’ explanations were less oriented towards the addressee when experts were pro-
vided with the illustration; in other words, the illustration impinged on experts’ expla-
                                                        
9 Also, research findings from studies that focus on adaptation on a lexical (word choice) level, that is, the so-called 
lexical entrainment, have been adduced as instances of adapation in communication (cf. section 2.4.3). 
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nations even though it did not constitute common ground (cf. the notion of representa-
tional guidance by Suthers and Hundhausen, 2002). 
 
Various models were brought forth that try to account for the fact that the perspec-
tive of the other is sometimes taken into account and at other times neglected (cf. Barr 
& Keysar, 2006; Rossnagel, 2000). These positions are located on a continuum in 
which at one end, the specific interlocutor is always considered in utterance production 
and comprehension and at the other end, language processing is initially egocentric and 
based on mere accessibility and the partner is only taken into account in a second, non-
mandatory step (cf. Schober, 2006).  
An account closer to the latter than the first endpoint is the interactive alignment 
model, brought forth by Martin Pickering and Simon Garrod (Pickering & Garrod, 
2004; Garrod & Pickering, 2004), which stretches the importance of priming processes 
as mechanism for adaptation in ordinary conversation. According to this account, inter-
locutors do not build up a mental model of the collocutor’s mental state routinely; on 
the contrary, performing inferences about common ground is seen as an optional strat-
egy that interlocutors employ only when resources allow and when a simpler mecha-
nism is ineffective. This simpler mechanism, which normally causes adaptation in 
communication, is a “primitive and resource-free priming mechanism” (Pickering & 
Garrod, 200, p. 172), and is described as follows: In conversation, each interlocutor 
builds up a situation model, that is, a representation of the communicational setting 
that contains information about “space, time, causality, intentionality and currently 
relevant individuals” (Garrod & Pickering, 2004, p.8). In ordinary conversation, the 
situation models of the interlocutors overlap to a big extent; and hearing an utterance 
by interlocutor B will activate a particular aspect of interlocutor A’s own situation 
model. As, according to the model, the same representations are used in comprehen-
sion and production, this will make it more likely that the person will use an utterance 
consistent with that aspect of the model, thereby causing alignment. The alignment in 
conversation takes place simultaneously and automatically on the various levels of con-
versation (i.e., with regard to the situation models as well as with regard to semantic 
representations etc.). Misalignment incidents are repaired by basic interactive repair 
processes, which also do not involve a modeling of the other’s mind. Only when these 
fail, inferences processes are performed.   
While thus, the emphasis of the Garrod and Pickering account is on priming, Wil-
liam Horton and Richard Gerrig (2005a, b) assume that interlocutors take into account 
each other’s perspective and audience-design their messages whenever the relevant 
memory representations become accessible within the appropriate time course, that is, 
during ongoing speech production processes. Thus, information on the addressee is 
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processed parallely to other relevant information whenever accessible, not subse-
quently. The authors make a claim for the need to view the cognitive processes involved 
in audience design as part of general memory processes. In a similar vein, Hanna et al. 
(2003) suggest that it depends on the salience and constraints of other available infor-
mation whether context information (which includes information about the addressee) 
has strong and immediate or weaker and delayed effects on language processing.  
At the current point in the debate10, no model that accounts for the obtained re-
search findings has reached common sense status. 
 
In sum, abundant empirical evidence has shown that interlocutors sometimes do 
take into account the other’s knowledge in comprehension and production and at other 
times, comprehension and production are driven by mere accessibility. In the context 
of this dissertation, it is especially interesting to note that despite the lack of a definite 
model that could explain when adaptation takes place and when it does not, a variety of 
factors have been discussed which seem to condition if and how messages are adapted 
to a model of the other’s knowledge (cf. Schober, 2004). Hereby, those factors which 
concern the characteristics of the conversational setting are especially relevant. Thus, 
Pickering and Garrod (2004) point out that their account was developed for “face-to-
face spontaneous dyadic conversation between equals with short contributions” (p. 187) 
and assume that in conversational settings that deviate from this, the processes of 
alignment will be less automatic. This suggestion is relevant in the current context 
which focuses on email communication. Do experts consider their lay interlocutor’s 
knowledge and adapt to it in the context of email health counseling? This will be ad-
dressed in studies II and III. The context of email health counseling will be described in 
more detail in section 2.4.   
                                                        
10 In addition to the referenced studies, there are numerous other contributions to this debate, see e.g., Barr & Keysar, 
2002, Gerrig, Brennan, & Ohaeri, 2000, Keysar & Horton, 1998, Metzing & Brennan, 2003, Polichak & Gerrig, 1998, 
as well as the open peer commentaries to Pickering & Garrod (2004; pp. 190-211), inter alia.   
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2.3.2 Politeness Principle 
“It's very provoking”, Humpty Dumpty said after a long  
silence, looking away from Alice as he spoke, “to be called an 
egg - very!'”  
“I said you looked like an egg, Sir,” Alice gently explained. 
“And some eggs are very pretty, you know”, she added,  
hoping to turn her remark into a sort of a compliment.  
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass 
 
In the last section, issues regarding the adaptation of a conversant towards her inter-
locutor have been discussed, parting from the Gricean notion of a cooperative principle 
in conversation. Especially in those contexts in which there is a big knowledge diver-
gence between the interlocutors, the cooperation in form of an adaptation to the (lay) 
collocutor is a necessary prerequisite for successful knowledge communication. How-
ever, the cooperative principle was not the only principle formulated for conversation. 
On the contrary, another important principle was – at least in early accounts – explic-
itly based on the observation that speakers often violate the Gricean maxims in order to 
achieve conversational goals other than efficient communication: Imagine, for instance, 
a godmother who travels from Cologne to the rather far away city of Leipzig in order to 
see her godson play in a trombone recital11.  While the tones torment her ears during 
the recital, she is already trying to figure out what to say to her godson afterwards. De-
spite the fact that in line with the cooperative principle, “Your performance was hor-
rendous” would be the most adequate message, the godmother is much more likely to 
utter “That was not perfect but quite nice”, even though thereby massively violating the 
maxims of quality, quantity and manner.  
The foregoing scenario depicts an example of how conversational goals can clash 
with the Gricean maxims. However, the godmother’s utterance can be explained with 
another notion – the notion of politeness. In the following, I will introduce this conver-
sational principle. Hereby, I will start with some commentaries on the linguistic term 
politeness. Thereafter, I shall introduce the widely received politeness theory by Pene-
lope Brown and Stephen Levinson (1987). Also, I will specifically address politeness in 
expert-layperson communication and in human tutoring.  
 
Linguistic politeness 
Before turning to a description of accounts of politeness, some clarifying remarks need 
to be made with regard to the somewhat ambiguous meanings of the term politeness.  
                                                        
11 Example adapted from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature, 
retrieved on June 30, 2007. 
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On the one hand, there is an everyday use of the term polite, which, according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, is defined as (a) courteous, behaving in a manner that is 
respectful or considerate of others; well-mannered, (b) cultured, cultivated; well-
regulated, and (c) refined, elegant, scholarly12. This everyday understanding of polite-
ness implies that polite behavior can be shown by itself, i.e. outside of concrete dyads 
and situations; or, in other words, certain forms of behavior can be labeled as polite 
behavior per se. With regard to the use of polite language, “we might give examples 
such as ‘language which contains respectful forms of address like sir or madam’, ‘lan-
guage that displays certain “polite” formulaic utterances like please, thank you, excuse 
me or sorry’, or even ‘elegantly expressed language’” (Watts, 2003, p. 1/2) in order to 
describe this per se polite behavior on a language level.  
On the other hand, however, what should be labeled as polite in a pragmatic sense 
always depends on the concrete situation and linguistic context (cf., Terkourafi, 2001). 
Consequently, Watts (2003) distinguishes a first-order (im)politeness (i.e., a lay inter-
pretation of the term politeness) from a second-order (im)politeness (i.e., politeness as 
understood in a sociolinguistic theory of politeness). In a similar vein, Brennan and 
Ohaeri (1999) contrast true politeness (which they define as giving a partner options) 
and conventional politeness, i.e. for instance merely adding words like please and 
thank you. In the following, this so-called true politeness will be the focus of interest.  
 
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) account of politeness 
While earlier accounts of politeness had stretched the importance of rules and maxims 
to account for politeness in conversation (e.g., Lakoff, 1973; Leech, 1983), Penelope 
Brown and Stephen Levinson (197813) focused on linguistic politeness from a new per-
spective, which emphasized – based on the notion of “face” as proposed by Goffman 
(1967) – the use of strategies for the consideration of politeness in conversation (cf. 
Terkourafi, 2001). In spite of the wealth of politeness accounts that have been brought 
forth since then (e.g., Blum-Kulka, 1987; Escandell-Vidal, 1996; Watts, 2003) and an 
ever-growing interest in the field of politeness, “Brown and Levinson’s seminal treat-
ment of politeness […] has remained the most frequently cited publication on language 
and politeness.  Indeed, […] it has held its ground as the model that other writers turn 
to as the starting-point of their own research perspective” (Leech, 2005, p. 5). Also Per-
son et al. (1995) point out the utility of the approach as a general framework.  
Also in this dissertation, Brown and Levinson’s account is taken as a basis for the 
consideration of politeness. This account is especially useful in the context of (formal as 
well as informal) expert-layperson communication due to its underlying notion of face, 
                                                        
12 Retrieved from Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://dictionary.oed.com/, on July 1st, 2007. 
13 This work was published as a monograph in 1987 and is therefore cited as Brown & Levinson, 1987. 
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as will become clear later in this section. Prior to an application of the account to this 
setting, however, the account will be described in general. 
 
Brown and Levinson (1987) start from the notion that in quite unrelated languages 
and cultures (South Indian Tamil, Mexican Tzeltal and US and British English), strik-
ing similarities in the ways in which utterances are constructed can be observed that 
diverge from a maximum of communicational efficiency (as would be expected accord-
ing to the Gricean maxims). These convergences are due to another rational principle in 
communication, namely to politeness.  
To illustrate their point, the authors introduce the notion of a Model Person. This 
Model Person is a fluent speaker of a natural language who has (as all competent adult 
members of a society do) the capacity to reason rationally on her communicative goals 
and on how to achieve those goals. Also, the Model Person has so-called positive and 
negative face. Brown and Levinson (1987)’s notion of face is derived from the Goffma-
nian one. In Interaction Ritual, Erving Goffman (1967) defines face as “the positive 
social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has 
taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of ap-
proved social attributes – albeit an image that others share, as when a person makes a 
good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself.” 
(p.5). Brown and Levinson (1987), then, describe face as a public self-image that every 
interlocutor wants to maintain, that can be either lost or enhanced and that needs to be 
constantly attended to in interaction. Hereby, face consists of two parts. On the one 
hand, there is negative face, that is, “the basic claim […] to freedom of action and free-
dom from imposition” (Brown & Levinson, 1987, p. 61). On the other hand, positive 
face is described as “the positive self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially including the de-
sire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants” (p. 
61; original emphasis). These two aspects of face are basic wants of members of society, 
which every member knows the others to have and which in general the members are 
inclined to satisfy.  
However, sometimes the communicative goals of two interlocutors might clash, if 
one of them – in order to pursue her goals with regard to the conversation – makes an 
utterance that somehow threatens the face of her interlocutor. Every speech act has the 
potential of threatening the other’s face, thus to be an imposition to the addressee, or in 
other words a face-threatening act (FTA). FTAs vary in the degree to which they are 
face-threatening, and can face-threaten negative or positive face (or both), as well as 
either the speaker’s face or the addressee’s face. Table 2-1 provides some of Brown and 
Levinson (1987)’s examples for each of these cases. In the following, however, I will 
focus on those instances in which a speaker performs a FTA that is face-threatening for 
Pragmatic principles in conversation  31 
her addressee (marked in grey in table 2-1), since for the current context of expert-
layperson communication, in which the experts’ conversational behavior towards their 
lay interlocutors is investigated, these threats are the relevant ones. 
 
Table 2-1. Examples to the four types of face-threatening acts  
 Negative face threatened Positive face threatened 
Threats to speaker’s face Excuses, expressing thanks, accep-
tance of apology, acceptance of offers 
Apologies, self-humiliation, confes-
sions, admissions of guilt or respon-
sibility, non-control of laughter or 
tears 
Threats to addressee’s 
face 
Orders, advice, warnings, offers, 
compliments, expression of hatred or 
anger, complaints 
Expressions of disapproval, criticism, 
complaints, accusations, insults, 
disagreements 
 
To which degree is concrete speech act face-threatening, then? According to Brown 
and Levinson (1987), speakers calculate the weightiness of a FTA for their addressees 
with the following formula 
 
 
Wx = D(S,H) + P(H,S) + Rx 
 
in which: 
Wx = weightiness of the FTA 
D(S,H) = social distance between speaker and addressee 
P(H,S) = power asymmetry between speaker and addressee 
Rx = degree to which the FTA is rated an imposition in the respective culture. 
 
The values of these sociological parameters are conceptualized as the speaker’s as-
sumptions about mutually shared values: “Thus these are not intended as sociologists’ 
ratings of actual power, distance, etc., but only as an actor’s assumptions of such rat-
ings, assumed to be mutually assumed, at least within certain limits” (p. 75/76, original 
emphasis).  
In a conversation, both interlocutors can perform speech acts that are potentially 
face-threatening to their communicational partner. Due to this mutual interdepen-
dency, a speaker will try to attenuate the weightiness of the FTA (or else avoid it alto-
gether). Brown and Levinson (1987) formulate five types of linguistic strategies that 
speakers employ in order to minimize a face threat (see 1. through 5.;  figure 2-2).  
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 Figure 2-2. Strategies for doing FTAs (from Brown & Levinson, 1987, p.60)  
 
The weightiness of the face-threatening act determines the degree of directness with 
which it is performed (the heavier the FTA, the more indirect the strategy). Hereby, the 
range goes from performing the FTA without any minimization effort (without redres-
sive action14, baldly; strategy 1) to not doing the FTA (strategy 5) at all. If the speaker 
decides to realize the face-threatening act off-record (strategy 4), that means that the 
utterance can be interpreted in more than one way; therefore, the speaker cannot be 
held responsible for one particular content. Thus, for instance, if a girl says “Damn, I 
already had plans before mom asked me to water grandma’s flowers”, and her brother 
sighs and says “Oh no, you always ask me to water them for you”, she could negate to 
have asked him this favor in the first place.  
If a speaker, however, decides to do the FTA on record, striving to fulfill her com-
municational goal on the one hand while minimizing the FTA’s face-threatening impact 
on the other hand, she can employ positive politeness (strategy 2; oriented towards the 
addressee’s positive face) or negative politeness (strategy 3; oriented towards the ad-
dressee’s negative face), depending on which aspect of face is potentially threatened by 
the FTA.  
For both aspects of politeness, Brown and Levinson (1987) formulate a (non-
exhaustive) set of substrategies with which the politeness aspect can be realized; con-
cretely, these are 10 substrategies for negative and 15 for positive politeness. For the 
off-record realization of FTAs, 15 strategies are proposed. In the following, some exam-
                                                        
14 By redressive action, Brown and Levinson mean „action that ‘gives face’ to the addressee, that is, that attempts to 
counteract the potential face damage of the FTA by doing it in such a way, or with such modifications or additions, 
that indicate clearly that no such face threat is intended or desired” (p.69/70; original emphasis). 
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ples for each type of strategy will be given. Brown and Levinson (1987) provide numer-
ous example sentences for each strategy; I will confine myself to one of their sentence 
examples each. 
 
Negative politeness strategies. Negative politeness strategies are performed to mini-
mize the imposition of the face-threatening act. Examples of the fifteen substrategies of 
negative politeness are:  
• Be conventionally indirect  
Explanation: When using this strategy, the speaker uses phrases and sentences 
that are contextually unambiguous but have different literal meanings. Thus, the 
speaker expresses the desire to have conveyed the content indirectly.  
Example: “Can you post this letter for me?” 
• Be pessimistic 
Explanation: The speaker may also express doubt that the conditions for the ap-
propriateness of his speech act obtain.   
Example: “You don’t have any manila envelopes, do you by any chance?” 
• Minimize the imposition, Rx 
Explanation: When using this strategy, the speaker indicates that the intrinsic se-
riousness of the imposition is not great in itself. 
Example: “Could I have a taste of that cake?” 
• Apologize 
Explanation: When applying this strategy, the speaker apologizes for doing an 
FTA, thus indicating his reluctance to impinge on the addressee’s negative face.  
Example: “I’m sorry to bother you but…” 
• Impersonalize speaker and addressee 
Explanation: With this strategy, the speaker phrases the FTA as if the agent was 
someone other than herself, and/or as if the addressee were someone other than 
the actual addressee.  
Example: “That letter must be typed immediately.”  
• State the FTA as a general rule 
Explanation: Hereby, the speaker states the FTA as an instance of some general 
social rule, regulation or obligation.  
Example: “We don’t sit on tables, we sit on chairs, Johnny.” 
 
Positive politeness strategies. While negative politeness strategies are directly oriented 
towards the imposition itself, in positive politeness, the focus is widened to the appre-
ciation of the other’s positive face wants in general or to the expression of similarity 
between one’s own and the other’s wants. Examples of the fifteen substrategies of posi-
tive politeness are:  
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• Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with addressee) 
Explanation: Hereby, the speaker exaggerates his interest, approval, sympathy 
with the help of prosodic features or by using certain words or particles. 
Example: “What a fantástic gárden you have!” 
• Use in-group identity markers 
Explanation: Also, the speaker may use markers like address forms, dialect or 
slang to claim common ground with the addressee. 
Example:”Come here, buddy.” 
• Avoid disagreement 
Explanation: When using this strategy, the speaker formulates his utterance so as 
to appear to agree with the addressee or as to hide her disagreement. 
Example: A: “What is she, small?” B: “Yes, yes, she’s small, smallish, um, not 
really small but certainly not very big.” 
• Presuppose / raise / assert common ground 
Example: “Look, you know I’ve got this test coming up, well how about lending 
me your Encyclopaedia Britannica?” 
• Assert or presuppose the speaker’s knowledge of and concern for the addressee’s 
wants 
Explanation: When using this strategy, the speaker asserts or implies knowledge 
of the addressee’s wants and her willingness to fit her own wants in with them.  
Example: “I know you love roses but the florist didn’t have any more, so I bought 
you geraniums instead.” 
• Be optimistic 
Explanation: The speaker’s utterance contains the assumption that the hearer’s 
and the speaker’s interests are similar (and the FTA therefore little). 
Example: “Look, I’m sure you won’t mind if I borrow your typewriter.” 
• Include both speaker and addressee in the activity 
Explanation: Speaker may use the inclusive ‘we’-form to appeal to the cooperation 
between speaker and addressee. 
Example: “Let’s stop for a bite.” (instead of: I want a bite, so let’s stop) 
 
Off record strategies. When doing a face-threatening act off-record, the speaker hints 
at her intended message while the addressee is supposed to figure out the conversa-
tional implicature from the contextual cues of the utterance. The speakers can hereby 
proceed using for instance one of the following strategies:  
• Give hints 
Explanation: The speaker says something that is not explicitly relevant in the 
situation, thereby inviting the addressee to search for an interpretation of the ut-
terance which makes it relevant.  
Example: “It’s cold in here”. (meaning: “Close the window”) 
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• Understate 
Explanation: The speaker says less then is required in a situation and thus invites 
the addressee to think about why.  
Example: “What do you think of Harry?” “Nothing’s wróng with him.” (meaning: I 
don’t think he’s very good) 
• Overstate 
Explanation: The speaker says more than is required in a situation and thus in-
vites the addressee to think about why.  
Example: “I tried to call a húndred times, but there was never any answer”. 
• Use metaphors 
Example: “Harry’s a real fish”. (meaning: Harry is cold-blooded like a fish) 
• Use rhetorical questions 
Example: “How was I to know…?” (meaning: I wasn’t to know) 
• Be incomplete, use ellipsis 
Explanation: By leaving the FTA half undone, the speaker can leave the implica-
ture ‘in the air’ and for the addressee to figure out. 
Example: “Well, if one leaves one’s tea on the wobbly table….” 
 
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness account has been criticized on numerous 
grounds (for a comprehensive outline of criticisms, see Kasper, 1990; Eelen, 2001; 
Watts, 2003). Hereby, one major criticism concerns the claimed universality of the ac-
count. Concretely - even though Brown and Levinson’s linguistic data had been col-
lected from divergent languages and cultures –critiques have depicted a “Western” bias 
in the model’s stress on individual face. Hereby, it was argued that - while apt within 
the Western cultures’ ideal of autonomy – an explanation of politeness phenomena 
based on individualistic wants was inadequate for the more group-oriented Eastern 
cultures (cf., Mao, 1994, Matsumoto, 1989, Wierzbicka, 1991). And indeed, research on 
languages like Chinese, Japanese or Greek has shown that politeness phenomena in 
these languages can only be accounted for under consideration of the wants and obliga-
tions that an individual has relative to her position within (the social hierarchy of) a 
certain community.  However, the ‘individual vs. group orientation’ does not need to be 
an either/or dichotomy. As Leech (2005) argues, a speaker is taking into account both 
individual and group values. For polite communication, then, the group values are 
more powerful in the East, while individual values are in the West.  Consequently, 
Leech (2005) rightly remarks (p.6, original emphasis):  
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“An absolute universalist position is clearly untenable: it 
is obvious, from studies over the past twenty years, that po-
liteness manifests itself in different terms in different lan-
guages/cultures. On the other hand, a completely relativist 
position is equally untenable. If there were not a common 
pattern shared by different languages/cultures, it would be 
meaningless to apply a word like “politeness” or “face” to dif-
ferent cultures”.  
With regard to the impact of culture, then, we have to be aware that a speaker’s po-
liteness choices are not merely individual. On the contrary, they are constrained “by a 
societal rationality which has precast […] the universe of possibilities into a range of 
concrete choices” (Terkourafi (2005), p. 249; original emphasis) that constitute the 
politeness norms and habits of that society.  
 
As already mentioned, many empirical research studies on politeness in different 
conversational settings are conducted within the theoretical framework of Brown and 
Levinson’s (1987) politeness account. In the following, some empirical research in this 
area will be depicted; hereby, the focus will be put on those studies that have produced 
results which are somewhat relevant in the current context of computer-mediated ex-
pert-layperson communication. 
 
Research based on Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness account 
Research on politeness has mainly focused on the study of politeness in oral interaction 
(Duthler, 2006). Thus, for instance, Aronsson and Rundström (1989) analyzed the 
transcripts of 30 doctor-parent-child encounters in an allergy outpatient clinic. These 
authors characterize the setting of pediatric consultations as a setting potentially rich in 
face-threats: In this context, the doctors have institutional authority over the child and 
the non-expert parents. This potentially threats the parental authority, as doctors often 
need to discuss matters of child hygiene, pet keeping, food habits, smoking of the par-
ents, among others, with the parents.  Both child-directed and adult-directed recom-
mendations were analyzed with regard to used politeness strategies. While the doctors 
gave their recommendations to the children in a quite direct fashion (Before you go to 
the physiotherapist, you have to cut your fingernails)15, when addressing the parents, 
the doctors preferably used indirect, polite ways of communicating the advice (That’s 
daring, I’d say). Only when doctors seemed to sense that these indirect moves were 
failing, their utterances became more direct in the course of the conversation.  
                                                        
15 The baldness is frequently accompanied by playful elements, however, e.g. by calling the child “Mylord” or “Little 
Lady”, or other jokes and playful uses of language.  
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Despite its main emphasis on spoken dialogue, politeness has also been analyzed in 
written communication. Hereby, many researchers apply linguistic research methods 
like genre analysis, corpus analysis and discourse analysis to natural text corpuses. 
Thus, for instance, Flowerdew and Dudley-Evans (2002) analyze 53 letters written by a 
co-editor of an international linguistics journal. In these letters, the editor sent out re-
views and communicated his decision regarding the publication of a manuscript. With 
regard to face-saving strategies that were administered when conveying the decisions 
that the manuscript had been rejected or needed to be revised, the editor often miti-
gated the face-threat. Thus, for instance, he frequently apologized (I am sorry that I 
have to bring you disappointing news), used the modals ‘could’ and ‘would’ (You could 
fairly easily remedy this), or outlined options to the author (If you would like to de-
velop your research and write a more extensive paper, we would be happy to consider 
it for the journal). As Flowerdew and Dudley-Evans (2002) point out, these instances 
of linguistic politeness serve the need to maintain a positive relationship but might 
clash with the comprehensibility of a message, leading to confusion on part of the 
manuscript’s author(s).  
 
While suchlike analyses of linguistic corpuses have been made for a variety of genres 
like for instance written requests in an institutional setting (Bremner, 2006), emails 
sent by learners of English to their teachers (Bretag, 2006) or work reports from sub-
ordinates to superiors (Rogers & Lee-Wong, 2003), also experimental studies have 
been conducted to address some of the issues raised by Brown and Levinson’s account 
of politeness.   
Thus, Brennan and Ohaeri (1999) compared the use of politeness devices in groups 
of three people each which had to recall and find a consensus on the plot of a movie clip 
they had just seen, either face-to-face, or mediated by a computer (using a chat tool). 
The authors argue that in the process of reaching consensus, face-needs are often 
threatened as different views clash. In the chat protocols respectively in the transcripts 
of the face-to-face discussions, the authors analyze the use of politeness for two polite-
ness devices (i.e., hedges and questions), arguing that both are markers of provisional-
ity of one’s own opinion. These give information about the willingness of a speaker to 
let her opinion be modified. For instance, it is clear that a bedtime story kind of thing 
as a hedged utterance leaves room for different proposals on the same scene; so does 
the use of a question as for instance “…, isn’t it”? As such, the speakers act politely, be-
cause they put some distance between themselves and their utterance, thus leaving 
room for their interlocutors to make a counterproposal. Results show that participants 
in the face-to-face and in the computer-mediated-communication groups performed 
equally well, with regard to the quantity and quality of recall of propositions from the 
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story, even though nearly twice as many words were used in the face-to-face condition. 
With regard to the provisionality markers, results showed that hedging was used much 
more in the face-to-face condition while questions were posed equally often in the two 
conditions. These findings are explained by the authors with the extra costs of hedging: 
For hedging, words or phrases have to be added, which requires more effort when typ-
ing than when speaking. The effort of posing questions, however, can be seen as more 
or less equal in both media. From their results, the authors conclude that social conven-
tions play a role in computer-mediated communication; the characteristics of the me-
dium influence the communicational contributions, however.  
While Brennan and Ohaeri (1999) thus investigate synchronous communication set-
tings, Duthler (2006) investigates two asynchronous communicational media (email vs. 
voicemail) with regard to message politeness. His student participants were instructed 
to request a meeting from a (fictitious) professor, to be scheduled either during or out 
of his office hours (variation of imposition) and using either voicemail or email (varia-
tion of communication medium). When composing an email, an author can plan, edit 
and revise her own message before sending it. Also, cognitive load during message con-
struction is reduced because of the externally represented text draft. When leaving a 
voicemail message, however, the message can be planned beforehand but then has to 
be uttered without the possibility of revision. Also, cognitive load is higher due to the 
need for simultaneous concentration on the content and the performance of the mes-
sage. As a consequence, Duthler hypothesizes that email messages should be more po-
lite than voicemail messages, and that requests that are high in imposition should be 
formulated more politely than messages that are low in imposition. This should only 
hold for email messages however, as due to the time for composing, the email messen-
ger is assumed to be more sensitive to the social context and have more chance to cus-
tomize their message. Results show partial support for the supposed effects. For the 
asynchronous setting of email communication it can thus be concluded that it rather 
fosters the use of politeness.  
 
In sum, politeness research within the theoretical framework of Brown and Levin-
son’s (1987) politeness account has provided important insights with regard to polite-
ness in different conversational settings. Thus, studies have documented ways in which 
face-threatening speech acts have been attenuated through the use of politeness. Also, 
it was shown that a polite way of formulation often impacts negatively on the clearness 
of a message and makes it less comprehensible to the addressee. Another important 
aspect which research has shown is that politeness is a relevant phenomenon also in 
written, computer-mediated communication. Hereby, politeness seems to be especially 
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relevant in asynchronous communication (concretely: email), Duthler (2006) ascribes 
this to the time for composing a message.  
 
What implications do the so-far made elaborations on politeness have for formal and 
informal learning contexts in which experts and laypersons communicate with each 
other? The politeness account of Brown and Levinson (1987) has been introduced as an 
account that has proven a useful theoretical framework for the investigation of polite-
ness, also in computer-mediated conversational settings. To recall to the mind: The 
core idea of this account is the notion that in dialogue, interlocutors try to maintain 
their ‘face’ as well as respect the face of their collocutor. However, speakers often have 
to do potentially face-threatening speech acts, like criticism or disagreement. In these 
instances, politeness is used in order to attenuate the face-threat of the speech act. The 
degree to which a speech act is a face-threat depends on the social distance and on the 
power distribution between the interlocutors, as well as on the culturally determined 
weightiness of the speech act.  
Taking Brown and Levinson’s account as a basis, Person et al. (1995) have described 
the impact of politeness in formal tutorial settings, providing evidence with examples 
from tutorial dialogues. In the following, starting with a description of Person et al’s 
(1995) analysis, the role of politeness in formal and informal tutorial settings will be 
depicted.  
 
Politeness in formal and informal tutorial settings 
The tutorial dialogue has many features of normal conversation; on a range with nor-
mal conversation at one end and less interactive discourse (e.g., classroom teaching) at 
the other end, Person et al. (1995) locate tutorial dialogue somewhere in between these 
two poles – being more close to the normal conversation pole. This similarity calls for 
an investigation of the role of ordinary conversation principles in tutorial dialogue. Per-
son et al. (1995) undertake this, providing an analysis of the one-to-one tutorial setting 
with regard to Brown and Levinson’s three parameters distance, power and degree of 
imposition. Hereby, social distance and power asymmetry are high, because (at least in 
the settings analyzed by Person et al., 1995) the tutors and the tutees do not know each 
other and the tutor has control in the situation. As described above, the degree of impo-
sition will vary with the amount of imposition contained in the speech act. Hereby, it 
needs to be pointed out that tutorial dialogue is a dialogue in which the tutor will need 
to do many potentially face-threatening acts; this will become clear in the following. 
From the analysis of the three parameters for tutorial dialogue, Person et al. (1995) 
conclude that politeness strategies play a substantial role in tutorial dialogue. In tran-
scribed tutorial dialogues from two tutorial samples (college students being tutored on 
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research strategies and seventh grade students being tutored on algebra), Person et al. 
(1995) investigate politeness strategies in these contexts. Through close readings of the 
transcripts, numerous politeness strategies are identified and documented, and the 
authors analyze in what ways these strategies foster as well as hamper the tutorial proc-
ess.  
 
On the whole, Person et al. (1995) deduce the use of 13 politeness strategies from 
their tutoring protocols (i.e., four positive politeness, five negative politeness and four 
off-record strategies; for a description of the strategies, see above in this section 2.3.2). 
For each of these strategies, the authors reflect on how the politeness conventions of 
normal conversation foster as well as hamper the tutoring process; this is depicted in 
table 2-2 (the strategies were described and can be reviewed on pp. 33 ff).  
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Table 2-2. The impact of politeness conventions on tutoring (adapted from Person et al., 1995) 
Type of strategy Benefits of strategy Costs of strategy 
Positive politeness 
Exaggerate. 
 
 
Avoid disagreement. 
 
 
Be optimistic. 
 
Presuppose common 
ground. 
 
Student is reinforced for mastering the 
material.  
 
Student is not challenged or put in 
adversarial relationship with the tutor. 
  
Used by tutor to facilitate student’s 
response.  
Time is not lost in a discussion of 
terms and principles already familiar 
to student.  
 
Feedback may be inappropriate for the 
response (e.g., ignoring minor errors in 
the response). 
Tutors need to correct the student’s 
knowledge deficits or develop student’s 
reasoning skills.  
Sets student up for failure if the student 
does not know the answer.  
Tutor’s assumptions about student’s 
knowledge may be false, leading to gaps 
in the student’s knowledge.  
Negative politeness 
Be conventionally indi-
rect. 
Be pessimistic. 
 
Minimize imposition. 
 
 
Apologize.  
 
State FTA as a general 
rule.  
 
Student is not continually following 
tutor’s commands.  
Reduces anxiety on part of student if 
probability of failure is high.  
Tutor’s requests are made to seem less 
burdensome.  
 
Used to clarify or restate ambiguous 
question. 
Tutor does not need to provide ration-
ale for the statement.  
 
Students may not understand what is 
expected from them.  
May cause student to believe that failure 
is expected or acceptable. 
Tutor may inhibit student’s learning by 
reducing the student’s cognitive burden. 
 
May cause loss of tutor’s credibility in 
the eyes of the student. 
Obscures relation between student’s act 
and general principle.  
Off-record 
Give hints. 
 
Understate. 
 
 
Use metaphors. 
 
 
Use ellipsis. 
 
Tutor facilitates the student’s answer. 
 
Softens the blow of critical feedback. 
 
 
Facilitates the comprehension of com-
plex topics.  
 
Tutor assists student in constructing 
answer.  
 
Hints may be inappropriate, vague, or 
too specific.  
Feedback may be inappropriate for the 
response (e.g., minimizing errors when 
they are severe). 
Students may not understand or only 
partially understand the metaphor.  
 
Tutor may obscure student’s lack of 
understanding by providing too much 
information or doing the work for the 
student.  
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The types of situations in which politeness strategies are used are presented within a 
a 5-step tutorial frame. For the current purpose (in which the depiction of Person et 
al.’s (1995) account is restricted to those tutorial moves which are also possible in the 
email conversational context with its only one conversational turn), step 3 (tutor gives 
feedback on tutee’s answer) und step 5 (tutor assesses student’s understanding of the 
answer) are relevant. The ways in which – according to the authors – politeness is used 
in these situations will be described in more detail:  
 
With regard to the feedback that the tutees receive from their tutors, it is important 
to point out that when tutees utter an error, tutors often do not give appropriate feed-
back nor correct the error. Concerning this matter, the authors assume (p. 174):  
“When a student commits an error in a tutoring session, the 
tutor has the responsibility to acknowledge and correct the 
error. Because, by definition, this is a face-threatening act, it 
seems likely that the politeness strategies will be employed to 
make the feedback less aversive”. 
 
To illustrate this point, the authors provide the following example (p. 175; original 
emphasis): 
Tutor: … OK, now, what is it, just FOIL. OK, FOIL. It stands for “first, outside, inside,  
last.” […] Do you see how that works? 
Tutee: Here’s the way I’ve done it [student mumbles solution to the problem from the  
book to himself].  
Tutor: Right. Well, that’s one way to do it, but they like this [the FOIL method]; this  
is really the way most people like to do it [elaborates on reasons]. 
 
In this example, the tutor lets the tutee’s answer pass as an adequate alternative, de-
spite its being wrong, and suggests the correct answer as just an alternative. The prob-
lem with this indirect kind of error correction is that the student may stick with his 
misconception. For the displayed tutorial sequence, the authors assign two politeness 
strategies: “state face-threatening act as a general rule” and “conventional indirect-
ness”. 
With regard to the assessment of the tutee’s understanding, the authors find in the 
protocols that tutors greatly rely on the tutee’s self-assessment of their own under-
standing, using questions that trigger self-assessment like for instance “so you under-
stand that, right?”. The authors ascribe this to the fact that in normal conversation, 
interlocutors usually rely on the other’s self-assessment of understanding, which is apt 
for everyday talk, but not for tutorial dialogue, where a tutee operates “on the frontier 
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of his or her knowledge, and self-assessments may be much less accurate” (p. 182) and 
the tutee is likely to try to hide knowledge deficits from the tutor. Thus, the authors 
conclude (p. 183):  
“Even when a concept or idea has been explicitly mentioned 
in a tutoring session, the tutor cannot be certain that the 
student both understands and remembers the information. 
This can be contrasted with normal conversation in which 
contributions by both participants are assumed to be in the 
common ground and completely understood […]. Tutors, 
therefore, must be careful not to carry over this conversa-
tional assumption into tutoring sessions.” 
According to Person et al. (1995), tutors should be aware of these costs and benefits. 
Also, tutors and students should establish so-called ground-rules, that is, the tutee 
should be informed that the tutor will use negative feedback as well as violate other 
rules of normal conversation.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that there were certain domain differences in the use 
of politeness strategies; these were used more heavily in the tutoring sessions on re-
search methods than in the ones on algebra. This might be due to the fact that tutorial 
dialogue on research methods might resemble normal conversation even more, because 
in this domain, there are hardly any answers which can easily be evaluated by ‘true or 
false’, but answers can also be partly correct so there is more need for content negotia-
tion between tutor and tutee than in tutoring sessions on algebra. Person et al. (1995) 
therefore call research methods an open-world domain and algebra a close-world do-
main. In this dissertation, the focus is put on medicine, which can also be perceived of 
as an open-world domain. 
 
As has been described in the previous sections, Person et al. (1995) discuss the role 
of politeness for formal tutorial settings. However, due to the structural parallels of 
tutoring in formal and informal settings (see section 2.2.1), it is worthwhile to discuss 
the impact of politeness on dialogue also for informal tutorial settings. When experts 
and laypersons communicate in counseling settings, it is generally for the purpose of 
knowledge communication, as a layperson – needing some advice – resorts to an expert 
of the respective topic (Bromme & Rambow, 2001). However, the interpersonal dimen-
sion does exist and needs to be considered in this setting (cf. Jucks, Paechter, & Tatar, 
2003). Thus, in expert-layperson communication, face-related and content-related is-
sues and communicative goals exist side by side (Fetzer, 2000). In order to consider the 
role of politeness for expert-layperson counseling, it is a useful approach to analyze the 
setting with the help of Brown and Levinson’s parameters (cf. p. 30): When a physician 
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is communicating with a medical layperson via email, what are the social distance, the 
power distribution and the weightiness of the speech acts likely to be?  
Firstly, the social distance between expert and layperson is likely to be evaluated as 
high. Her expertise gives the expert a higher status; this status does not have to be ne-
gotiated during interaction but is predefined by the institutional frame in which doctor-
patient communication takes place (Fetzer, 2000; Aronsson & Rundström, 1989). In 
addition, the social distance is even bigger (i) because expert and layperson communi-
cate via email and (ii) they often do not know each other. 
Secondly, with regard to the power distribution, there is a power asymmetry, as the 
patient depends from the doctor and her expertise1617.  
Thirdly, with regard to the face-threatening value of a physician’s speech acts, it is 
safe to say that doctor-patient communication is a communicational situation rich in 
face-threatening speech acts on part of the physician (cf. Aronsson & Rundström, 
1989). For instance, the doctor often has to give medical advice that hazards the auton-
omy of the patient by requiring lifestyle changes. Thus, the patient might feel hazarded 
in her autonomy and also sense an implicit critique with regard to her current lifestyle. 
In addition, in email communication, the expert has time to compose her answer and 
might thus have more opportunity to realize a polite version of speech than if commu-
nicating synchronously (for instance via chat). 
 
Taken together, we can hypothesize that politeness does very likely play a role also in 
informal learning settings. The question of whether and how the conversational princi-
ple of politeness impacts on how experts converse with laypersons in email health 
counseling will be addressed in study IV (cf. chapter 7).  
 
                                                        
16 Depending on the concrete case, patient and doctor also negotiate contents and decisions, rather than the physician 
dictating them (cf., Runde, 2005). Also, the doctor depends on the patient to a certain degree (i.e., on her compliance, 
but also economically). However, on balance, the notion of power asymmetry still holds. 
17 Strictly speaking, Brown and Levinson explain P as a measure of power that the speaker has over the hearer. They also 
speak of power asymmetry, however. In the context of expert-layperson communication, as well as in tutoring (see 
next section), I will assume that the power that the expert (respectively the tutor) has over its interlocutor will also 
increase the weightiness of the face-threatening act (this is also proposed by Person et al., 1995).  
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2.4 Email health counseling 
In the previous sections of this chapter 2, theoretical backgrounds have been described 
that are relevant in the applied research context of this dissertation, that is, in email 
health counseling. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to providing more 
insights into this applied setting.  
 
For this aim, I will start by describing online health counseling services, with email 
health counseling being one of them (section 2.4.1). Thereafter, special characteristics 
of email communication will be outlined in section 2.4.2. Last but not least, in section 
2.4.3, research that has been conducted in this conversational setting will be described; 
these research pieces focus specifically on lexical alignment, that is, on the lexical adap-
tation of the expert to her lay interlocutor.    
2.4.1 Health services on the Internet 
In the last twenty years, the Internet has become firmly established in public as well as 
in private life (cf. Döring, 2003). The use of the Internet for information search on a 
variety of topics is large and growing; one very popular topic being health issues. Con-
venience (i.e., the option to search for information from home), anonymity and wealth 
of information are among the factors cited most frequently by Internet users as to why 
they look for health information on the Internet (Fox & Rainee, 2000). As Koc (2002) 
reports, every third Internet user also looks for health-related information. Other stud-
ies report even higher quotas. For instance, Fox (2006) reports data from the Pew 
Internet & American Life Project (conducted in August 2006). In this study, eighty 
percent of American Internet users reported to have searched for health information on 
the Internet on at least one of seventeen topics.  
 Baker, Wagner, Singer and Bundorf (2003) comment that there exists a „wide varia-
tion in estimates of Internet use for health, coupled with the fact that the highest esti-
mates have been the most widely disseminated“ (p. 2401). Indeed, as shown, reported 
numbers vary substantially between studies. Therefore, absolute and definite figures 
cannot be reported here. However, it is safe to assume that the search for medical in-
formation on the Internet is a ubiquitous and evermore important societal phenome-
non. This fact can be further illustrated with the help of the following anecdote reported 
by Cline & Haynes (2001): In 1997, the American National Library of Medicine (NLM) 
opened their database MEDLINE – which had only been accessible by physicians be-
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fore – to the public18. As a result, the searches on the database increased from 7 million 
in 1997 to 120 million in 1998. The NLM and the US institutes of health reacted to this 
by creating MedlinePlus, which was specifically intended to serve the informational 
needs of consumers.  
 
On the quality of health-related information on the Internet 
Thus, an abundant amount of health-related information has become easily accessible 
on the Internet19; the quality of this information, however, is far from guaranteedly 
high (Eysenbach & Diepgen, 1999).  Information can be obsolete or false, and often, 
commercial product information is presented in a way that makes the source of infor-
mation seem official (Schürer-Maly, Koneczny, Butzlaff, & Vollmar, 2006). The prob-
lem is further exacerbated by the fact that most Internet users search for medical health 
information rather uncritically (cf. Stadtler, 2006).  
 
An analysis20 of the first five search hits of a Google search on “diabetes” (cf. foot-
note 18) shows how lay health information consumers are confronted with information 
from different backgrounds and with potentially varying quality (table 2-3). Hereby, the 
first hit leads to a site provided by the American Diabetes Association, and is specifi-
cally intended for lay use. The second hit leads to a site provided by a pharmaceutical 
company. The fact that this is a commercial site is, however, not apparent at first 
glance, which is on one side due to the neutrality of the URL (www.diabetes.com). On 
the other side, there is no obvious product placement or advertisement on the site. In 
the category ‘Treating type 2 diabetes’, however, a link labeled ‘Click here for a type 2 
diabetes treating option that can help’ leads to a page that informs about a diabetes 
medicine of said pharmaceutical company.  
The third hit leads to the ‘diabetes’ entry in Wikipedia. While in general, the quality 
of Wikipedia articles is deemed to be high and in many cases comparable to the quality 
of renowned encyclopedias (Giles, 2005), the information on Wikipedia can not be 
trusted unconditionally, as examples of false information that stayed for months on 
Wikipedia have shown21. Also, the numbers of edits and re-edits on popular Wikipedia 
sites are very high.22 
The fourth hit is a link to the diabetes journal of the American Diabetes Association. 
The articles in this journal have titles like „Activation of Sphingosine kinase-1 Mediates 
                                                        
18 Cf. http://www.nlm.nih.gov/about/nlmhistory.html (Retrieved March 2nd, 2007). 
19 As a means of illustration of the abundance of information: Typing the search command „diabetes” into google.com 
results in 82,700,000 hits (search undertaken March 13, 2007).  
20 Analysis procedure adapted from Schürer-Maly et. al, 2006. 
21 Cf. the following article in USA Today: http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-11-29-wikipedia-
edit_x.htm, retrieved on March 13, 2007.  
22 Cf. the following article in Zeit: http://www.zeit.de/online/2005/50/wikipedia?page=all, retrieved on March 13, 
2007. 
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Inhibition of Vascular Smooth Muscle Cell Apoptosis by Hyperglycemia“ (You, Ren, 
Yan, & Sun, in press) and are intended for a scientific audience. While articles like these 
are of supposedly high scientific quality, they are not apt for laypersons.  
The last, fifth hit leads to the ‘National Diabetes Information Clearinghouse’, an in-
formation dissemination website set up by the National Institute of Diabetes and Diges-
tive and Kidney Diseases. The site is dedicated to patients, health care professionals 
and the general public and thus explicitly addressed at laypersons.  
 
Table 2-3. Search results 1-5 of “diabetes” google search, March 13, 2007 
 URL Operator Advertisement 
1. http://www.diabetes.org 
American Diabetes  
Association 
no 
2. http://www.diabetes.com Glaxo Smith Kline yes 
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diabetes Wikipedia no 
4. http://diabetes.diabetesjournals.org/ 
American Diabetes  
Association 
no 
5. http://diabetes.niddk.nih.gov/ 
National Institute of  
Diabetes and Digestive 
and Kidney Diseases 
(NIDDK), NIH 
no 
 
As a consequence of the previous, various initiatives have been founded that aim at 
making high quality health information on the Internet easier to identify (cf. Charatan, 
2002; Cline & Haynes, 2001) and quality criteria have been formulated by numerous 
authors and institutions (Adelhard & Obst, 1999).  
For instance, since 1996, the non-profit Swiss Health on the Net Foundation 
(HON)23 accredits web-sites according to eight ethical criteria (see table 2-4). Thus, 
when laypersons - looking for health information on the Internet - finds a site that is 
tagged with the HON seal, they know that these criteria are fulfilled. Also, users can 
download a free “plug in" service integrated in the navigator, which automatically indi-
cates if the visited page is part of an HON-accredited site.  
 
                                                        
23 See www.healthonnet.org  
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Table 2-4. The eight HONcode principles24 
Authoritative Indicate the qualifications of the author 
Complementary Information should support, not replace, the doctor-patient relationship. 
Privacy Respect the privacy and confidentiality of personal data submitted to the site 
by the visitor.  
Attribution Cite the source(s) of published information, date and medical health pages.  
Justifiability Site must back up claims relating to benefits and performance.   
Transparency Accessible presentation, identities of editor and webmaster, accurate email 
contact.   
Financial disclosure Identify funding sources. 
Sponsorship Clearly distinguish advertising from editorial content.  
 
To provide another example, Brown (2002) describes the efforts of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) for a health-related Internet domain like for instance “.health“; 
such a domain could be used to signal to users that the respective sites meet certain 
criteria of accuracy and safety.      
While thus, a lot of thought and research has been done on the technical quality of 
health-related Internet information, the understandability of this information to lay-
persons has been hardly investigated from a psychological perspective (cf. Jucks, et al., 
2003). From the perspective of the layperson, however, it is just as important to obtain 
information that she can understand than obtain information that is correct. To pro-
vide understandable information is a great task for physicians, also in the net-based 
health counseling context which is the focus of this dissertation.   
There are numerous possibilities for medical laypersons to obtain medical informa-
tion from the Internet. Commercial Internet sites (e.g., www.netdoctor.co.uk) provide 
lay-oriented information on health-related issues, as well as clinics and medical institu-
tions (e.g., www.mayoclinic.com; www.health.nih.gov; http://medlineplus.gov).  
Hereby, medical information is brought about in different forms. On the one hand, a 
layperson can consult and read informational texts displayed on web pages. Also, in-
formation can be obtained from lists of frequently-asked questions (FAQ’s), mailing 
lists or newsletters.  
 
Another source of information provided frequently, which is more adapted to the in-
formational needs of the individual, is the possibility to consult a medical expert via 
email. Then, possibly with some delay, the individuals receive email answers; on some 
                                                        
24 From: http://www.hon.ch/Global/pdf/ShortHONpresentationOct2006.pdf, retrieved on March 7, 2007.   
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sites, these answers are stored in publicly accessible archives so that other users con 
read them. This medical email counseling is the informational setting which is investi-
gated in this dissertation. In the following, I will focus on email communication in more 
detail. 
2.4.2 Characteristics of email health counseling 
In “using language”, Herb Clark (1996) makes a point for face-to-face conversation be-
ing the basic setting for language use from which all other conversational settings are 
but derivative. Therefore, the understanding of communication in different communi-
cational settings needs to start from an understanding of conversation (cf., Schober, 
2006). The characteristics of the respective specific conversational setting greatly influ-
ence communication. Clark and Brennan (1991) provide a framework with which dif-
ferent media of communication can be located on various dimensions (cf. Brennan & 
Lockridge, 2006). These dimensions describe the constraints25 that different communi-
cation media put on establishing common ground in communication. These eight di-
mensions are: 
 
• Copresence: In face-to-face conversation, the interlocutors share the same physi-
cal environment, they can usually see and hear what the respective other is doing 
and looking at. In other media, this is mostly not the case.  
• Visibility: Also, in face-to-face communication, the interlocutors can see each 
other, while in many other media, they cannot. 
• Audibility: When interlocutors communicate in a way that they can hear each 
other, they can take note of timing and intonation.  
• Cotemporality: This dimension addresses whether interlocutor B receives a mes-
sage at roughly the same time as it is produced by interlocutor A.  
• Simultaneity: Also, in face-to-face communication, messages can be conveyed 
and received by both interlocutors simultaneously.  
• Sequentiality: When talking face-to-face, interlocutor A’s and B’s turns usually do 
not get out of sequence.  
• Reviewability: While speech fades quickly, in other communicational media, arti-
facts of conversation remain that can be reviewed later by either of the interlocu-
tors or by a third party.  
                                                        
25 Monk (2003)  points out that the term ‘constraints’ may be a little distracting in the context of this taxonomy: While in 
everyday language, the term ‘constraints’ is used to describe something ‘bad’, here constraints are good in that they 
reduce ambiguity and thus foster the establishment of common ground. 
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• Revisability: Some media allow for revising one’s utterances privately before 
sending them to the collocutor. Face-to-face communication, however, does not 
allow for this; rather, self-repairs must be done publicly. 
 
The conversational setting that is the focus of this dissertation is a computer-
mediated counseling scenario in which a layperson asks an expert for advice via email. 
Taking the dimensions proposed by Clark and Brennan (1991) as a starting point, it is 
possible to analyze this setting some more:  
In email communication, the expert and the layperson do not share the same physi-
cal environment. Thus, when explaining, the expert cannot refer to objects that both 
interlocutors perceive26 – for instance a model of an organ or an X-ray image; instead, 
she needs to find other ways to refer to objects. Expert and layperson cannot see nor 
hear each other either, so there is no possibility to add meaning to an utterance (be-
yond its content) through gesture, mimic or paraverbal features such as intonation. 
Also, the layperson cannot send a message parallely to the expert, for instance frown or 
make sounds that provide feedback on whether she is understanding what she is hear-
ing or not. Therefore, it is harder to estimate whether one’s messages are understand-
able to the interlocutor or not. As for sequentiality, in email communication utterances 
mostly form only a loose chain that is interrupted as interlocutors receive intermittent 
contributions uttered by others.   
The characteristics described up to now of email communication make it more diffi-
cult to establish common ground than in face-to-face communication. It is harder for 
the expert to draw inferences about what the layperson already knows or doesn’t know 
(because many feedback possibilities of face-to-face communication are missing; cf., 
Whittaker, 2003).  
In our setting, this estimation is especially difficult given that mostly, communica-
tion consists only of one turn with one lay email query being followed by one expert 
answer. Thus, other than in multi-turn email interactions – the experts have to rely on 
the written query as only source of information on the sender’s knowledge; they cannot 
elicit that knowledge during the course of a longer email dialogue. The email remains, 
however, visible and reviewable as an artifact of conversation, and the experts have 
time to think and plan their answer before sending it. Therefore, they might rely more 
heavily on their suppositions about the other than in face-to-face communication (cf., 
Fussell & Kraus, 1992).  
                                                        
26 Unless it is an illustration that is provided online. In the already mentioned research program at the University of 
Muenster, one research question concerns the ways in which shared illustrations impact on netbased expert-
layperson communication, e.g., Jucks, Bromme, & Runde, 2007.  
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In sum, there are several constraints put on communication in written, asynchro-
nous net-based expert-layperson communication, which make it both difficult and vi-
tally important for the expert to draw correct inferences about the layperson’s knowl-
edge from the email. Thus, experts are in great need of information on the layperson’s 
knowledge. One type of information is the utterance of lay beliefs within the layperson‘s 
email text. To what degree do experts draw inferences from this information in order to 
assess the layperson’s knowledge? To what extent does this information impact on the 
ways experts answer the lay query? These are two main research questions which will 
be addressed in this dissertation.  
 
Up to this point, this section on email health counseling has focused on the applied 
setting of email health counseling by integrating it into the bigger context of health ser-
vices on the Internet, as well as by applying characteristics of email communication to 
the setting. In the following, some empirical studies on online health counseling will be 
described which have been conducted within the research project on recipient orienta-
tion in net-based health counseling at the University of Muenster (see chapter 1). In 
these studies, the role of audience design and accessibility in the adaptation of the ex-
perts’ answers to their lay addressee was analyzed, focusing specifically on the adapta-
tion to the layperson’s lexical choices; this uptake of word choices is called lexical 
alignment in linguistics. In order to make the description of the studies understand-
able, I will start with a short introduction on research on lexical alignment.  
2.4.3 Lexical alignment in email health counseling 
The table was a large one, but the three were all crowded to-
gether at one corner of it: "No room! No room!" they cried 
out when they saw Alice coming. "There's plenty of room!" 
said Alice indignantly, and she sat down in a large arm-chair 
at one end of the table.  
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 
 
In Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (chapter VII), Alice joins the 
March Hare, the Hatter and a dormouse in the famous mad tea-party. The welcoming 
that Alice receives is quite rough; nonetheless, this excerpt is a good example of how 
quickly standardization of vocabulary takes place in communication. Imagine the three 
of them welcoming Alice by crying ‘No seats! No seats!’ instead, she would probably 
have replied, and rightly so, ‘There are plenty of seats!’.  
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Lexical alignment in dialogue 
Many research studies have shown that this mutual adaptation of word choices -  called 
linguistic entrainment (Garrod & Anderson, 1987), lexical entrainment (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996) or lexical alignment (Garrod & Pickering, 2004)27 - emerges rapidly in 
face-to-face communication (e.g., Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964, 1966; Carroll, 1980; 
Brennan & Clark, 1996) as well as in computer-mediated communication (Garrod & 
Anderson, 1987)28. For instance, in the well-known study conducted by Simon Garrod 
and Anthony Anderson (1987), participants cooperated in a computer maze game. In 
their analysis of the dialogue transcripts, the authors found that between dyads, very 
different ways were used to describe positions in the maze, but that within a dyad, very 
similar forms of description were used, both on a linguistic as well as on a conceptual 
level. 
In a similar fashion, Brennan and Clark (1996) found evidence of lexical alignment 
between interlocutors. In their experimental series, pairs of participants cooperated in 
a matching task. In this task, two sets of 12 cards each were used, with each card depict-
ing an object (e.g., a shoe). The two card sets differed as to whether the depicted objects 
were the only ones of their class (e.g., a penny loafer; card set 1) or whether there were 
more than one object of a class in the same set (e.g., a penny loafer, a sneaker and a 
high heel; card set 2). The participants ran through three kinds of trials. Hereby, they 
first used card set 1 (trials A) in which, as described, each object was unique in its cate-
gory. Second, card set 2 was used, which in addition to the cards of card set 1 included 
pictures of other objects of the same categories (trials B). Last, in the C trials, the origi-
nal card set A was used again. The authors analyzed the transcripts of the audiotaped 
experimental sessions with regard to how objects were referenced. They found that 
while in the trials A, the objects were referenced with their basic-level category names, 
in the trials B the interlocutors switched to more specific labels. Most interestingly, 
they maintained these labels in the trials C, albeit these being overly informative in the 
context of trials C, where only one object from each category was presented on a card. 
However, these more specific labels were only used when in trials C, participants coop-
erated with the same partner than in trials A and B; when a new partner was presented 
in trials C the dyads used the more basic level descriptions.  
 
As the abovedescribed as well as numerous other studies (e.g., Bortfeld & Brennan, 
1997; Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964, 1966; Carroll, 1980) demonstrate the occurrence of 
                                                        
27 As from this point, I shall stick with the term lexical alignment.   
28 In the study of language coordination in dialogue, researchers frequently use the so-called referential communication 
task paradigm. In this paradigm, participants are engaged in tasks that require them to refer to a certain set of objects 
repeatedly.  Mostly, participants cooperate in dyads, and the two people are assigned roles, usually those of a matcher 
and a director. Hereby, the director gives instructions which are followed by the matcher. For a review on the history 
of the referential communication task paradigm, I suggest (with Schober, 2006) Yule (1997).  
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lexical adaptation in dialogue, this phenomenon can be called undisputed. However, 
keeping in mind the different accounts for adaptation in dialogue that were presented 
in section 2.3.1, it does not come as a surprise that there are various different explana-
tions for why it occurs; these accounts make different assumptions about the (specific) 
role of the addressee for lexical adaptation. 
On the one hand, lexical entrainment has been conceptualized as an addressee-
oriented activity: Interlocutor B uses certain expressions to label objects, because her 
collocutor, interlocutor A, has used them. According to this view, lexical entrainment 
can be conceived of as a product of a cooperation process in which interlocutors take 
each other into account. According to Clark and Marshall (1981), people keep so-called 
reference diaries for their specific conversational partners, enabling them to adapt 
their choice of words according to whom they talk. Brennan and Clark (1996) assume 
that lexical entrainment occurs as interlocutors build up so-called conceptual pacts 
with each other, i.e. mutual conceptual and terminological agreements which are built 
up in the process of grounding (cf. section 2.3.1) in dialogue. Conceptual pacts are es-
tablished in the course of conversation with a concrete collocutor: „When people refer 
to an object in conversation, we have proposed, they establish a conceptual pact, a tem-
porary agreement about how they and their addressees are to conceptualize that ob-
ject.” (Brennan & Clark, 1996, p. 1491). The authors interpret their abovedescribed re-
sults as consequences of an establishing of conceptual pacts in conversation. In a study 
on language comprehension, Metzing and Brennan (2003) use eye-tracking data to 
demonstrate that hearers connect word use to a certain speaker and hence, also expect 
conceptual pacts not to be broken: In a referential communication task (cf. footnote 
52), the authors varied whether the same or a new director referred to objects that a 
prior director had already named before. Also, it was varied if new referents or same 
referents were used for labeling. Whenever the old director used new referents to refer 
to the objects, there were partner-specific interferences in that the addressees were 
slower to look at the object than when the new expression was uttered by the new 
speaker. The results can be interpreted as partner-specific effects on word comprehen-
sion in dialogue. Thus, some results point towards the role of the partner for lexical 
adaptation in dialogue.  
On the other hand, however, a reasonable point was also made for standardization 
in word use being the result of a non-adaptive, egocentric activity that is based on word 
accessibility in memory. Experiments on priming have shown that memory processes 
impact greatly on the choice of referents for ambivalent objects (Sloman, Harrison & 
Malt, 2002) and on the syntax of subsequent sentences (Branigan, Pickering, & Cle-
land, 2000). Pickering and Garrod (2004) argue that interlocutors achieve aligned 
situational models, consisting of multiple level information, by a primitive and re-
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source-free priming mechanism (cf. section 2.3.1); one of these levels is the lexical level. 
According to Barr and Keysar (2002), lexical alignment is due to the use of linguistic 
precedents. These precedents become established when an object is named for the first 
time, and thus, a connection between encodings and encoded objects is built. The 
precedents influence, once established, speech processes due to their high availability. 
In an eye-tracking experimental series, the authors found that previous mentioning of 
referents facilitated their identification – independently of whether precedents repre-
sented shared knowledge or not.  
 
In sum, it is important to note that lexical alignment is an ubiquitous phenomenon 
in everyday conversation. Hereby, different theoretical accounts try to explain the phe-
nomenon with either an adaptation of word choices under consideration of the ad-
dressee or with mere word accessibility. This reflects the differing positions on the 
mechanisms of adaptation in dialogue which have been outlined in section 2.3.1.  
 
One of the research aims of the research program at the University of Muenster (cf. 
introductory section of this dissertation) was to investigate lexical entrainment in the 
context of online health counseling. Does lexical alignment also occur in this written, 
asynchronous, computer-mediated communication between experts and laypersons? 
The research findings also helped to shed more light on the aforesketched debate on the 
mechanism underlying lexical alignment. In the following, I will give a rough outline of 
a selection of the project’s studies on the matter.   
 
Lexical alignment in email expert-layperson communication 
As described, lexical alignment has been amply documented for oral conversation; 
hereby, most of the relevant research findings were gathered in an experimental setting 
and transcripts of the dialogues analyzed with regard to conversational phenomena. In 
the written online health counseling setting, however, the emails remain as artifacts of 
conversation, and thus, constitute evidence of natural communication outside the ex-
perimental setting: Many health sites provide a service for users that allows the review 
of old email dialogues that other users have had with the medical experts of the site; 
these email dialogues are stored in topic-specific archives. Thus, before sending her 
own question to the medical doctor, the lay user may first check whether or not another 
user had asked that same question before. 
In a field analysis of 120 question-answer sets from seven health archives, Jucks & 
Bromme (2007) exploratorily investigated the occurrence of lexical entrainment in this 
written expert-layperson communication. For this aim, they investigated the medical 
terminology used in laypersons’ queries and found that laypersons did use a substantial 
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amount of medical technical terminology: At least one medical term was used in 84% of 
all investigated lay queries. The question-answer sets investigated by Jucks and 
Bromme (2007) were chosen under consideration of several quality and representa-
tiveness-related criteria. The authors analyzed how many of the medical terms that the 
laypersons had used in their emails were also used by the medical experts; they found a 
highly significant correlation between laypersons’ and experts’ use of medical terms. 
Hereby, a substantial amount of terminology that the patients had proposed was en-
trained by the expert (34 %). The entrainment, however, was not restricted to medical 
terms; also educated terms of the German language (mostly terms “borrowed” from 
Latin and Greek) were entrained by the experts.  
As such, this field study of natural communication in the online health counseling 
suggested strongly that linguistic alignment also plays a role in this setting. Such a non-
experimental approach cannot, however, substitute experimental evidence. Therefore, 
an experimental investigation of lexical alignment was undertaken by Bromme, Jucks 
and Wagner (2005). In a simulated online health counseling scenario, they asked par-
ticipants to answer fictitious lay email queries. Each participant answered two queries, 
one on the topic of diabetes, one on thyroid problems. Lexical alignment was investi-
gated with the following paradigm: Each lay query was formulated in two versions, 
which only differed in whether several terms were encoded in a more medical technical 
or in a more everyday-language way. For instance, the patient would speak of her blood 
sugar level in diabetes query version A, while in version B, she would speak of her 
blood glucose concentration. In German, many medical concepts can be phrased either 
in a more everyday language term or in a specialist term of Greek or Latin origin; for 
instance, one could say Pankreas for pancreas or else use the more colloquial German 
“translation” Bauchspeicheldrüse (literally: gland of ventral saliva). In the German lan-
guage, these everyday medical terms are more common than in English. Apart from the 
lexical variations, the queries were identical. Each participant answered one query in 
the technical, the other one in the everyday version. Analyses of the experts’ answers 
showed that experts entrained to the encoding that the layperson had brought into the 
email conversation: In answers to everyday-versions of a query, experts used more eve-
ryday encodings of the concepts than when answering the technical versions. When the 
layperson had ‘suggested’ technical wording, the experts also used more technical 
wording than when the layperson had suggested everyday terming.  
Following the same paradigm, the participants in the study of Jucks, Becker and 
Bromme (in press) each answered one patient query on diabetes. The aim of this study 
was to investigate whether lexical alignment in experts’ answer emails was restricted to 
an alignment to the interlocutors’ word suggestions or if also wording from other 
sources would be entrained. For this purpose, a second variation was added to the lexi-
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cal variation (i.e., the everyday vs. technical terming) in the queries: The experts were 
provided with an illustration (a concept map) which depicted the issues the layperson 
had asked for; the experts were told that this illustration was given to them in order to 
assist then in formulating their answer to the layperson, and that the layperson did not 
dispose of the illustration. Parallely to the two versions of the query, two versions of the 
illustration existed; in these, the same words that were varied in the query were varied 
in the illustration. Thus, illustration version A contained the terms in an everyday en-
coding and version B in a technical encoding. The resulting research design had four 
conditions: the four combinations of everyday and technical wording of illustration and 
query. Again, in the experts’ answers, the everyday and technical encodings of the ma-
nipulated terms were counted. The results showed that both query and illustration im-
pacted on the experts’ lexical choices. Hereby, in the conditions where experts were 
confronted with technical language from one source (illustration or query) and every-
day language from the other source, it did not make a difference for entrainment 
whether the everyday language (respectively the technical terminology) was suggested 
by the illustration or by the patient.  
The results of Jucks et al. (in press) suggest that the found lexical alignment in the 
email counseling scenario cannot – at least not exclusively – be interpreted as a result 
of adaptation. On the contrary, the fact that the encodings of the illustration, even 
though not available to the addressee, impacted on word choices, makes a point for the 
impact of word accessibility on language processing (cf. Jucks et al., 2007, who also 
show how under certain conditions, experts are influenced by salient information that 
has nothing to do with the addressee, leading to expert answers that are less oriented 
towards the lay addressee). 
 
The described studies on lexical alignment in email health counseling are relevant in 
the current context of the dissertation for several reasons:  
First, these studies have documented that experts pick up technical terminology that 
is introduced into the conversation by their lay interlocutor. This adaptation seems to 
be, as the results of Jucks et al. (in press) suggest, due rather to an automatic priming 
mechanism than to conscious adaptation, which might cause problems in expert-
layperson communication: The investigated terms that experts aligned to were techni-
cal terms, that is, words depicting concepts from the medical field (be it in a more tech-
nical or in a more everyday encoded version). Hereby, we have to remember that tech-
nical terminology has a different role in communication for experts and laypersons: A 
domain’s technical terminology reflects the quality of experts’ knowledge representa-
tions, enabling efficient communication between experts by condensing a great package 
of knowledge in one term. Furthermore, technical language forms the basis of experts’ 
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categorical perception (Bromme & Rambow, 2001). Laypersons, on the contrary, often 
only have vague or wrong ideas about what a medical term means, and consequently, 
physicians and patients have a quite divergent understanding also of commonly used 
medical terms (cf. section 2.1.3). Nonetheless, when conversing with a doctor, medical 
laypersons tend to using medical terminology. Thus, if experts entrain on medical ter-
minology suggested by laypersons in a rather unreflected manner, the different under-
lying understandings of the terms hazard successful knowledge communication.  
 
While the drawn conclusions on lexical entrainment seem quite compelling, it has to 
be kept in mind what Jucks and Bromme (2007) state about the observed lexical en-
trainment in written net-based health counseling (p. 275):  
Nevertheless, we cannot say for sure that patients do not 
possess medical knowledge about the terms they use in their 
inquiries. We assume that patients will vary in terms of their 
medical knowledge about terms, and also that medical terms 
will vary in terms of their complexity. Further research […] is 
needed to cast light on experts' and patients' understanding 
of common terms and enable us to draw clear conclusions on 
the practical implications of the phenomenon studied here.”  
This research desideratum is addressed in study I, in which lay understanding of com-
mon illness terms is investigated for issues broadly related to the metabolic syndrome.  
 
Second, the studies on lexical alignment illustrate an example of how conversational 
mechanisms from everyday conversation are also applied by experts when conversing 
with laypersons. 
 
In chapter 2, the theoretical backgrounds of the dissertation have been delineated. 
In the upcoming chapter 3, I will deduce the research questions which emerge from the 
theoretical background and which will be addressed in this dissertation.  
 3 Emerging research questions  
In the process of expertise formation, expert knowledge is not only quantitatively in-
creasing, but also qualitatively reorganized, leading to the highly interconnected and 
integrated expert knowledge. Lay knowledge, on the contrary, is characterized by naïve 
beliefs and theories, and while lay representations comprise correct beliefs and as-
sumptions, they also consist of erroneous beliefs and lacks of knowledge. Lay represen-
tations of domain-related concepts are affected by real life personal experiences as well 
as by naïve presumptions; therefore they diverge largely between laypersons and are 
unclear and blurry (cf. section 2.1). For different topics within the field of medicine, 
research studies have shown that experts and laypersons have a crucially divergent un-
derstanding of important medical terms. However, as Jucks and Bromme (2007) point 
out, further research is needed to cast more light on experts’ and laypersons under-
standing of common medical terms. Therefore, in Study I, lay medical knowledge will 
be investigated for illness terms related to the broad thematic field of the metabolic 
syndrome, within which expert-layperson communication processes are studied in this 
dissertation. The study will provide a description of lay beliefs related to the terms.  
 
When experts converse with laypersons, both enter conversation from very diver-
gent perspectives. Hereby, the experts have the difficult task of transforming their 
knowledge in a way that makes their explanations understandable for their lay collocu-
tor (cf. section 2.1). In this dissertation, the focus is put on the expert-layperson con-
versational setting of email health counseling. Especially in this context, it is difficult 
for the expert to draw inferences about the knowledge of the layperson, due to the lim-
ited feedback possibilities of the setting. Since the conversation usually does only con-
sist of one conversational turn, however, it is vitally important for the expert to esti-
mate the layperson’s knowledge in order to be able to adapt their utterances (see sec-
tion 2.4). In online health counseling, the written lay query is the only source of infor-
mation for the experts in order to estimate the layperson’s knowledge. Hereby, one type 
of information is provided by those instances in which the layperson utters false under-
standing in her email. How does this display of false understanding impact on experts’ 
assessment of lay knowledge? Research from tutoring in formal learning contexts has 
shown that in face-to-face conversation, experts have difficulties in acknowledging er-
roneous knowledge that is uttered spontaneously by the tutee. In addition, they do not 
build up a detailed representation of their lay collocutor’s understanding but only a 
rather fuzzy impression (cf. section 2.2). Also, they tend to overestimate their lay tutee’s 
knowledge. Study II will help shed some light on the open empirical question of if and 
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how a display of erroneous knowledge will affect knowledge assessment in the conver-
sational context of email health counseling. 
 
As already mentioned, due to the divergent perspectives of experts and laypersons, 
experts cannot communicate with laypersons from their own angle, but have to tailor 
their utterances to a lay level of understanding in order for them to be comprehensible. 
As studies from face-to-face tutoring research have shown, one important feature of 
adaptation is the correction of the tutee’s false understanding. However, tutors fre-
quently ignore when a tutee utters false beliefs; also, their tutoring is generally not 
adapted to their individual tutees but rather done in stereotypic ways (cf. section 2.2). 
What impact does a display of false understanding on part of the laypersons have on 
the ways experts tutor in email health counseling, then? Study III will provide some 
answers to this research question. 
 
In addition to the purpose of knowledge communication, there is an additional di-
mension to expert-layperson communication, namely the interpersonal dimension, 
which needs to be resolved in every conversation. Expert-layperson communication is 
potentially rich in face-threatening speech acts. Consequently, when experts communi-
cate with laypersons in tutorial dialogue, they might try to attenuate the impact of their 
speech acts by phrasing their utterances in a polite way. As Person et al. (1995) show for 
formal tutorial settings, tutors in these settings frequently avoid direct error feedback 
and prefer indirect ways of error correction. By proceeding like this, error feedback is 
made less aversive; however, such politeness strategies are often detrimental to peda-
gogical goals and to the effectiveness of knowledge communication.  
In study IV, the question will be addressed of whether politeness is also relevant for 
the experts’ conversational behavior in the informal tutorial setting of email health 
counseling. For this aim, medical experts will be provided with metapragmatic infor-
mation about the characteristics of the conversational setting.  
  
4 Study I: Not quite blank slates – a questionnaire survey of 
lay medical beliefs  
4.1 Introduction 
People acquire a great amount of medical knowledge in the course of everyday life. 
Hereby, a variety of sources offers bits and pieces of medical information, like televi-
sion, magazines, the Internet, or family and friends. Consequently, from childhood, 
laypersons hold a variety of medicine-related beliefs, which are often erroneous.  
As has been outlined in section 2.1.2, a number of research studies have investigated 
the beliefs that laypersons hold with regard to frequently used medical concepts, for 
instance concepts from orthopedics or from genetic counseling. These studies show 
that laypersons often have a rather vague or erroneous understanding of the terms. In 
conversations between experts and laypersons, however, the divergent understanding 
often remains unnoticed, as experts have difficulties in diagnosing false beliefs held by 
their lay interlocutors (see section 2.1.3).  
In this dissertation, the metabolic syndrome was chosen as thematic field in which 
to study communication processes between experts and laypersons. This rather broad 
thematic field was chosen because it entails a variety of key concepts which are com-
mon in everyday lay medical talk, such as ‘diabetes’, ‘arteriosclerosis’ or ‘stroke’. Study 
I29, to-be-presented in this chapter, provides a description of beliefs that laypersons 
hold with regard to these concepts. Thus, the research aims of Study 1 are 
 
• to describe central beliefs that laypersons hold about concepts related to the 
metabolic syndrome 
as well as 
• to describe the disparity of knowledge within the lay sample.  
 
The topics related to the metabolic syndrome are of societal relevance (as will be 
outlined in section 4.2.2). Nonetheless, at least in Germany, knowledge about these 
terms does not form a part of high school biology education curricula. Thus, correct and 
congruent knowledge representations of these concepts in laypersons cannot be taken 
for granted. In contrast to experts, who build up systematic, highly interconnected ex-
pert knowledge in the course of their expertise formation (cf. section 2.1.1), laypersons 
gain knowledge – as mentioned above – through a variety of sources and personal ex-
                                                        
29 A paper which presents the data described in study I has been published in Becker, Bromme, and Jucks (2008).  
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periences. As a result, when investigating beliefs that laypersons have with regard to 
medical concepts related to the metabolic syndrome, it is expected that 
 
• a considerable disparity should be found within the lay sample 
and that  
• lay knowledge with regard to these concepts will comprise correct as well as er-
roneous beliefs, and also lacks of knowledge, just like in other lay domains 
(cf. section 2.1.2) 
 
As pointed out in section 2.1.3, not only experts have difficulties in estimating lay 
knowledge; also laypersons frequently have difficulties in estimating their own knowl-
edge. In Study I, the layperson’s estimation of their own understanding with regard to 
the investigated beliefs was assessed exploratorily by asking the laypersons to rate their 
own confidence with regard to these beliefs.  
 
As lay participants, college students enrolled in courses other than natural sciences 
were chosen, who are a highly relevant population with regard to the metabolic syn-
drome, because college students are young and prevention of the metabolic syndrome – 
as will be elaborated below – needs to start at an early age.  
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
The sample consisted of a total of 100 students enrolled in an undergraduate course at 
the University of Muenster (WWU). They were approached in lectures and on campus 
and asked to participate in the study. The students participated voluntarily and were 
compensated with € 7. In order to obtain a representative sample of WWU students 
enrolled in courses other than natural sciences, the ratio of participants from each fac-
ulty to all participants reflected the ratio of the students enrolled in that faculty to all 
students of the university, resulting in a majority of humanities students (see table 4-1 
for the number of participants from the different faculties and for the resulting per-
centages30).   
 
                                                        
30  The number of students refers for each faculty refers to those students whose main course (‘Hauptfach’) is allocated 
to that faculty, winter semester 2004/2005. This statistic was retrieved from the homepage of the University of Mue-
nster (WWU) on the 18th of May, 2005. 
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Table 4-1. WWU student statistics and distribution of participants on faculties 
Faculties 
Number of 
students 
% 
Number of 
participants 
Interdisciplinary courses 544 1.90 2 
Faculties of Theology  1278 4.46 5 
Faculty of Law 4365 15.25 15 
Faculty of Economics 4756 16.61 16 
Faculty of Philosophy 13866 48.44 48 
Faculty of Mathematics and Natural 
Sciences without Physics, Chemistry, 
Pharmacy and Biology 
3611 12.61 13 
Music Department of the WWU 207 0.72 1 
Total 28627 28.73 100 
 
In order to prevent insufficient language skills to account for participant perform-
ance, proficiency in German was essential for participation. Therefore, the data sets of 
two participants were excluded, because they stated that they had started speaking 
German later than early childhood31. Thus, the data from 98 medical laypersons (61 
female) was used in the analysis. Participants were on average in their third year of 
university (M = 4.84, SD = 3.12 semesters) and their ages ranged between 19 and 38 (M 
= 22.84, SD = 2.80).  
4.2.2 Materials 
Selection of the topic 
The term metabolic syndrome comprises several risk factors of metabolic origin, which 
researchers associate with an elevated risk for cardiovascular diseases (CVD) and Type 
2 diabetes. While there are several definitions of the metabolic syndrome, the National 
Cholesterol Education Program Adult Treatment Panel III (ATP III, 2001) offered a 
modus of diagnosis that simplified former WHO criteria (Alberti & Zimmet, 1998). Ac-
                                                        
31 Both students belonged to the faculty of Philosophy. 
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cording to the ATP III definition, diagnosing the metabolic syndrome requires the con-
comitance of three of the following clinical measures: elevated waist circumference, 
elevated triglycerides, reduced HDL cholesterol, elevated blood pressure and elevated 
glucose. The risk potentials of these factors exponentiate, i.e. they increase the risk of 
CVD, Type 2 diabetes and the manifestations of not-yet existing other factors by more 
than the sum of their individual risks (Grundy, 2006).  
Epidemiological studies have shown a high prevalence of the metabolic syndrome 
with a quota of ≥ 20% in U.S. adults older than 20 and of ≥40% in U.S. adults older 
than 60 (Ford, Giles, & Dietz, 2002). Also in other continents, high numbers have been 
reported (e.g., Isomaa et al., 2001; Gu et al., 2005). However, the metabolic syndrome 
is not a constellation of symptoms affecting only the elderly, but can also be found in 
children and adolescents (Molnar, 2004).   
Although multiple factors contribute to the pathogenesis of the metabolic syndrome, 
including genetic predisposition, a sedentary lifestyle plays a prominent role in the 
process (Ford, Kohl, Mokdad, & Ajani, 2005). Thus, lifestyle modification is not only 
the primary therapy for the metabolic syndrome, but also plays a major role in its pre-
vention, which needs to start at an early age in order to decrease the risks of developing 
one or more of the metabolic syndrome’s constituting factors.  
Hereby, in the main, two components of lifestyle modification exert a favorable in-
fluence on the metabolic syndrome’s cardiovascular disease risk factors, thus leading to 
weight reduction and an amelioration of lipid profiles, blood pressure and glucose lev-
els: For one thing, a substantial body of evidence points to the beneficial effects of lei-
sure time physical activity and to the harms of physical inactivity (sedentary behavior) 
(e.g., Gustat, Srinivasan, Elkasabany & Berenson, 2002). For the other thing, the effec-
tiveness of a healthy diet in risk reduction is assumed (e.g., Park et al., 2003; with re-
gard to the combined impact of diet and physical activity on preventing and treating the 
metabolic syndrome, see Robinson & Graham, 2004). 
 
As the descriptions show, the topic metabolic syndrome (MetS) comprises a variety 
of different symptoms and consequences, and thus entails a variety of medical concepts 
that are part of lay everyday talk, like for instance diabetes, obesity and heart infarc-
tion. Coming next, the construction of a medical questionnaire will be described that 
was designed in order to investigate lay beliefs with regard to these topics: The MetS 
Questionnaire.  
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Development of the MetS Questionnaire 
A questionnaire was constructed in order to assess lay knowledge in the domain of the 
metabolic syndrome. In the following, the construction of the questionnaire is de-
scribed.  
 
Selection of concepts. The terms listed in table 4-2 were selected which – after an ex-
tensive study of the medical literature (e.g., Greten, 2002; Hien & Böhm, 2001) – were 
deemed as highly relevant in the context of MetS. For these terms, items were con-
structed.   
 
 Table 4-2. Disorder concepts and their English translations 
Disorder concepts 
Diabetes (diabetes) 
Fettleibigkeit (adiposity)  
Hoher Blutdruck (hypertension / high blood pressure)  
Erhöhter Cholesterinspiegel (high blood cholesterol) 
Arterienverkalkung (arteriosclerosis)  
Schlaganfall (stroke) 
Herzinfarkt (cardiac infarction / infarction of the heart) 
 
Item format. The item format of true/false questions, combined with the option to re-
spond “unsure”, was chosen for the study after having considered the pros and cons of 
various item formats (which are discussed controversially; cf., Bortz & Döring, 2002; 
Ebel, 1978). For multiple choice formats, for instance, it is rather difficult and should 
be undertaken empirically to create adequate alternatives which seem equally plausible 
to the uninformed. Also, by suggesting alternatives, sensitivity is created for the possi-
bility of one’s own beliefs being inadequate. Semi-structured formats, in turn, are criti-
cized for their lack of objectivity. In the end, the above-mentioned format was chosen 
and, by adding the option 'don’t know', the most serious disadvantage of forced-choice 
item formats, i.e. the obligation to select an answer, was removed. By choosing 'don’t 
know', the laypersons were able to indicate their lack of knowledge. As an additional 
feature, whenever answering “true” or “false”, participants rated the confidence about 
their answer on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “very unsure” to “very sure”. By a 
comparison of these ratings for correct and incorrect answers, the feel that laypersons 
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have for the correctness of their own knowledge was investigated exploratorily. For an 
item example, see figure 4-1. 
 
TRUE O  FALSE  O 
 
Ο---------Ο---------Ο---------Ο---------Ο---------Ο---------Ο 
very                                          halfway                                   very  
unsure                                         sure                                           sure 
Hardening of the arteries can cause renal 
damages.  
Don’t know O 
Figure 4-1. Example of item format (English translations) 
 
Creation of an item pool. Because the scope of the present study was to obtain a fairly 
broad picture of lay knowledge, several pieces of information were selected which – 
after consultation of the medical literature (e.g., Greten, 2002; Hien & Böhm, 2001) – 
were regarded as relevant for a layperson to know about the respective concept.  Also, 
information distributed by official health organizations, patient information brochures 
from health insurance companies, and medical books written for a lay readership were 
consulted (see table 4-3 for examples). To provide an example of a piece of information 
that was regarded as relevant to know: With regard to hypertension, it is relevant for 
laypersons to know that some disorders are related, for instance that individuals with 
hypertension are more likely to suffer from arteriosclerosis than individuals without. 
Items were formulated in consideration of formal criteria to make statements lexi-
cally and syntactically as understandable as possible. By proceeding as described, an 
item pool of 127 items on disorders was constructed32.  
                                                        
32 For the purpose of material construction for a different study, participants were also presented with items on other 
concepts than on disorder concepts related to the metabolic syndrome.  For the current purpose, however, analyses 
focus on the metabolic syndrome. 
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Table 4-3. Examples of sources of medical information 
Sources of information Examples 
Medical literature Faller, A. (1999). Der Körper des Menschen [The 
human body] (13th ed.). Stuttgart: Thieme  
Hien, P. & Böhm, B. (2001). Diabeteshandbuch 
[Handbook of diabetes].  Berlin: Springer 
Greten, H. (2002). Innere Medizin [Internal 
medicine] (11th ed.). Stuttgart:  Thieme  
Information distributed by official  
health organizations 
www.gbe-bund.de  
(Federal Health Monitoring) 
www.adipositas-gesellschaft.de  
(German Adiposity Society) 
www.deutsche-gefaessliga.de  
(German League against vascular diseases)  
www.schlaganfall-hilfe.de  
(German Stroke Foundation) 
Patient information brochures Techniker Krankenkasse (2002). Diabetes 
 mellitus. 
Medical books written for lay readership Schmeisl, G.W. (2002) Schulungsbuch für  
Diabetiker [Training guide for diabetics] (4th ed.). 
München: Urban & Fischer  
Rümelin, A. (2003). Kursbuch Arthrose [Arthrosis 
guidelines]. München: Südwest  
Mathes, P. (2003). Ratgeber Herzinfarkt [Cardiac 
infarction guide] (4th ed.). Darmstadt: Steinkopff  
Vaitl, D. (2004). Ratgeber Bluthochdruck 
 [Hypertension guide]. Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
 
Preliminary expert questionnaire analyses. In one individual (60 minutes, n=1) and 
one dyadic interview session (100 minutes, n=2), the item pool was presented to 3 
medical experts, who were asked to answer the questionnaire. Afterwards, they were 
shown the true and false labeling of the items and were asked to indicate whether the 
items were (i) correctly labeled as true or false and (ii) formulated unambiguously from 
a medical point of view. Also, further comments were encouraged. After having made 
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notes for themselves, the experts discussed the items with the interviewer (i.e., with 
me). As a consequence of the interviews, 13 disorder items were deleted from the item 
pool. To provide an example: One item had initially been phrased “Liposuction is a 
therapy in adiposity treatment” which was tagged as false in the list. However, as one 
expert pointed out correctly, this item was formulated in a way that it could not unam-
biguously be tagged as false, because some obese patients consult and undergo cos-
metic surgery (liposuction) in order to deal with their weight problems. Liposuction, 
however, is surely not an advisable primary therapy for the treatment of adiposity. As a 
consequence, in order to be unequivocally taggable as false, the item was reformulated 
into “Liposuction is a state-of-the-art treatment in adiposity therapy”.  
 
In order to base item selection and validation on an even bigger sample of experts, 
an additional questionnaire study with n=33 medical experts was conducted. Advanced 
medical students were recruited in lectures and on the WWU Medical Campus and 
were paid 10 Euros for their contribution to the study. Participants filled in a version of 
the questionnaire which consisted of the remaining items.    
Because proficiency in German was essential for participation, three experts had to 
be excluded, as they had started to speak German later than early childhood. The re-
maining 30 medical students were in their fifth year of university medical training with 
M = 5.3, SD = 1.32 semester after First State Examination33. They were between 24 and 
33 years old (M = 25.13, SD = 2.01). Sixty-seven percent of the sample was female; the 
first language of 26 students was German, while the others spoke German since early 
childhood.  
Items were deleted that were not answered with either “true” or “false” by at least 
70% of the expert sample, because it was deemed likely that those items were formu-
lated ambiguously. Consequently, an additional 15 illness items were deleted from the 
pool.  
Final questionnaire. The final questionnaire consisted of 90 items (for item distri-
bution on the different concepts see table 4-4) 34. At the end of the questionnaire, sev-
eral demographic variables were assessed.  
 
                                                        
33 Medical schools in Germany are organized into a non-clinical and a clinical part, with the former requiring four se-
mesters (i.e., two years) of study. 
34 Item numbers for each of the concepts are not distributed equally (i) due the described item selection processes that 
lead to a reduction of the itempool, and (ii) due to the interplay of factual constraints of the respective topics and the 
item format (for instance, to formulate an item on the manifestation of diabetes, one would have to differentiate be-
tween different types of diabetes with different manifestation processes. Of more basic interest, however, is the as-
sessment of whether laypersons knew that there were different types of diabetes at all. Since an item on the manifes-
tation of diabetes would automatically indicate that there were different types and thus prohibit the assessment, it was 
not administered). 
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 Table 4-4. Number of items per concept 
Concepts Number of items 
Diabetes 16 
Adiposity 9 
Hypertension 12 
High blood cholesterol 6 
Arteriosclerosis 17 
Stroke 12 
Cardiac infarction 18 
∑ 90 
4.2.3 Procedure 
The study was conducted in group sessions in group rooms of the WWU. Participants 
were asked to work by themselves without flipping back pages in the questionnaire and 
could take as much time as they needed. The average participation time was 40 min-
utes. 
4.3 Data Analyses and Results  
In order to investigate the lay participants’ beliefs with regard to each concept, percent-
age scores for correct, incorrect and 'don’t know' responses were calculated. In the fol-
lowing, the knowledge of the lay sample will be described with regard to the investi-
gated beliefs. In order to provide a comprehensible overview of lay knowledge on the 
concepts, knowledge on each concept will be described only with regard to an exem-
plary subset of the investigated beliefs. The results for all 90 items, however, can be 
consulted in table 4-5 (p.70) which provides the percentages of correct responses, false 
responses, and ‚don’t know’ responses for all items. 
 
Diabetes. One interesting result concerning diabetes beliefs was that 70% were igno-
rant about the connection between diabetes and arteriosclerosis, including 37% of 
‘don’t know’-answers. While about three quarters of the sample detected correctly that 
alertness was no frequent symptom of diabetes, its most common symptom, that is, 
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frequent urination, was acknowledged by less than half of the laypersons as important 
symptom. While about half of the participants knew that in diabetes, sugar can’t enter 
the cells sufficiently, more than half erroneously assumed that diabetes was character-
ized by the fact that sugar cannot diffuse in the blood.  
 
Adiposity. By far the majority of the laypersons (89%) affirmed that adiposity was 
something other than just overweight and that nutrition was not the only factor deter-
mining adiposity. Most also knew about the link between adiposity and arteriosclerosis. 
A false adiposity belief held by a considerable amount of laypersons was that liposuc-
tion was a state-of-the-art treatment in adiposity therapy (39%).  
 
Hypertension. Two thirds of the lay sample knew that it is often difficult to make out a 
concrete cause for why a patient suffers from hypertension, while almost one third 
falsely believed that such a cause could be detected. Eighty-six percent knew that he-
redity played a role in the genesis of hypertension. Less than half knew that hyperten-
sion can cause dizziness (44% thinking that it couldn’t and 9 percent ‘don’t know’). As 
for the sequelae of hypertension, 32% thought that hypertensive individuals were as 
likely as anybody else to suffer from arteriosclerosis (and 13% didn’t know). Thirty per-
cent falsely assumed that medication could usually be discontinued when the hyperten-
sion has declined. 
 
High blood cholesterol. About half of the sample knew that heredity and high blood 
cholesterol were linked in some way, and that high blood cholesterol promotes arterio-
sclerosis. While 61% knew that high blood cholesterol does not cause acute ailments, 
39% falsely assumed fatigue to be a symptom of high blood cholesterol. By far the ma-
jority of the participants knew that treatment included a low cholesterol diet and medi-
cation.   
 
Arteriosclerosis. Laypersons had some correct, but also some erroneous ideas about 
what actually happens in the arteries in arteriosclerosis. While 41% knew that blood 
platelets accumulate on the walls of the arteries, 47% denied the correct fact that fat 
also does. More than half of the lay sample knew that arteries do not contract when 
sclerotic and do not soften, but rather get less elastic, while almost all laypersons have 
denied the true fact that arteries also get brittle. While almost 70% knew that arterio-
sclerosis can not be cured completely, more than half erroneously assumed that there 
was medication that could free arteries from the sediments. Almost 30% erroneously 
assumed that the risk of arteriosclerosis was not hereditary. 
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Stroke. While almost all of the laypersons knew that a stroke affects the brain, eleven 
percent falsely assumed that a stroke is caused when overexcited cells produce too 
much electricity (26% ‘don’t know’). Twelve percent falsely denied the fact that a stroke 
is caused by artery obstruction (plus 9% who didn’t know). More than one third of the 
sample thought that a stroke announces itself through chest pains (which often precede 
a cardiac infarction), while also more than one third denied the true fact that stroke 
typically announces itself through speech problems. One third of the sample lacked 
knowledge on the link between diabetes and stroke. Almost all of the laypersons knew 
that a stroke is very likely to cause permanent damages. 
 
Heart infarction. While 72% of the participants knew that cardiac infarction was 
caused by artery obstruction, almost 70% falsely assumed that malfunctioning of the 
heart valves caused the infarction. While more than 80% of the participants knew that 
the oxygen supply of the heart was affected by an infarction, only 47% knew that car-
diac muscle tissue dies in an infarction. Almost 30% of the participants thought that 
damage caused by an infarction was usually non-permanent. Almost 70% of the par-
ticipants thought that a heart infarction was preceded by loss of sensation and numb-
ness (plus 6% didn’t know), and almost half thought that it is followed typically by pa-
ralysis phenomena (plus 8% ‘don’t know’); both applies to stroke rather than infarction. 
Twenty-eight percent denied the fact that diabetes was a predisposing factor for a heart 
infarction (26% ‘don’t know).  
 
 
 Table 4-5. Percentages of responses to questionnaire items 
 Correct 
response 
% correct 
response 
% false 
response 
% don’t 
know 
Diabetes     
There are several different types of diabetes. True 88 5 7 
Hereditary factors play a major role in the development of diabetes.  True 85 12 3 
An increased alertness is a frequent symptom of diabetes.  False 77 10 13 
Hereditary factors play only a minor role in the development of  
diabetes.  
False 65 27 8 
Pregnant women have a reduced risk of acquiring diabetes. False 64 5 30 
Eye disorders can be consequences of diabetes.  True 60 25 15 
For some diabetics it is not advisable to take insulin. True 60 30 10 
Diabetics may only eat special sweets for diabetics.  False 59 41 0 
With diabetes, sugar cannot enter the cells sufficiently. True 57 32 11 
Poor appetite is a frequent symptom of diabetes.  False 54 24 22 
With Diabetes, too much sugar enters the cells.  False 53 32 15 
Pregnant women have an increased risk of acquiring diabetes.  True 51 34 15 
Frequent urination is a frequent symptom of diabetes. True 47 35 18 
Diabetes patients must have insulin shots. False 34 66 0 
Arteriosclerosis is one of the sequelae of diabetes. True 30 34 37 
With Diabetes, sugar cannot diffuse in the blood. False 29 52 19 
S
tu
d
y I: N
ot qu
ite b
lan
k slates –
 Q
u
estion
n
aire su
rvey of lay m
ed
ical b
eliefs                               71 
  
Correct 
response 
% correct 
response 
% false 
response 
% don’t 
know 
Adiposity     
Adipose individuals have an elevated risk of suffering heart infarction. True 99 0 1 
Adiposity is not only caused by nutrition, other factors contribute as 
well.  
False 98 0 2 
An excessively fatty, high-caloric diet is the only factor that determines 
adiposity.  
False 97 2 1 
The terms ‘overweight’ and ‘adiposity’ are synonyms.  False 89 9 2 
Cessation of breathing while sleeping is a possible consequence of adi-
posity.  
True 88 11 1 
Adipose individuals have the same risk than non-adipose individuals of 
suffering a stroke.  
False 76 20 4 
Adipose individuals are more likely to suffer from arteriosclerosis.  True 68 15 16 
Liposuction is a state-of-the-art treatment in adiposity therapy.  False 59 39 2 
Adiposity can be treated surgically.  True 50 46 4 
Hypertension     
Hypertension is associated with heredity.  True 86 8 6 
For the most part, a concrete single reason of why a patient suffers from 
hypertension can be determined.  
False 67 31 2 
Pregnant woman are less likely to suffer from hypertension.  False 65 6 29 
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Correct 
response 
% correct 
response 
% false 
response 
% don’t 
know 
After medication has lowered hypertension, the medication can usually 
be discontinued.  
False 62 29 9 
People with hypertension are as likely to suffer from arteriosclerosis as 
those with normal hypertension.  
False 53 32 15 
Pregnant women are as likely to suffer from hypertension as non-
pregnant women.  
False 50 21 29 
Individuals with hypertension are less likely to suffer from arteriosclero-
sis.  
False 49 25 27 
Hypertension can cause dizziness.  True 47 44 9 
Hypertension can be caused by disorders of the thyroid gland.  True 45 28 28 
Hypertension can cause renal damage.  True 37 37 27 
Hypertension can lead to eye disorders.  True 36 47 17 
Hypertension can be caused by cerebral tumors.  True 18 50 32 
High blood cholesterol     
A low cholesterol diet can supplement therapy for high blood cholesterol. True 95 1 4 
High blood cholesterol can be treated with medication.  True 85 10 5 
High blood cholesterol does not cause acute ailments.  True 61 29 10 
High blood cholesterol is not associated with hereditary factors.  False 55 31 14 
High blood cholesterol promotes arteriosclerosis.  True 53 13 34 
S
tu
d
y I: N
ot qu
ite b
lan
k slates –
  Q
u
estion
n
aire su
rvey of lay m
ed
ical b
eliefs                             73 
  
 Correct 
response 
% correct 
response 
% false 
response 
% don’t 
know 
Fatigue is a frequent symptom of high blood cholesterol. False 42 39 19 
Arteriosclerosis     
Arteriosclerosis increases the risk of suffering a stroke.  True 83 7 10 
Leg pains are a symptom of arteriosclerosis. True 70 16 13 
With arteriosclerosis, arteries become softer.  False 69 5 26 
Arteriosclerosis can be cured completely.  False 67 14 18 
With arteriosclerosis, arteries contract. False 59 29 12 
With arteriosclerosis, arteries become less elastic.  True 58 20 21 
As a result of arteriosclerosis, blood pressure is likely to decline. False 53 16 31 
As a result of arteriosclerosis, blood pressure is likely to increase.  True 51 18 31 
High blood pressure and arteriosclerosis are not linked with each other.  False 50 36 14 
In arteriosclerosis, a sustainer can be inserted into the artery in order to 
stabilize it. 
True 50 24 27 
The risk of suffering from arteriosclerosis is not hereditary. False 48 29 24 
Arteriosclerosis can cause renal damage.  True 45 28 28 
With arteriosclerosis, blood platelets accumulate on the arterial walls.  True 41 31 29 
With arteriosclerosis, fat accumulates on the arterial walls.  True 36 47 17 
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Correct 
response 
% correct 
response 
% false 
response 
% don’t 
know 
Individuals with high blood pressure are more likely to suffer from arte-
riosclerosis.  
True 29 49 22 
Medication can remove completely sediments from the arteries. False 26 51 24 
With arteriosclerosis, arteries become brittle. True 25 49 27 
Stroke     
A stroke affects the brain.  True 98 2 0 
If a patient survives a stroke, there are usually no permanent conse-
quences.  
False 98 2 0 
Permanent speech defects are possible consequences of a stroke.  True 96 3 1 
A stroke is often followed by memory dysfunction.  True 87 11 2 
There are different types of strokes. True 82 11 7 
A stroke is caused by artery obstruction.  True 79 12 9 
The nutrient supply to the brain is not affected by a stroke. False 78 16 6 
A stroke is characterized by a sudden dysfunction of the heart.  False 65 28 7 
A stroke is caused when overexcited cells produce too much 
electricity.  
False 63 11 26 
A stroke is preceded frequently by chest pains. False 58 34 8 
A stroke is preceded frequently by speech problems. True 58 38 4 
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 Correct 
response 
% correct 
response 
% false 
response 
% don’t 
know 
Diabetics are more likely to suffer a stroke.  True 32 37 32 
Heart infarction     
Smoking is a minor risk factor with respect to a heart infarction.  False 96 3 1 
When suffering a heart infarction, pain may radiate into the arms.  True 86 5 9 
The oxygen supply to the heart is not affected by a heart infarction.  False 81 15 4 
Hereditary factors play a role in the risk of suffering a heart infarction.   True 79 19 2 
After a heart infarction, anticoagulants are administered.  True 78 7 15 
A heart infarction is caused by cerebral deregulation of the heart.  False 77 10 13 
A heart infarction is often preceded by shortness of breath.  True 74 17 9 
A heart infarction is caused by arterial obstruction.  True 72 15 12 
Damage caused by a heart infarction is not usually permanent.  False 62 29 9 
After a heart infarction has occurred, parts of the cardiac muscle tissue 
can die.  
True 58 29 13 
A heart infarction must be treated surgically.  False 57 40 3 
With a heart infarction, cardiac muscle tissue dies.   True 47 34 19 
Diabetes is a predisposing factor for a heart infarction.  True 47 28 26 
A heart infarction is typically followed by some degree of paralysis.  False 44 48 8 
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 Correct 
response 
% correct 
response 
% false 
response 
% don’t 
know 
When suffering a heart infarction, pain may radiate into the stomach.  True 27 54 19 
A heart infarction is caused by malfunction of one or more heart valves.  False 25 68 7 
A heart infarction is usually preceded by loss of sensation and numbness. False 25 69 6 
A heart infarction can manifest itself through nausea and vomiting.  True 22 58 19 
Note. These English items are translations of the original German ones. A thematical list of the German items can be found in appendix A1. 
Due to rounding, percentages sometimes may seem not to add up to exactly 100. For each concept, items are presented sorted in declining order of the  
percentage of correct responses. However, in the administered questionnaire, all items were presented in a randomized order. 
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In sum, while there are numerous correct beliefs held by the participants with regard to 
each of the investigated concepts, also false beliefs for each concept are widely spread. 
Hereby, are some knowledge areas more problematic for laypersons than others? An 
additional, exploratory analysis was conducted in order to explore the structure of the 
laypersons’ knowledge, that is, to explore which aspects of illness knowledge were more 
and which less problematic for laypersons. For this aim, the item statements were allo-
cated to the following four categories35 36: 
• Enabling conditions of an illness (27 items) 
Items on patient and contextual factors that contribute to the development of an 
illness.  
Item example: Hereditary factors play a major role in the development of diabe-
tes. (True) 
• Pathophysiological processes (18 items) 
Items about the malfunctioning that occurs in an illness.  
Item example: With diabetes, too much sugar enters the cells. (False) 
• Consequences of an illness (27 items) 
Items on probable short-term and long-term consequences of an illness.  
Item example: Permanent speech defects are possible consequences of a stroke. 
(True)  
• Procedures (12 items) 
Items on treatment procedures and medication.  
Item example: Liposuction is a state-of-the-art treatment in adiposity therapy. 
(False)  
 
The allocation of items to the four knowledge aspects was subjected to an independ-
ent coding; intercoder agreement was 95.83 %. Because of the explorative character of 
this analysis, (p < .05) is defined as significant and (p < .10) as a trend. With Cohen 
(1988), the effect sizes will be interpreted as follows: ηp² < .06 as small effect, ηp² be-
tween .06 and .13 as medium effect and >.13 as large effect; d<.5 as small effect, d be-
tween .5 and .8 as medium effect and >.8 as large effect.   
For all attribute classes, a mean knowledge score was calculated for each layperson, 
by dividing the sum of correctly answered items by the sum of all items in the respec-
tive component. To determine whether the students’ knowledge differed systematically 
between the different knowledge components, a repeated-measures ANOVA with 
knowledge components as within-subject factor was conducted, and this factor turned 
out to be highly significant, F(3, 95) = 8.16, p < .001, ηp² = .21, large effect.   
                                                        
35 The categories were chosen following the components of the illness script proposed by Boshuizen and colleagues (e.g., 
Boshuizen,2003), cf. section 2.1.1.  
36 Hereby, six of the 90 items were excluded, because they did not match the knowledge components. 
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Post-hoc comparisons of means were performed with t-tests37 and indicated that lay 
knowledge fell into three groups. Hereby, the lay participants knew most about the ena-
bling conditions (M = .63, SD = .15), followed by treatment procedures (M = .60, SD = 
.14). Knowledge scores on illness consequences (M = .57, SD = .14) and on pathophysi-
ological processes (M = .56, SD = .16) were lowest and did not differ statistically from 
each other (see table 4-6).  
Thus, participants knew least about the bodily processes that occur in an illness and 
about the consequences of an illness. They knew more about treatment and medication, 
and most about the enabling conditions. Even though this distinction into three groups 
is supported partly only by trends, and the effect sizes of the t-tests are rather small, the 
distinction provides a first exploratory indication of lay knowledge structure.  
 
Table 4-6. Post hoc-comparisons of knowledge aspects 
Comparisons t(97) p d 
Enabling conditions - Procedures  2.14 < .05 .24 
Enabling conditions - Consequences 4.59 < .001 .46 
Enabling conditions - Processes 4.21 < .001 .45 
Procedures - Consequences 1.82 < .10 .21 
Procedures - Processes 1.86 < .10 .22 
Consequences - Processes .26 ns .02 
 
There is a substantial amount of disparity in the lay sample concerning conceptual 
knowledge on the assessed terms. Laypersons gave a maximum of 61 and a minimum of 
zero ‘don’t know’- answers (M = 12.75; SD = 14.01). With regard to correct responses, a 
minimum of 28 correct responses and a maximum of 81 correct responses were given 
out of the 90 items (M = 54.76, SD = 9.71). The laypersons gave M = 23.29 incorrect 
responses on average (i.e. the incorrect choice of ‘true’ or ‘false; Min = 4, Max = 45, SD 
= 8.38).  
 
As already mentioned, also the confidence ratings that the participants gave for each 
of their 'true' and 'false' answers were analyzed. Table 4-7 shows the means and stan-
dard deviations for all confidence ratings, for confidence ratings of only correct re-
sponses and of confidence ratings for incorrect responses. Also, the minimums and 
maximums of the participants’ mean confidence ratings are reported.  
                                                        
37 Since the t tests can be considered as protected t tests, there was no correction for inflation of Type I error rate.  
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Table 4-7. Means and standard deviations of different confidence ratings 
 
M SD 
Min of 
mean con-
fidence 
Max of 
mean con-
fidence 
All confidence ratings 4.23 .75 2.24 6.06 
Confidence ratings of correct  
answers 
4.45 .78 2.17 6.17 
Confidence ratings of incorrect 
answers 
3.82 .73 2.23 5.94 
 
As the table shows, there is a substantial variation between the participants as to 
how confident they were about their answers, with a rather wide range of mean confi-
dences for all confidence ratings in general, as well as for confidence ratings of correct 
and of incorrect answers. A t-test performed to compare mean confidence ratings of 
correct and incorrect answers revealed that the participants were more confident with 
regard to their correct than with regard to their incorrect answers, t(97) = 13.85, 
p<.001, d = .84, large effect. 
4.4 Discussion  
‘Diabetes’, ‘stroke’ and ‘hypertension’ are terms that are frequently used in lay everyday 
medical talk, as well as the other four illness concepts for which lay understanding was 
investigated in Study I. For each of these terms, a number of aspects were selected 
which are important for laypersons to know (as inspections of the medical literature, of 
patient information brochures and of information on official health organizations’ 
Internet sites had shown). In order to assess the beliefs that laypersons hold with re-
gard to these illness concepts, a questionnaire was developed and answered by a stu-
dent lay sample. On the basis of the participants’ answers to the questionnaire items, 
the main research aim of the study was to describe widespread lay beliefs; the beliefs 
were outlined separately for each concept in a descriptive analysis. The results of this 
analysis show that laypersons are no ‘blank slates’ – while there are certainly many 
pieces of information that are not known to the laypersons; laypersons also have nu-
merous correct or erroneous medical beliefs. Thus, for instance, many participants as-
sumed a malfunctioning of the heart valves to be responsible for cardiac infarction. Or, 
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to provide a second example, the study showed that many laypersons seemed to get the 
symptoms of cardiac infarction and stroke mixed up.  
In addition to a description of frequent lay beliefs for each term separately, an ex-
ploratory analysis aimed at investigating across terms whether laypersons were more 
knowledgeable with regard to some aspects of knowledge than with regard to others. 
This analysis revealed that participants were most knowledgeable about the conditions 
that contribute to the manifestation of an illness, followed by knowledge about how 
illnesses are treated. Least was known about the micro-processes and consequences of 
illnesses. As described in section 2.1.3, results from cognitive research on lay knowledge 
have described that lay knowledge comprises the superficial aspects of knowledge, for 
instance the perceptually salient elements. The results partly support these findings, in 
that the laypersons were least knowledgeable about the (perceptually not salient) mi-
cro-processes of an illness. The fact that the participants also showed comparatively 
little knowledge about the consequences of an illness is somewhat more surprising. 
However, these results are only indications based on a first exploratory analysis. Future 
research will need to shed more light on knowledge structures of laypersons.  
The lay sample showed a big disparity with regard to how much they knew and how 
many false beliefs they held. Also, the laypersons differed considerably in how confi-
dent they were about their answers. While the mean confidence rating was only slightly 
higher than the middle of the 7-point scale, the laypersons showed some sense of 
whether their answers were right or not, because the confidence ratings were signifi-
cantly higher in those cases in which the participants had given a correct answer than 
in those that they had given an incorrect answer. Taken together, the laypersons were 
not very efficient at estimating their own knowledge, which is in line with the results on 
the estimation of laypersons of their own knowledge as presented in section 2.1.3.  
 
Results of studies that describe concrete lay medical beliefs like the ones obtained in 
this study point towards problematic aspects of lay understanding. Thus, the study con-
tributes to the body of research that is devoted to shed more light on lay understanding 
of common medical terms and through this adds to the existing literature (see section 
2.1.2) by complementing it with results for concepts related to the topic ‘metabolic syn-
drome’. Thus, the results of study I are also of practical value, because an awareness of 
lay knowledge can help physicians to provide explanations which are appropriate to a 
lay level of understanding. Thus, in addition to being a prerequisite for the other stud-
ies that are described in this dissertation, the results of study I are of practical relevance 
to physicians.  
Study I provides results for a sample of lay college students enrolled in courses other 
than natural sciences and thus for a population of laypersons that is (a) highly relevant 
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in terms of prevention and (b) likely to be more educated than the general population. 
As a consequence, the results cannot be extrapolated to laypersons in general, but they 
give sufficient evidence to assume that false beliefs should be as widespread (if not 
more) in other lay populations than the student one as well.  
 
With regard to expert-layperson communication, the results show that also in the 
domain of interest in this dissertation (i.e., issues within the broad field of the meta-
bolic syndrome), a medical expert cannot take for granted that her lay interlocutor has 
a sufficient understanding of concepts that are part of the conversation. This becomes 
even clearer when one considers the great disparity that was found in Study I, and it 
applies to terms that are introduced by the expert into the conversation as well as to 
terms that are introduced by the layperson herself. Studies II through IV of this disser-
tation will investigate how experts react when an erroneous understanding on part of 
the layperson is displayed in a layperson’s utterance for the conversational context of 
email health counseling.  
 5 Study II: The impact of a display of lay beliefs on medical 
experts’ anticipation of lay knowledge  
5.1 Introduction 
When experts communicate with laypersons in email counseling settings, the interlocu-
tors cannot hear nor see each other, and thus cannot give feedback through gesture, 
mimic or paraverbal features on whether they have understood the other’s utterance. 
As a consequence, it is more difficult for the expert to draw inferences about her lay 
interlocutor’s knowledge; at the same time, it is vitally important to draw those infer-
ences: As communication usually only consists of one turn (one lay email query being 
followed by one expert answer), the expert cannot elicit the layperson’s knowledge in a 
stepwise manner during the course of a longer conversation, but has to rely on the writ-
ten query text as only source of information (see section 2.4.2).  
One type of information on the lay interlocutor’s knowledge that stems directly from 
the email query text is those instances in which the layperson utters false beliefs in her 
email. As the results of Study I showed, medical laypersons hold a variety of false be-
liefs with regard to important concepts in the field ‘metabolic syndrome’. In Study II, 
to-be-described next, the impact of this type of information on experts’ assessment of 
their lay interlocutor’s knowledge was investigated. Consequently, the following re-
search question was formulated:  
 
How does a display of false beliefs in the lay query impact on the experts’ assessment 
of the lay query author’s knowledge?  
 
Study II introduces a paradigm that allows for the comparison of experts’ knowledge 
anticipation for cases in which the lay nature of the email author’s understanding of 
medical concepts is evident in the email to a different degree. In this paradigm, the 
medical experts are provided with a lay email query, in which a (fictitious) layperson- 
upon describing her38 situation – uses several medical concepts as for instance ‘arterio-
sclerosis’ (from the broad field of the metabolic syndrome, diabetes was chosen as main 
topic of the query). The query is realized in 3 versions; in the first version, the layper-
son utters a false belief for each of these concepts (FB query version). As described, 
these false beliefs do not only inform on the layperson’s concrete misunderstanding, 
                                                        
38 The gender of the email author was irrelevant for this study in that it was not deducible from the email text. When 
referring to the fictitious lay email author, however, I will stick with the female form. 
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but also point to the fact that there is a general deficiency to lay term understanding. In 
the second version, a correct belief is uttered by the layperson for each concept (CB 
query version). Obviously, if a correct belief is uttered, the expert is not made aware of 
the lay concept misunderstandings (rather on the contrary, i.e. it rather obscures the 
lay nature of concept knowledge). In the third version, there are no beliefs displayed 
alongside the concepts (NB query version; for a detailed description of the query ver-
sions, see 5.2.2). After reading the query, the experts rate the layperson’s knowledge in 
a questionnaire. Due to the manipulation of beliefs in the query versions, the impact of 
a display of false beliefs on the experts’ knowledge assessment can be estimated by 
comparing the assessment in the false-beliefs condition with the ones in the two other 
conditions. 
 
In section 2.2, I have proposed a structural parallel between expert-layperson com-
munication in formal and informal learning settings. Research studies on face-to-face 
tutorial dialogue in formal learning settings have shown that the tutors in these settings 
have difficulties in acknowledging a tutee’s erroneous knowledge: The tutors do not 
build up an elaborate representation of the tutee’s knowledge and rather tend to over-
estimate correct understanding; this holds especially for so-called open-world domains 
like for instance medicine, that is, domains in which errors do not consist in giving the 
wrong answer to a yes-or-no problem, or to a simple question, but in a more complex 
misunderstanding on part of the tutee.  
Tutors do, however, not only have difficulties in acknowledging erroneous tutee un-
derstanding in general, but also with regard to erroneous knowledge that is uttered 
explicitly by the tutee during the tutorial session: In the study by Chi et al. (2004), for 
instance, the authors analyzed how tutors reacted when tutees uttered erroneous know-
ledge in a tutorial session. Frequently, these errors were not addressed at all (meaning 
that neither a feedback about the incorrectness of the knowledge deficit nor the correct 
knowledge was provided). These results were interpreted as a failure to detect the 
knowledge deficits (cf. section 2.2).  
Taking this interpretation as a basis, one might assume that just as in face-to-face 
formal tutorial settings, the experts in email health counseling might not acknowledge 
the erroneous knowledge that is uttered by the layperson, resulting in the following 
hypothesis: 
 
• Disregard hypothesis:  
The display of false beliefs does not impact on the experts’ estimation of lay 
knowledge. With regard to the three versions of the email query that are realized 
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in Study II, this would result in no differences between experts’ knowledge rat-
ings in the three conditions. 
 
It needs to be considered, however, that inferences supposedly do play a bigger role 
in email communication than in face-to-face communication (cf. section 2.3.1). As al-
ready mentioned above, the characteristics (constraints sensu Clark and Brennan, 1991) 
of online communication make it harder to establish common ground in email than in 
face-to-face communication (cf. section 2.4.2). Considering the lacking feedback possi-
bilities and the fact of usually only a singular conversational turn, and given that the 
email is visible and reviewable, it is plausible to assume that the conversational sce-
nario of online health counseling calls for a more thorough consideration of the lay in-
terlocutor’s conversational contribution. As a consequence, the experts might build up 
a more thorough and detailed representation of the layperson’s knowledge. Hereby, the 
display of false beliefs in the email query contains two types of information: Thus, it 
does not only inform on the layperson’s concrete false beliefs, but it also hints to the 
fact of the characteristic deficiency of lay understanding (that is, the fact that layper-
sons frequently hold erroneous beliefs. Which of these two informational values will be 
taken into account by the experts?  
In order to translate the preceding considerations into hypotheses, I shall coin the 
term beliefs-related prior knowledge in order to refer to knowledge that relates directly 
to those knowledge pieces about which beliefs were displayed, and the term topic prior 
knowledge in order to refer to knowledge that refers to the topic of the query but is not 
related to the displayed beliefs. Thereby resulting, based on the afore-sketched consid-
erations concerning the characteristics of email counseling, the following two hypothe-
ses can be formulated: 
 
• Specific impact hypothesis:  
The display of beliefs impacts on the experts’ beliefs-related prior knowledge as-
sessment. As a consequence, the lay email author will be estimated as less knowl-
edgeable about these knowledge pieces when the email contains false beliefs than 
when it does contain no beliefs or correct beliefs. The layperson should be esti-
mated as more knowledgeable about the knowledge pieces, however, when the 
email contains correct beliefs than when it does not contain these or when it con-
tains false beliefs. With regard to topic prior knowledge, no differences in knowl-
edge estimation of the lay authors of the three different email versions are ex-
pected.  
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• Generalizative impact hypothesis:  
The display of beliefs impacts on the experts’ assessment in a generalizative way, 
that is, with regard to both beliefs-related prior knowledge and topic prior knowl-
edge. As a consequence, the knowledge ratings will not only differ with regard to 
the beliefs-related prior knowledge, but also with regard to topic prior knowledge. 
Concretely, if this was the case, the lay email author will be estimated as less 
knowledgeable about knowledge pieces of the thematic field (both related to the 
beliefs and not) when the email contains false beliefs than when it does contain no 
or correct beliefs. The layperson will be estimated as more knowledgeable about 
the knowledge pieces of the thematic field, however, when the email contains cor-
rect beliefs than when it does not contain these (or when it contains false) beliefs.  
 
The three delineated alternative outcomes (disregard of display of beliefs / specific 
impact of display of beliefs / topic-general impact of display of beliefs) are depicted 
graphically in table 5-1 and are investigated in the present Study II.  
 
 Table 5-1. Alternative outcomes of Study II 
Disregard of display of beliefs 
 FB CB NB 
False beliefs in email (FB)  =/ = = / = 
Correct beliefs in email (CB)   = / = 
Specific impact of display of beliefs 
 FB CB NB 
False beliefs in email (FB)  </ = < / = 
Correct beliefs in email (CB)   > / = 
Generalizative impact of display of beliefs 
 FB CB NB 
False beliefs in email (FB)  </ < < / < 
Correct beliefs in email (CB)   > / > 
Note. This table is to be read following the lines from left to right. The black symbols refer 
to the hypothesized specific impact, the grey ones to the hypothesized overall impact. The 
first line of the specific impact hypothesis (FB condition), for instance, says that according 
to this hypothesis, the experts’ ratings should be lower for those knowledge pieces about 
which beliefs are uttered in the FB than in the CB and in the NB condition. For the overall 
impact, however, no differences are expected.  
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In addition to answering the knowledge assessment questionnaire in which the 
medical experts rated the layperson’s knowledge with regard to concrete knowledge 
issues, the medical experts were also asked to give a holistic assessment of the layper-
son’s diabetes knowledge. Thus, the impact of the inserted lay beliefs on an overall im-
pression was investigated.   
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Advanced medical students (n=75) from a German university were asked at the end of 
lectures to participate in our study. In order to assess their knowledge in the domain of 
diabetes, the experts completed a 15-item diabetes knowledge questionnaire (see sec-
tion 5.2.2). Three participants answered less than 10 items correctly and were excluded 
from the analyses. 
Fifty-four per cent of the remaining participants were female. The mean age was 
24.2 years (SD=2.73). The students were in their fourth year of university medical 
training39 (M = 3.17, SD = .80 semesters after First State Examination). Participants 
were rewarded for participation with candy and by having a one-in-five chance of win-
ning € 5 in a raffle. 
5.2.2 Materials 
Diabetes questionnaire 
In addition to choosing medical students at the end of their university training in order 
to ensure that the participants would be medical experts, a test was developed to test 
the participants’ knowledge specifically for the specific thematic field of the query, that 
is, diabetes. After a thorough consultation of the medical literature (e.g., Böhm, 
Palitzsch, Rosak, & Spinas, 2001; Hien & Böhm, 2001; Scherbaum, 2002; Greten, 
2002), a 15-item questionnaire was constructed in order to test the participants’ diabe-
tes knowledge. The data of those participants that had answered less then ten items 
correctly were excluded from the study.  
The questionnaire is displayed in table 5-2. For the original, German version of the 
questionnaire, see appendix B1. 
 
                                                        
39 Medical schools in Germany are organized into a non-clinical and a clinical part, with the former requiring four se-
mesters (i.e., two years) of study and concluding with the First State Examination. 
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Table 5-2. Diabetes questionnaire (English translation) 
 True False 
Don’t 
know 
In diabetes, glucose absorption into the cells is increased.     
Lack of appetite is a frequent symptom of diabetes.    
An insulin overdose is a cause of hypoglycaemia.*    
Polydipsia is a symptom of diabetes. *    
The early detection test of diabetes-caused renal damages is 
called macroalbuminuria test. 
   
The HBA1c  level is a measure of the blood glucose levels of the 
last three months.* 
   
A clinically manifest diabetes starts at fasting blood sugar lev-
els of 20 mmol/l.  
   
Diabetes type 2 is characterized by an absolute lack of insulin.     
Retinopathy is one of the complications of diabetes.*    
Most type 2 diabetics are overweight. *    
Insulin is released in constant quantities.     
Insulin causes sugar to dissolve in the blood.     
Arteriosclerosis is one of the complications of diabetes.*     
Some type 2 diabetics have an elevated insulin secretion.*    
Adiposity starts at a BMI of 25.      
Note. Correct items are marked with a * 
 
Patient email query 
As already pointed out in the introduction, a query was constructed in which a layper-
son described how a physician had recently confronted her with the diagnosis ‘diabe-
tes’, about which certain aspects had remained unclear to her. The topic type 2 diabetes 
was chosen because, though relevant for a considerable number of people, the general 
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public’s knowledge about it is not as widespread as to rule out further informational 
needs. In order to ensure that the medical expert would engage in explaining subject-
matters to the patient (instead of just giving a simple yes-or-no answer or some empa-
thetic or advisory commentary), the query closed with questions that needed some ex-
planations of medical relations (for instance an explanation of the effects of increased 
insulin production on receptor desensitization). This was especially relevant in order to 
be able to investigate the answering behavior of the medical experts. This is undertaken 
in study III, which uses the same query (versions) as study II.  
The query was constructed in three versions, displaying either various false beliefs 
(condition FB) or correct beliefs (condition CB) related to central concepts in the query, 
or which did not contain these beliefs (condition NB). For instance, the fictitious lay-
person stated that “my mother also suffers from diabetes, I guess therefore I had a 
higher risk myself” (CB) vs. “my mother also suffers from diabetes, that’s quite a coin-
cidence” (FB) vs. “my mother also suffers from diabetes” (NB), thus exhibiting (or not) 
her understanding of the role of heredity in diabetes. The patient query in version FB is 
displayed in figure 5-1, in which the two parts (i) patient describes her situation and (ii) 
patient poses questions  (i.e. the final part of the query, starting with ‘I know what I am 
supposed to do, but my questions to you are:’) are marked with arrows.  
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Figure 5-1.  (Fictitious) lay query (English translation) 
 
Apart from the addition of beliefs in the FB and CB queries, there were no further 
differences between the three query versions. As can be seen in figure 5-1, the beliefs in 
the FB and CB versions were only inserted into that part of the query in which the pa-
tient described her own situation. The questions at the end of the query were identical 
in all three conditions.  Table 5-3 provides an overview of the manipulations of this 
study. To read all three versions of the query, see appendices B2 for the German and B3 
for the English versions.  
 
 
 
Description 
Questions 
Hello,  
 
I am 55 years old and I am suffering from adiposity (87 kg, 1meter70), 
which is not a problem for my health per se. I have never had any 
seriours health problems, but last week I went to a routine health 
check up and my doctor found that my blood sugar level was too high. 
I’d had a chocolate tart the day before, though. The doctor told me 
that I have type 2 diabetes. My mother also has it, what a coincidence. 
Now I have to go see a diet advisor and engage in physical activity. I 
was told that this was also necessary to prevent arteriosclerosis, and I 
really don’t want worn-out joints. I asked my doctor   
why I can’t just inject insulin, but he told me that I had enough insu-
lin in my blood, seems like my insulin intake with food is sufficient. 
That kind of surprised me, as people always say that you have to in-
ject insulin when you have diabetes. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I know what I am supposed to do, but I still would like to ask you the 
following questions: 
Why am I suffering from this disease even though I apparently have 
enough insulin in my blood? What does insulin do in the body? And 
in which way do diabetes and arteriosclerosis have to do with each 
other? 
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Table 5-3. Manipulation of Study II (English translation) 
CB FB NB 
I am 55 years old and I am 
suffering from adiposity (87 
kg, 1meter 70), and I am 
aware that that is a health 
risk. 
I am 55 years old and I am 
suffering from adiposity (87 
kg, 1meter 70), which is not a 
problem for my health per 
se. 
I am 55 years old and I am 
suffering from adiposity (87 
kg, 1meter 70). 
I have never had any serious 
health problems, but last 
week I went to a routine 
health check up and my doc-
tor found that my blood 
sugar level was too high. This 
was surely not only due to 
the chocolate tart that I’d 
had the day before. 
I have never had any serious 
health problems, but last 
week I went to a routine 
health check up and my doc-
tor found that my blood 
sugar level was too high. I’d 
had a chocolate tart the day 
before, though. 
I have never had any serious 
health problems, but last 
week I went to a routine 
health check up and my doc-
tor found that my blood 
sugar level was too high. 
The doctor told me that I 
have type 2 diabetes. My 
mother also has it, which 
probably made me more 
vulnerable for it. 
The doctor told me that I 
have type 2 diabetes. My 
mother also has it, what a 
coincidence. 
The doctor told me that I 
have type 2 diabetes. My 
mother also has it. 
I was told that this was also 
necessary to prevent arterio-
sclerosis, and I really don’t 
want jammed arteries. 
I was told that this was also 
necessary to prevent arterio-
sclerosis, and I really don’t 
want worn-out joints 
I was told that this was also 
necessary to prevent arterio-
sclerosis. 
I asked my doctor why I can’t 
just inject insulin, but he told 
me that I had enough insulin 
in my blood, seems like I 
produce enough insulin. 
I asked my doctor why I can’t 
just inject insulin, but he told 
me that I had enough insulin 
in my blood, seems like my 
insulin intake with food is 
sufficient.   
I asked my doctor why I can’t 
just inject insulin, but he told 
me that I had enough insulin 
in my blood. 
Note. For the purpose of demonstration, the concepts with regard to which beliefs are displayed in the 
query are underlined, the corresponding beliefs are written in italics. 
 
Knowledge assessment questionnaire 
In order to investigate the experts’ assessment of the lay author’s knowledge, a knowl-
edge assessment questionnaire was constructed which consisted of 20 specific knowl-
edge items (e.g. How much does the patient that wrote the inquiry know about the 
symptoms of diabetes?). All items had to be answered using a 7-point Likert scale with 
verbally anchored points ranging from ‘very little’ to ‘very much’. Figure 5-2 shows the 
item format of the knowledge assessment questionnaire.  
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How much does the patient that wrote the inquiry know about… 
 Very 
little 
Little 
Rather 
little 
Medium 
Rather 
much 
Much 
Very 
much 
… the role of heredity in diabe-
tes? 
O O O O O O O 
 
Figure 5-2. Example of item of the knowledge questionnaire 
 
With the help of the 20 specific knowledge items, the experts’ knowledge anticipa-
tion could be assessed for different facets of diabetes knowledge. In the introductory 
section of this chapter, I explained how the beliefs that are inserted into the lay emails 
might impact on the experts’ assessment of the laypersons knowledge not only on a 
local level (i.e. with regard to that very beliefs), but also on a broader level. This 
‘broader level’ can be further differentiated. Thus, due to the inserted beliefs, the lay-
person might be assessed as less (or more) knowledgeable about (i) issues related to the 
manipulation of false vs. correct vs. no beliefs, but also with regard to (ii) other issues 
mentioned in the query; (iii) issues related to the layperson’s questions at the end of the 
query; and (iv) other aspects of diabetes that were not subject of the query. Thus, (i) 
focuses on the assessment of beliefs-related prior knowledge, while (ii) through (iv) 
focus on aspects of topic-prior knowledge. These knowledge facets are assessed by 5 
items each in the questionnaire. In the following, I will explain these facets as well as 
provide the corresponding items. In the original questionnaire, however, the items 
were presented in a randomized order. The original German questionnaire as well as its 
English version can be viewed in appendices B4 and B5.  
 
• Issues related to the manipulation of false vs. correct vs. no beliefs. 
These items treated the facts about which the patient had uttered beliefs in the CB 
and FB queries. For instance, the patient had said that it was a coincidence that 
her mother was also suffering from diabetes. In the related item of the knowledge 
assessment questionnaire, the experts had to rate how much they thought the pa-
tient knew about the role of heredity in diabetes. The five items that belong to this 
category are:   
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How much does the patient that wrote the inquiry know about… 
… the sequelae that adiposity can have? 
… the functioning of blood sugar regulation? 
… the role of heredity in diabetes?  
… the processes that happen in arteriosclerosis?  
… how insulin is produced? 
 
 
• Issues mentioned in the query. 
An additional group of items treated other pieces of knowledge that were related 
to the issues that the patient talked about in her query, but that were not manipu-
lated in the beliefs. For instance, the patient addressed dietary aspects. In the re-
lated item of the knowledge questionnaire, then, the experts rated how much they 
thought the patient knew about how diabetes can be influenced nutritionally. The 
five items that belong to this category are:  
 
How much does the patient that wrote the inquiry know about… 
… what kind of illness diabetes is? 
… how diabetes can be influenced nutritionally? 
… the treatment options of diabetes?  
… what adiposity is?  
… the relations between adiposity and arteriosclerosis? 
 
 
• Issues related to the layperson’s questions at the end of the query. 
Five items treated those issues about which the patient had asked the questions at 
the end of the query (cf. figure 5-1), these are: 
 
 
How much does the patient that wrote the inquiry know about… 
… which different types of diabetes exist? 
… what distinguishes the different types of diabetes?  
… which factors influence the development of diabetes type 2? 
… which function insulin serves in the body? 
… the relation of diabetes and arteriosclerosis? 
 
 
• Other aspects of diabetes knowledge not part of the query.  
In order to assess how the manipulation impacted on the experts’ knowledge as-
sessment of aspects that were not directly related to the query, the following five 
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items were used that treated diabetes-related issues that were not mentioned in 
the lay query: 
 
 
How much does the patient that wrote the inquiry know about… 
… the symptoms of diabetes? 
… critical blood sugar levels? 
… at what age levels the different types of diabetes are likely  
to appear? 
… the possible role of diabetes in pregnancy? 
… which different types of diabetes medication exist? 
 
 
Holistic knowledge assessment item 
In addition to rating the layperson’s knowledge for concrete knowledge pieces within 
the topic of diabetes, the medical experts also gave a holistic assessment of the layper-
son’s knowledge on diabetes, using the same 7-point Likert scale with verbally an-
chored points ranging from ‘very little’ to ‘very much’. ‘For the item format, see figure 
5-3. 
 
In your opinion, how much does the patient know about diabetes? 
Very little Little Rather little Medium Rather much Much Very much 
O O O O O O O 
Figure 5-3. Holistic assessment item format in Study II (English translation) 
 
5.2.3 Design and Procedure 
The participants were assigned randomly to the experimental conditions resulting in a 
number of 24 participants in each of the three conditions FB, CB and NB. In the intro-
ductory part of the questionnaire, participants were told that they had to read a health-
related email query and answer some questions about it. Thus, participants did not 
know that they were going to be asked to assess the knowledge of the email author. 
Then, each participant read one of the three query versions (between-design with dis-
play of beliefs as independent factor) and afterwards filled in the knowledge assess-
ment questionnaire. The participants were told not to flip back to the query while an-
swering the assessment items. Last, the participants filled in the diabetes test and an-
swered some demographic questions. For a schematic overview of the experimental 
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procedure, see figure 5-4.  The study was conducted in seminar rooms of the medical 
campus; the average participation time was 30 minutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5-4. Experimental procedure of Study II. 
5.3 Results 
In the following, all significances are reported two-tailed unless specified otherwise; 
hereby, (p < .05) is defined as significant and (p < .10) as a trend. With the aim of being 
able to draw (however tentative) conclusions from finding no statistically significant 
differences between the experimental conditions, an alpha-level of >.25 was taken as a 
basis for interpretation. This procedure indirectly minimizes the beta-error by enlarg-
ing the alpha-error (cf., Bortz, 1993). With Cohen (1988), the effect sizes will be inter-
preted as follows: ηp² < .06 as small effect, ηp² between .06 and .13 as medium effect 
and >.13 as large effect; d<.5 as small effect, d between .5 and .8 as medium effect and 
d >.8 as large effect.   
For the specific knowledge assessment, a mean score was calculated for each of the 
four item aspects (cf. description of knowledge assessment questionnaire in section 
5.2.2). The multivariate analysis revealed a significant effect of display of beliefs, F(8, 
134) = 3.34, p = .002, ηp² = .17 (large effect). Univariate analyses revealed a significant 
difference between the assessment of the lay author in the three query versions only for 
the items on issues related to the manipulation of false vs. correct vs. no beliefs 
(F(2,69) = 10.00, p = < .001, ηp² = .23 (large effect). For all other groups of items, there 
were no differences between the ratings to the three query versions, all F(2, 69) < 1.70, 
p > .19.   
For the items on issues related to the manipulation of beliefs, post-hoc comparisons 
of means were performed with t-tests40 and showed that the experts’ ratings on these 
issues were significantly higher in the CB condition than in the NB (t(46) = 2.67, p =.01, 
d = .78; medium effect) and in the FB condition (t(46) = 4.09, p < .001, d = 1.19; large 
effect). Also, there is a trend for the ratings in the NB condition to be higher than in the 
                                                        
40 Since the t tests can be considered as protected t tests, there was no correction for inflation of Type I error rate. 
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FB condition, t(46) = 1.84, p = .072, d = .53 (medium effect). Descriptive statistics for 
the four mean score variables are displayed in table 5-2. 
 
Table 5-2. Means (and standard deviations) of the knowledge assessments 
 Experimental condition 
Knowledge assessment mean scores 
CB query 
version 
M (SD) 
FB query 
version 
M (SD) 
NB query 
version 
M (SD) 
Issues related to the manipulation of beliefs 
2.65 
(.91) 
1.76 
(.56) 
2.06 
(.58) 
Other issues mentioned in the query 
2.93 
(.71) 
2.65 
(.70) 
2.62 
(.55) 
Issues related to the layperson’s questions  
at the end of the query 
2.17 
(.75) 
1.97 
(.65) 
1.95 
(.65) 
Other aspects of diabetes that were not  
subject of the query 
1.84 
(.54) 
1.76 
(.48) 
1.75 
(.58) 
 
To sum up, medical experts who read one of the three query versions rate the knowl-
edge of the email author differently between the versions only with regard to those as-
pects that relate to the manipulated beliefs. For these, the layperson is rated most 
knowledgeable when the email displays correct beliefs, less when there are no beliefs 
and least when there are false beliefs. With regard to knowledge that concerns other 
contents of the query, the concrete questions at the end of the query or additional dia-
betes knowledge that was not topic of the query, there are no differences between the 
experts’ knowledge assessment in the three conditions.  Thus, the findings confirm the 
specific-impact hypothesis, while both the topic-general impact hypothesis and the dis-
regard hypothesis need to be refuted. In figure 5-5, the findings are displayed graphi-
cally.  
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 Figure 5-5. Specific knowledge assessment. 
 
With regard to the holistic knowledge item, a univariate analysis revealed a signifi-
cant difference between the conditions, F(2,68) = 5.48, p < .01, ηp² = .14 (large effect). 
Post-hoc comparisons of means were performed with t-tests41 and showed that the 
overall rating was significantly higher in the CB condition (M = 3.17, SD = 1.13) than in 
the NB (M = 2.52, SD = .90; t(45) = 2.16, p<.05, d = .64; medium effect) and in the FB 
condition (M = 2.21, SD = 1.02; t(46) = 3.08, p = .003, d = .89; large effect). The as-
sessment in the NB and in the FB condition did not differ significantly from each other, 
t(45) = 1.12, p > .25. Thus, those experts that had read the correct-beliefs email rated 
the knowledge of the lay author globally higher than experts that had read the no-
beliefs version or the false-beliefs version of the query. The estimations of the experts in 
the latter two conditions, however, did not differ from each other.  
5.4 Discussion 
In section 2.2, two ways are described in which the tutors’ mental representation of 
their tutee’s knowledge is investigated in tutoring research: Thus, on the one hand, tu-
tors describe what correct and erroneous knowledge they assume their tutees to have. 
Comparisons between these descriptions and tutees’ descriptions of their own knowl-
                                                        
41 Since the t tests can be considered as protected t tests, there was no correction for inflation of Type I error rate. 
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edge show that the tutors often do not acknowledge erroneous knowledge held by the 
tutees, while correct tutee understanding is overestimated. On the other hand, the tu-
tors’ conversational behavior in instances in which the tutee utters erroneous knowl-
edge during the tutorial session is analyzed. From the addressing (or not-addressing) of 
the tutees errors, inferences about the tutors’ mental representation of the uttered er-
rors are drawn. This is an indirect way of analysis, which contains the presumption that 
when tutors acknowledge an error, they also address it.  
In study II, presented in this chapter, however, experts’ knowledge representations 
of uttered laypersons’ errors were investigated more directly for the informal tutorial 
setting of email health counseling: Medical experts read an email query and afterwards 
assessed the knowledge of the layperson that had written the email. In the query, the 
layperson uttered either several false or several correct beliefs, or did not utter these 
beliefs. The medical experts had to rate both beliefs-related prior knowledge and topic-
prior knowledge, i.e. knowledge that was not related directly to the manipulated beliefs, 
but to the topic of the lay query. Hereby, a generalization of effects of the display of be-
liefs to other aspects of topic-prior knowledge in the form of higher or lower ratings on 
the layperson’s knowledge was investigated for three aspects: For issues that the lay-
person mentions in the query, for issues asked by the layperson at the end of the query, 
and for issues that are not mentioned in the query but only related to the topic of the 
query. Thus, the study aimed at investigating how uttered errors impact on the experts’ 
representation of lay knowledge differentiatedly for different aspects of knowledge.  
 
The results of the knowledge assessment questionnaire showed that the inserted be-
liefs impacted only on the experts’ assessment of the layperson’s beliefs-related knowl-
edge. After reading the query into which false beliefs had been inserted, the experts 
rated the layperson’s knowledge on these issues lower than when no beliefs or correct 
beliefs were inserted. When correct beliefs were inserted, the experts rated the knowl-
edge highest, higher than when no or false beliefs had been inserted. However, no gen-
eralization to other aspects of knowledge was found.  
Before filling in the knowledge assessment questionnaire, the experts answered a 
general item in which they had to rate how much they thought the layperson knew 
about the topic of diabetes. With regard to this holistic assessment, only correct beliefs 
impacted on the assessment. The lay author was rated more knowledgeable when cor-
rect beliefs were displayed in the email than when false or no beliefs were displayed, 
while ratings for the latter two types of queries did not differ from each other. This re-
sult shows that a display of beliefs does have some influence also on the overall impres-
sion of the layperson’s knowledge; however, this observation is restricted to the display 
of correct beliefs. While false beliefs in lay queries serve as information on the lay inter-
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locutor’s knowledge on issues that are closely related to these beliefs, they do not serve 
as hints on the lay nature of the interlocutor’s concept understanding in general: The 
tendency to rate the lay knowledge lower in the false-belief condition and higher in the 
correct-beliefs condition does not generalize to other aspects of lay knowledge. Thus, 
with regard to an overarching impression of the layperson’s knowledge, the results of 
the holistic knowledge assessment item point towards an impact of a display of correct 
beliefs but not of false beliefs on the assessment. Future research will need to clarify the 
impact of a display of beliefs on a more holistic knowledge impression further.  
 
In a nutshell, with regard to the specific knowledge assessment of the experts, the 
results point towards a local influence of the display of false beliefs on the experts’ 
knowledge assessment. Presumably, hereby, the characteristics of online communica-
tion play a central role: When conversational contributions are processed more thor-
oughly in written asynchronous communication, erroneous knowledge can be detected 
and represented more easily. These results correspond to the notion by Pickering and 
Garrod (2004; cf. section 2.3.1), who point out that in conversational settings that devi-
ate from face-to-face conversation, communication processes are likely to be less auto-
matic. Thus, experts might make more inferences on the layperson’s knowledge and 
thus detect knowledge deficits more easily than in face-to-face contexts.  
With the help of the paradigm used in this study, the impact of a display of errone-
ous knowledge on the experts’ knowledge assessment could be measured directly and 
differentiatedly. Also for tutoring research which focuses on face-to-face tutoring, also 
here new ways need to be found that allow for a more direct assessment of the tutors’ 
representation of tutee knowledge. For this aim, a paradigm would need to be con-
structed in which several tutor participants of a study are confronted with the same 
errors. Possibly, these errors could be uttered by a confederate tutee, in a tutorial ses-
sion that would be controlled to a certain degree but also be as ecologically valid as pos-
sible. After the tutorial session, the tutors could rate the tutee’s knowledge with regard 
to different knowledge aspects, both related and unrelated to the uttered errors.  
 
The foregoing study investigated medical experts’ assessment of lay email author’s 
knowledge. In the upcoming Study III, the focus will shift from experts’ anticipation to 
their communicative behavior in email health counseling. Tutoring research has shown 
that novice tutors often tutor in a rather standardized way, not responding to the spe-
cific needs of their respective tutees. How and to what extent do medical experts in 
email health counseling adapt to their specific lay interlocutors and to uttered lay er-
rors? Again using the paradigm of display of beliefs, this question will be addressed in 
Chapter 6.  
 6 Study III: The impact of a display of lay beliefs on medical 
experts’ answers to lay queries 
6.1 Introduction 
When a layperson turns to an expert with a problem for which she seeks advice or with 
issues for which she would like to receive more information, both expert and layperson 
are confronted with a conversational partner with a knowledge background that is very 
divergent from their own (cf. section 2.1). As a consequence, when experts have to ex-
plain issues from their domain of expertise to laypersons, they cannot explain them 
from their own angle, but have to transform, so-to-say translate their expert knowledge 
in order to produce explanations that are apt to the understanding of their lay inter-
locutors. Hereby, different conversational settings put different constraints on accom-
plishing this audience design. Thus, in face-to-face conversation, interlocutors can 
adapt and re-adapt their messages to the collocutor’s understanding: In the process of 
grounding (sensu Clark, see section 2.3), meaning is negotiated during a several-turn 
conversation, and lacks of understanding can become apparent in the course of the 
conversation through verbal and non-verbal feedback. The conversational context of 
written, asynchronous, online health counseling, however, does not allow for such a 
step-wise adaptation (see section 2.4): Because the email counseling interaction usually 
only consists of one turn (i.e., one email query is followed by one answer), there are no 
feedback possibilities and no course of several interactional turns. As a consequence, an 
initial adaptation of the expert’s conversational contribution does play an even bigger 
role; it is vitally important that the expert adapts her reply to the layperson as much as 
possible. One aspect of adaptation hereby is the addressing of false understanding. Re-
sults from formal tutoring research have shown that the correction of errors is central 
for learning and knowledge acquisition; in addition, it is also beneficial for learning 
when tutees are aware of the fact that they had made an error and that their assump-
tions had been wrong (cf. section 2.2). In study III, to-be-described in this chapter, the 
experts’ adaptation to uttered lay errors in email health counseling will be investigated. 
In study II, I have introduced the paradigm of display of beliefs. In this paradigm, 
the fact of the existence of an alternative and often erroneous lay understanding is 
made apparent in a lay email to a different degree. Concretely, medical experts are pre-
sented with an email query of a (fictitious) layperson in which that layperson describes 
her medical situation. In the three versions that were constructed of the query, either 
false, correct, or no beliefs were inserted into the query (see section 5.2.2).  
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In study III, the same paradigm will be used in order to explore how a display of 
false lay understanding in the query impacts on experts’ adaptation to the lay ad-
dressee. Concretely, in this study, the following research question will be addressed: 
 
How does a display of false beliefs in the lay query impact on the experts’ email an-
swers?  
 
As will be described in the following, I hereby distinguish between two different 
ways of adaptation to the layperson. As a result, the research question can be specified 
as follows:  
 
How does a display of false beliefs in the lay query impact on the experts’ email an-
swers (a) with regard to the adaptation of the emails to the lay understanding of their 
interlocutors and (b) with regard to an addressing of the layperson’s false beliefs? 
 
In order to address this question, medical experts were asked to read one of the 
three lay query versions and answer it. Due to the manipulation of beliefs in the query 
versions, the impact of a display of false beliefs on the experts’ answering behavior can 
be estimated by comparing the answers in the false-beliefs condition with the ones in 
the two other conditions. Hereby, the answers will be analyzed (i) with regard to their 
audience design to a low level of understanding and (ii) with regard to whether issues 
that need to be explained by the expert and that are related to the inserted beliefs are 
addressed more frequently in the false-beliefs condition.  
 
As has been delineated in section 2.2, studies from tutoring research have described 
that tutors often do not adapt their tutorial behavior to their tutees. Thus, the tutors 
frequently do not correct errors that are uttered by the lay tutee. Also, they do not tailor 
their tutoring moves to their individual lay interlocutors, but rather tutor in a standard-
ized way. As Putnam (1987) proposes, tutors follow a so-called curriculum script when 
tutoring; this curriculum script contains an internal representation of an ordered set of 
tutorial moves. While the tutors and tutees in Putnam’s (1987) study were engaged in 
tutorial dialogues on the “close-world domain” of addition operations, also for tutoring 
sessions that deal with more “open” topics, little adaptation on part of the tutors has 
been reported. Thus, based on analyses of tutoring protocols on the human circulatory 
system, Chi et al. (2004) state that the tutors’ “explanations must have been delivered 
very much in the spirit of knowledge displays and knowledge telling“ (p. 385).  
102  Chapter 6 
In section 2.2, a structural parallel between tutorial dialogue in formal learning set-
tings and expert-layperson communication in informal learning settings has been pro-
posed. Due to this analogy, it could be reasoned that experts in the online health coun-
seling setting might also show only poor adaptation to their individual lay email inter-
locutor. While these experts are unlikely to dispose of a curriculum script, since they 
are not trained pedagogically and the counseling setting is not a formal learning setting, 
they are even more likely to present their knowledge to the layperson in a knowledge-
telling kind of way, without a proper adaptation of their explanations to the individual 
lay interlocutor. Based on the foregoing considerations, the following hypothesis can be 
formulated:  
 
• Knowledge telling hypothesis:  
The display of beliefs does not impact on the experts’ email answers. With regard 
to the three versions of the email query, this will result in no differences between 
experts’ answers in the three conditions with regard to the different measures of 
adaptation. 
 
While this hypothesis seems quite compelling, the non-addressing of errors and the 
knowledge telling in formal face-to-face tutoring is, however, frequently explained with 
a failure of detection of erroneous lay knowledge (see sections 2.2 and 5.1). In the con-
text of tutoring in email health counseling, however, erroneous knowledge seems to be 
detected and represented more easily, as the research results of study II have shown: 
When the layperson had uttered false beliefs in her email, the experts were more likely 
to rate her knowledge on issues that were related to these beliefs as lower than when 
correct or no beliefs were contained in the query. Thus, the false beliefs were processed 
quite specifically in the written, net-based counseling scenario.  
Based on these results of study II, one could also argue that possibly, the character-
istics of the setting - for instance the fact that the lay email is visible and reviewable 
while the expert composes her answer - do not only facilitate the mental representation 
of the layperson’s knowledge but also facilitate an adaptation to the individual lay email 
author.  Hereby, two levels of adaptation can be distinguished; these differ in how ex-
tensive the adaptation is.  
On the one hand, the adaptation could be restricted to a “repair” of the displayed 
false beliefs in the FB version of the lay query: Thus, in the false beliefs condition, the 
layperson’s erroneous beliefs that are inserted into the query could function as a sort of 
warning signal, that is, since the expert has processed these beliefs, she might also ad-
dress them (other than in tutorial dialogue, where spontaneously uttered false tutee’s 
beliefs are often not addressed, but supposedly also often not detected, either). Apart 
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from this error repair, the experts might still stick to a knowledge telling kind of an-
swering behavior, as described above for the tutors in formal tutorial settings; this 
would result in no further adaptations of the answers.  
The outlined considerations can be translated into the following hypothesis:  
 
• False beliefs correction - hypothesis:  
The manipulation of the display of beliefs in study III will impact on medical ex-
perts’ answers to their lay interlocutor in such a way that they are more likely to 
address issues related to these beliefs in the false beliefs condition than in the 
other two conditions. Since in study II, the layperson in the no beliefs condition 
was rated less knowledgeable than in the correct beliefs condition, the issues will 
also be addressed more when the layperson had not uttered any beliefs related to 
these issues than when she had uttered correct beliefs. Beyond that, there will be 
no further adaptations on part of the experts to their lay addressee.  
 
On the other hand, however, the characteristics of the email counseling setting could 
also have a more extensive effect on the experts’ answering behavior. Hereby, it needs 
to be taken into account that the false beliefs that are inserted into the queries are quite 
fundamental to an understanding of the issues about which the layperson had asked. 
Now taking into account that (a) these beliefs are visible while the expert is composing 
her answer, and (b) an adaptation is vitally important (as described above), and (c) the 
expert has – other than in face-to-face dialogue - time to compose (and revise) her an-
swer, the displayed false beliefs might also trigger further supportive actions on part of 
the experts in that they would produce answers that might be more apt for a low level of 
lay understanding. This would result in adaptations that go further than mere error 
repair. As a consequence, the following, third hypothesis can be formulated:  
 
• Comprehensive adaptation - hypothesis:  
The medical experts will address issues that are related to the manipulated beliefs 
more frequently when answering queries that contain false beliefs, and least fre-
quently when the layperson has uttered correct beliefs (same assumption than in 
the error correction hypothesis). 
In addition, the display of beliefs will impact on the experts’ answers in such a 
way that the answers will show adaptations to a low understanding in the false be-
liefs condition. Thus, indicators of audience design to a low level of understanding 
will show higher values in this than in the other two conditions, between which no 
differences are expected.  
 
The three outlined, concurring hypotheses are investigated in Study III, described in 
this chapter.  
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6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
The sample consisted of 88 medical students from a German university. Participants 
were recruited in lectures and on the university’s Medical Campus and were paid € 6 
for their contribution to the study. In order to assess their knowledge in the domain of 
diabetes, the experts completed the same 15-item diabetes knowledge questionnaire 
that was administered in study II (see section 6.2.2). Two participants answered less 
than 10 items correctly and were therefore excluded from the analyses. Because profi-
ciency in German was essential for participation, the data of another participant had to 
be excluded who did not speak German for at least 15 years. Due to technical problems, 
the data sets of two participants were lost.  
The remaining 83 medical students were in their fifth year of university medical 
training (M = 5.38, SD = 2.19 semester after First State Examination); the mean age 
was M = 26.10 years (SD = 3.35). Sixty-four percent of the sample was female; the first 
language of 65 students was German, while the others spoke German since childhood 
respectively at least for 15 years. They answered an average of 12.38 out of the 15 diabe-
tes items correctly (SD = 1.14). In terms of counseling experience, 86% said that they at 
least sometimes explained medical contents to medical laypersons.  
The participants were also asked to answer a short questionnaire on their computer 
use, their Internet use and their text-processing software use (for more details, see sec-
tion 5.2.2). Herein, the participants stated that they used computers with a mean of 
13.89 hours a week (SD = 15.56). This included an average of 2.85 hours of using text-
processing software (SD = 3.59) per week and 8.44 hours (SD = 7.76) on the Internet. 
All experts stated that they used the Internet, with 85% (N=71) having Internet access 
at home. Seventy-six experts stated that they used email. The percentage of family and 
friends that use the Internet was estimated with a mean of 82.83 % (SD = 19.17). 
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant differences between the three experi-
mental conditions with regard to domain knowledge (as manifested in the diabetes 
knowledge test), years of medical training, age, computer use, Internet use, text-
processing software use, counseling experience and percentage of family and friends 
that use the Internet (all F(2,80) < 1.60, ns.). Also, there were no differences with re-
gard to gender, the Internet services the participant used and if they had Internet ac-
cess at home (all χ2(2) < 2.78, ns.). Therefore, these variables were not considered fur-
ther.  
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6.2.2 Materials 
Diabetes questionnaire 
The same diabetes questionnaire as in study II was administered to the participants 
(for a detailed description of the questionnaire, see section 5.2.2.). With this question-
naire, it was ensured that the participants’ knowledge level was sufficiently high with 
regard to the thematic field of diabetes. Thus, the data of those participants that had 
answered less then ten items correctly were excluded from the study. The questionnaire 
items can be viewed in their English translation in table 5-2 (p. 96). For the original 
German questionnaire, see appendix B1.  
 
Patient email query 
The same patient query versions than in study II were used. In the query, a medical 
layperson describes how she has recently been confronted by her physician with the 
diagnosis ‘Type II diabetes’ and names some issues that she still has not understood, 
asking the online doctor for explanations. Hereby, the layperson uttered either various 
false beliefs (version FB) or various correct beliefs (condition CB) related to central 
concepts in the query, or did not utter these beliefs (condition NB). For a more detailed 
description of the query, see section 5.2.2.  
 
Computer, Internet, & text processing software use questionnaire 
The research aim of the current study III was to investigate the impact of a display of 
lay medical beliefs on medical experts’ communicative behavior in the conversational 
setting of email health counseling. This display is not the only possible influence on the 
communicative behavior, however. On the contrary, experts are also influenced in how 
they communicate via email by their experiences with the medium. Thus, it was impor-
tant to ensure that the experimental groups did not differ with regard to their experi-
ences concerning computer use, use of the Internet and of text processing software. In 
order to measure these experiences, a short questionnaire was constructed42. The ques-
tionnaire is displayed in table 6-1. For the original German version, see appendix C1.  
 
                                                        
42 The questionnaire consists of a sample of items that have also been used in other research studies from the research 
project on recipient orientation in net-based health counseling (cf. chapter 1), e.g., Bromme, Jucks, & Wagner, 2005. 
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Table 6-1. Computer, Internet, & text processing software use questionnaire (English translation) 
How frequently do you use a computer?   ___ hours per week 
How frequently do you use the Internet?   ___ hours per week 
How frequently do you work with text processing software?   ___ hours per week 
Do you have internet access at home?    YES  NO 
Which Internet services do you use?   
World Wide 
Web (WWW) 
 
Email 
 
Chat 
 
Telnet 
 
FTP 
 
Others 
 
None 
 
How many of your friends and acquaintances use the Internet 
(including email) on a regular basis?    
___ % 
 
 
Holistic knowledge assessment item 
After answering the email query, the experts’ were asked how much they thought the 
layperson knew about the topic of diabetes when composing their query (for the item 
format, see figure 6-1).  
 
In your opinion, how much did the patient know about diabetes when composing the query? 
Very little Little Rather little Medium Rather much Much Very much 
O O O O O O O 
Figure 6-1. Holistic assessment item format in Study III (English translation) 
 
This overall item was administered to the participants in order to compare explora-
torily whether a holistic assessment of lay knowledge after answering a query would 
produce different results than doing the assessment after only reading a query. Studies 
II and III from this dissertation had been conducted as separate studies on purpose, in 
order to avoid an influence of the answering activity on the assessment. For future re-
search, however, it is important to gain some knowledge on whether such a confound-
ing is likely or not.  
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6.2.3 Design and Procedure 
Using a 1x3 design with the display of beliefs as independent factor, participants were 
assigned randomly to the experimental conditions (between-subject design; see table 6-
2).  
 
Table 6-2. Experimental conditions and number of participants of Study III 
 N 
False beliefs displayed (FB)   28 
Correct beliefs displayed (CB)   29 
No beliefs displayed (NB)   26 
 
 The experiment was conducted online using an Internet browser. The experimental 
environment was programmed in HTML, data were stored with the database program 
FileMaker. The experimental environment consisted of eight web pages that could only 
be viewed in a predetermined sequence (for a screenshot of the experimental environ-
ment, see figure 6-2, which depicts the query page of the environment).   
 
 
 Figure 6-2.  Screenshot (FB version of patient query; English translation)  
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After a brief introduction to the task, participants answered the computer, Internet, 
& text processing software use questionnaire before they proceeded to answering the 
patient's query. On the query web page, the participants – as figure 6-2 shows – typed 
their answers into a text field that was located below the query text. Once they had 
completed and sent off their answer to the query, they were no longer able to review or 
edit it. After answering the query, the experts answered the holistic knowledge assess-
ment item; the experiment ended with the domain-specific knowledge test and some 
demographic questions. The medical experts participated in computer rooms of the 
Medical Campus, the average participation time was 35 min. For a schematic overview 
of the experimental procedure, see figure 6-3. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6-3. Experimental procedure of Study III. 
6.2.4 Quantitative data analysis 
Intercoder agreement 
A group of trained coders analyzed the text corpus. Intercoder agreement was assessed 
by providing two coders with the same randomly selected subset of the text corpus (10 
answers) for analyses. The similarity of their codings on this subset was determined by 
assessing reliability. For quasi-interval data, the intra-class coefficient (ICC2-way, unjust) is 
reported (cf., Shrout & Fleiss, 1979; Wirtz, 2006). For categorical data, kappa (κ) statis-
tics reported. Hereby, it needs to be considered that κ is drastically lowered by an im-
balance in the cross table’s marginal totals. Since for some of the dependent variables, 
cross tables of intercoder concordance have quite asymmetrically distributed marginal 
totals, the informational value provided by the κ coefficients was enriched with reports 
of the percentage of agreement of the respective variables. Reliability statistics are re-
ported below, in line with the description of the respective dependent variable. 
 
 
Diabetes test & 
demographics 
 
Read & Answer Query CB 
Read & Answer Query FB 
Read & Answer Query NB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General 
Instructions 
CIT  
question- 
naire 
Instructions 
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Dependent measures 
The experts’ answers were analyzed with regard to content-related as well as linguistic 
variables, to-be-described next. These variables were analyzed in order to measure the 
experts’ adaptation to the lay email author with regard to the addressing of false beliefs 
and with regard to the adaptation of the answer to a low level of understanding.  
 
As for their contents, the answer emails of the experts were submitted to a content 
analysis: What did the experts explain in order to answer the layperson’s questions 
posed at the end of the query (i.e., in the questions-part of the query, see figure 5-1, p. 
90)? In order to handle the explanation task successfully, that is, to answer the ques-
tions at the end of the query, the experts had to explain certain issues and processes 
related to type 2 diabetes. With the help of a medical expert and medical textbooks 
(e.g., Böhm, Palitzsch, Rosak, & Spinas, 2001; Hien & Böhm, 2001; Scherbaum, 2002; 
Greten, 2002), fifteen different aspects which are essential for a comprehensive expla-
nation of these processes were identified. Hereby, five of these issues are related to the 
beliefs that are inserted into the queries in the FB and CB conditions. The other ten 
aspects do not relate to these beliefs. The two types of aspects were analyzed separately, 
as will be depicted in the following.  
 
Elaboration of issues related to manipulation.  Thus, the first content-related analysis 
was dedicated specifically to those parts of the explanations that were related to the 
experimental manipulation of the study. The five issues about which the layperson had 
uttered beliefs in the FB and CB versions of the query were issues which the expert 
needed to elaborate on in order to answer the layperson’s questions properly. For in-
stance, the layperson had asked why she was suffering from diabetes. A comprehensive 
expert answer would also address the fact that the layperson had a higher risk of devel-
oping diabetes due to the diabetes of her mother. With regard to the role of heredity in 
diabetes, a belief had been uttered by the layperson in the FB and CB conditions (stat-
ing that her mother’s diabetes had probably made her more vulnerable for developing 
the disease vs. rating her mother’s diabetes as a coincidence).  
Thus, by analyzing whether the five issues that were related to the manipulation 
were elaborated on in the experts’ answers, it was possible to look at how the experts 
deal with the laypersons false beliefs, or in other words, whether the issues are elabo-
rated on more frequently (thus addressing the false beliefs) in the FB condition than in 
the other conditions.  
For a listing of all five issues related to the manipulation, see table 6-3. For each of 
the five issues, the experts were given a point when they had elaborated on the issue. 
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Raters agreed on the coding of the manipulation-related issues with an unweighted 
Cohen's kappa of .88 (with a percentage agreement of 96%).  
 
Table 6-3. Elaboration of issues related to manipulation (English translation) 
In the email query, the layperson…  Issues related to manipulation 
.. does (version CB) vs. does not (version FB) 
recognize adiposity as a health risk. 
Adiposity as health risk 
When elaborating on this aspect, the expert 
explains that adiposity is a predisposing fac-
tor for a variety of illnesses.  
… does not (CB) vs. does (FB) think that the 
elevated blood sugar level could have been 
caused by a chocolate tart the day before.   
Relation of nutrition and blood sugar level 
Hereby, the expert elaborates on how food 
uptake and short-term as well as long-term 
elevations of blood sugar levels are related to 
each other.  
… does (CB) vs. does not (FB) recognize the 
diabetes of her mother as a predisposing fac-
tor for herself to develop diabetes.  
Role of hereditary factors in diabetes 
The expert elaborates on the fact that diabe-
tes type II has a genetic component.  
… associates the term ‘arteriosclerosis’ with 
hardening of the arteries (CB) vs. with worn-
out joints (FB). 
Characteristics of arteriosclerosis 
When elaborating on this aspect, the expert 
explains the bodily characteristics of arterio-
sclerosis. 
… thinks that insulin is produced in the body 
(CB) vs. taken up via nutrition (FB). 
Insulin production 
Hereby, the experts elaborates on the fact 
that the body produces insulin. 
 
Extensiveness of expert explanation.  In the second content-related analysis, the ex-
perts’ answers were analyzed with regard to the ten different aspects which (in addition 
to the five issues related to the manipulation) are essential for a comprehensive expla-
nation. For example, answers could address the fact that glucose absorption into the 
cells is inhibited in adult onset diabetes, or could point out the role of adiposity as a 
predisposing factor for diabetes. In table 6-4, all ten issues are outlined.  
For these ten issues, the number of issues that the experts elaborated on in the an-
swers was assessed, thus obtaining a measure of the extensiveness of the experts’ an-
swers. For each of the ten issues, the experts were given a point when they had elabo-
rated on the issue. Raters agreed on the coding of the manipulation-related issues with 
an unweighted Cohen's kappa of .93 (with a percentage agreement of 96.88%). 
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Table 6-4. Aspects of comprehensive explanation 
Insulin production intact 
The expert explains that most of the time, the production of insulin is still working in type II 
diabetes.  
Type I vs. type II diabetes 
A differentiation is made between the different types of diabetes, mentioning that there is also 
diabetes type I that has different characteristics from type II diabetes. 
Role of age 
The expert explains that diabetes type II is developed mostly by elderly people.  
Process of receptor desensitization 
The expert explains how a progressing receptor desensitization takes place in type II diabetes. 
Insulin resistence of cells and tissues 
In the answer, it is explained that ultimately, there is an insulin resistance of cells and recep-
tors in type II diabetes.  
Function of insulin 
The expert explains the functioning of insulin in the body. 
Reduced effectiveness of insulin  
The expert explains that the functioning of insulin is impeded in diabetes type II, so that the 
insulin’s effectiveness is reduced. 
Disturbed glucose uptake into cells 
The expert explains that the glucose metabolism is obstructed in type II diabetes. 
Arteriosclerosis as one of the sequelae of diabetes 
Arteriosclerosis is named as one of the sequelae of diabetes. 
Other consequences of diabetes 
The expert elaborates on other consequences of diabetes. 
 
In addition to the described content-related analyses, further characteristics of the 
experts’ answers were assessed in order to determine the degree of adaptation of the 
email answer to a lay level of understanding. These characteristics were based on vari-
ables that have been used in other psycholinguistic studies on audience design; in addi-
tion, variables from instructional psychology were included (for a similar procedure, 
see e.g. Bromme, Jucks, & Wagner, 2005; Jucks, Bromme, & Runde, 2003; Runde, 
2005). It can be assumed that these characteristics are relevant to recipients’ text un-
derstanding.  
 
Number of words. The length of the provided answers was assessed by counting the 
total number of words used in the answers with the help of a text processing software.  
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Use of difficult medical technical language (MTL) terms. In German, many medical 
concepts can be named in different ways: In a technical term with a Greek or Latin ori-
gin or in a non-technical German translation term, which is commonly used by lay-
people. This is significant in the current research context, because the use of non-
technical (or technical) language signals whether a lay perspective was used (or not). 
Use of MTL terms was assessed by counting all words which are listed in the German 
reference book for medical terms, and which are not listed in the general German dic-
tionary. This approach excludes non-technical language concepts (like stomach). Each 
word was counted only once even if it occurred more often within one answer. The in-
terrater reliability for identifying MTL terms was high with an intraclass coefficient of 
.86, p< .001. 
 
Use of examples. The number of times that experts provided one or more examples to 
illustrate their explanations was counted, such as naming neuropathy as an example of 
a complication of diabetes. The raters agreed in counting how many times examples 
were given with an intraclass coefficient of 1.00. 
6.2.5 Qualitative data analysis 
The answers from the FB condition were submitted to an additional qualitative analy-
sis. This analysis transcends the formal addressed-yes-or-no coding in that it takes a 
closer look at how false beliefs were addressed.  
6.3 Results  
6.3.1 Results of quantitative analysis 
In the following, all significances are reported two-tailed unless specified otherwise; 
hereby, (p < .05) is defined as significant and (p < .10) as a trend. With the aim of being 
able to draw (however tentative) conclusions from finding no statistically significant 
differences between the experimental conditions, an alpha-level of >.25 was taken as a 
basis for interpretation. This procedure indirectly minimizes the beta-error by enlarg-
ing the alpha-error (cf., Bortz, 1993).  
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With Cohen (1988), the effect sizes will be interpreted as follows: ηp² < .06 as small 
effect, ηp² between .06 and .13 as medium effect and >.13 as large effect; d<.5 as small 
effect, d between .5 and .8 as medium effect and >.8 as large effect.   
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables are reported in table 6-5.  
 
Table 6-5. Means (and Standard Deviations) of the dependent variables  
 Experimental conditions 
Dependent measures 
CB query 
version 
FB query 
version 
NB query 
version 
Elaboration of issues related to beliefs 
1.10 
(1.01) 
1.82 
(1.16) 
1.00 
(.80) 
Extensiveness of expert explanation 
3.66 
(1.63) 
3.96 
(1.75) 
4.00 
(1.33) 
Number of words 
157.48 
(94.48) 
167.25 
(96.17) 
143.00 
(75.46) 
MTL terms 
7.00 
(3.64) 
7.50 
(4.70) 
7.50 
(4.43) 
Examples 
.28 
(.53) 
.36 
(.62) 
.50 
(.81) 
 
Elaboration of issues related to manipulation 
A sum score was calculated for the number of manipulation-related issues that were 
addressed in each answer. A univariate ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
display of beliefs: F(2, 80) = 5.48, p < .01, ηp² = .12 (medium effect). Post-hoc com-
parisons of means43 indicated that tutors explained significantly more of these issues in 
the FB condition than in the CB condition (t(55) = 2.50, p =.02, d = .66; medium effect) 
and in the NB condition  (t(52) = 3.01, p =.004, d = .82; large effect), while the latter 
conditions did not differ from each other, t(53) = .42, p > .25. Thus, the experts were 
more likely to elaborate on the contents for which beliefs were formulated when they 
answered a query that contained false beliefs on these issues than when it contained 
correct or no related beliefs. Nonetheless, it is important to note that they only ad-
dressed 1.82 out of the five aspects on average (36%) in the FB condition. In table 6-6, 
the number of answers in which issues were elaborated are displayed separately for the 
                                                        
43 Since the t tests can be considered as protected t tests, there was no correction for inflation of Type I error rate.  
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three experimental conditions. As the table demonstrates, all five displayed false beliefs 
are addressed by a considerable number of experts (at least by 14 % of the experts).  
 
 Table 6-6. Frequencies of elaborations on issues related to beliefs  
 
Experimental  
conditions 
 
Issues related to beliefs 
CB 
(n=29) 
FB 
(n=28) 
NB 
(n=26) 
∑ 
Adiposity as health risk 6 17 8 31 
Relation of nutrition and blood sugar level 5 5 2 12 
Role of hereditary factors in diabetes 4 5 2 11 
Characteristics of arteriosclerosis 2 8 5 15 
Insulin production 15 16 9 40 
 
 
Extensiveness of expert explanation 
A sum score was calculated for the number of arguments that experts used to answer 
the layperson’s questions (out of the list of ten arguments, see 6.2.4). A univariate 
analysis did not reveal differences with regard to how many of these issues were ad-
dressed in the three conditions, F (2,80) = .40, ns., p > .25.  
 
The results of the content-related analyses are depicted graphically in figure 6-4.  
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 Figure 6-4. Content-related analyses. 
 
Number of words 
The lengths of experts’ answers varied considerably, ranging from a minimum of 37 to a 
maximum of 409 words, M = 156.24, SD = 89.03. In order to illustrate the disparity of 
the answer within the sample, the shortest and the longest answer are displayed in fig-
ure 6-5. For the German original answers, see appendix C2.   
 
A univariate ANOVA did not reveal any significant differences in length between the 
conditions, F(2, 80) = .50, ns, p > .25.  
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Answer expert no. 75: 
In order for the cells to be able to take up glucose, insulin is needed. In addition, the cells have 
receptors; these are occupied by fat in adipose individuals. As a consequence, glucose cannot be 
taken up by the cells with the help of insulin. In diabetes, substances settle in the blood vessels, 
resulting in a higher risk of arteriosclerosis, heart infarction or stroke.  
 
Answer expert no. 5:  
Hello, 
your physician is right with what he has explained to you! You do have enough insulin. How-
ever, solely insulin is not sufficient in order to transport sugar which is taken up with each meal, 
from the blood to the cells in the human body. The sugar needs to enter the cells, because it is 
vitally important for each cell of the body – thus, for us. You take up sugar (as well as other nu-
trients, of course, but let’s leave that out for now), it enters the bloodstream and also gets to the 
pancreas. At this point (when the sugar has reached the pancreas), the pancreas starts to release 
insulin, also into the bloodstream. Our goal is: Sugar into the cell! But how can it enter the cell? 
This is not so simple, but it works with insulin, of which you have a sufficient amount. The cells 
are equipped with certain receptors, to which the insulin binds. In this way, the cell is provided 
with a signal to provide transport molecules that can take up the sugar into the cell. This can be 
illustrated with the following comparison: 
Imagine that the insulin was something like a messenger who knocks on a door (our receptor) 
and tells the cell to open another, specific door (our transport molecule) for the sugar. Only then 
it can enter the cells. Now, in your case, the insulin is not the problem, but the number of 
“doors” which the insulin approaches in order to tell the cell: Please open door for sugar! You 
dispose of the same among of doors as someone without diabetes type 2, but you need to sustain 
a much bigger body mass and that with the same number of “doors” for insulin. As a conse-
quence, the cells take up much less sugar than those of a person that has normal weight and that 
is healthy. If you can reduce your weight, the same number of “doors” need to sustain less mass, 
and the sugar can be taken up once more into the cells adequately. What does this have to do 
with arteriosclerosis? 
Because the sugar is in your blood and the whole amount of sugar that you eat is not taken up 
into the cell anymore, a part of it remains in the blood. The more sugar is in the bloodstream, 
the higher the probability that small sugar micro crystals form in the bloodstream and stick to 
the walls of the blood vessels. This process can, at some point, lead to a slow obstruction of the 
blood vessel.  
Figure 6-5. Shortest (expert no. 75) and longest (expert no. 5) expert answer (English translation) 
 
 
Use of MTL terms 
Technical medical terms were identified with the help of a medical and a general Ger-
man reference book. The expert participants used a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 
22 technical terms in their answers. With regard to the technicality of language in the 
tutors’ answers, there was no significant effect for display of beliefs, F(2, 80) = .129, ns, 
p > .25.  
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Use of examples 
The experts provided a minimum of zero and a maximum of three examples in their 
answers. They did, however, not use more examples in any of the conditions than in 
any other, F(2, 80)=0.810, ns, p > .25.  
 
The results of the analyses, taken together, provide partial support for the false be-
liefs correction hypothesis: While the experts addressed issues that related to the ma-
nipulated beliefs more frequently when answering the false-beliefs query, there were no 
further adaptations to a low level of understanding. It has to be taken into account, 
however, that contrary to the assumptions, the answers to queries that contained cor-
rect or no beliefs did not differ from each other with regard to the manipulation-related 
issues, but just contained less elaboration on these issues than the answers to the false 
beliefs. The two other concurring hypothesis (i.e., the comprehensive adaptation hy-
pothesis and the knowledge telling hypothesis, see chapter 6.1), need to be rejected.  
 
Holistic knowledge assessment item 
With regard to the holistic knowledge assessment item, there was a significant differ-
ence between the conditions, F(2,80) = 3.39, p < .05. Post-hoc comparisons of means 
were performed with t-tests and showed that the rating was significantly higher in the 
CB condition (M = 3.28, SD = 1.16) than in the NB (M = 2.69, SD = 1.29; t(53) = 1.77, 
p<.10, d = .48; small effect) and in the FB condition (M = 2.54, SD = .92; t(55) = 2.66, p 
= .10, d = .71; medium effect). The assessment in the NB and in the FB condition did 
not differ significantly from each other, t(52) = .52, p > .25. 
 
6.3.2 Results of qualitative analysis 
In the FB version of the query, the layperson utters several false beliefs throughout 
her email text. The experts that answer this version of the email (FB condition of the 
experimental design) have to deal with these uttered false beliefs. In the quantitative 
analyses, instances were counted in which experts addressed issues that were related to 
the false beliefs, thus providing the layperson with proper knowledge and correcting the 
beliefs. While conducting the quantitative analyses, it became evident that there were 
differences with regard to the directness with which the experts addressed the false 
beliefs. As a consequence, the answers from the FB condition were submitted to an ad-
ditional qualitative analysis. Hereby, through a close reading of those parts of the an-
swers that elaborated on beliefs-related issues, several manners in which the experts 
addressed the beliefs were identified, to-be-described in the following.  
118  Chapter 6 
References to lay belief 
Some of the experts made a reference to the false belief of the layperson when elaborat-
ing on a belief-related issue. These references were made in different ways:  
 
• Explicit reference to query. 
One way in which the experts referred to a false lay belief when correcting it was 
by explicit reference to the query. Hereby, the attention of the layperson is drawn 
to their own contribution and possibly to the false belief that it contains. Expert 
no. 17, for instance, explains: 
 
[…] In your query, you mention arteriosclerosis, which you are supposed to 
prevent through weight reduction. Arteriosclerosis does not have to do with 
the joints (the wearout of joints is called arthrosis). Arteriosclerosis is an ill-
ness that involves the arteries that lead away from the heart. […] 
 
In this excerpt, the expert points towards the part of the lay query in which the 
layperson had used the term ‘arteriosclerosis’ (giving it a wrong definition). Thus, 
without directly mentioning it, the answer hints to the fact that the layperson had 
been wrong in her definition of arteriosclerosis.  
 
• Entrainment of the layperson’s phrase formulation. 
In the query, the layperson’s false beliefs are uttered using certain phrases. For 
instance, with regard to the fact that her insulin level seemed sufficiently high, the 
layperson commented: “seems like my insulin intake with food is sufficient”. 
When correcting this belief, some experts made a reference to the query by en-
training the belief phrase. For instance, expert no. 23 explained in her answer:  
 
[…] Insulin is a hormone, so there is no insulin intake with food; your body 
produces this hormone. […] 
 
Hereby, the erroneous phrase insulin intake with food is entrained from the 
query. This is another way of hinting to a lay error in the query without directly 
mentioning it.  
 
• Use of markers. 
Sometimes, when elaborating on an issue that relates to a false belief, the experts 
used certain adverbs or phrases which implicate that what they are going to say 
next is in some way contradictory to something that has been said in earlier con-
versation, so in this case in the lay query (as the earlier conversation does only 
consist of the layperson’s contribution). For instance, expert no. 14 writes:  
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[…] By the way, insulin is a hormone which accelerates the glucose metabolism. It 
is produced in the pancreas. […] 
 
The use of the phrase by the way can be (but does not have to be, cf. below) interpreted 
as a reference to the false belief of the layperson that insulin was taken in with food.  
 
By phrasing their explanations in one of the just-described ways, the medical experts 
just hinted to the lay query when elaborating on beliefs-related issues. From all in-
stances in which false beliefs were addressed, these references were made in 29.4% of 
the cases. Hereby, a further differentiation can be made: In 19.6% of the cases, the ex-
perts negated the erroneous knowledge and provided correct knowledge. In 9.8%, they 
just did one or the other.  
 
Mere knowledge provision 
The qualitative analysis revealed that in most instances, the false beliefs were ad-
dressed only in an indirect fashion, namely by providing the correct knowledge (70.6% 
of all instances in which beliefs were addressed). Thus, for instance, expert no. 68 ex-
plains to the lay query author:  
 
[…] Thus, more sugar remains in the blood. It is built into the walls of the arteries, 
and over the years, a constriction of the arteries emerges. They get less elastic. 
This is called arteriosclerosis […] 
 
Thus, this answer provides an explication of the term arteriosclerosis without any ref-
erence to the layperson’s confusion of arteriosclerosis and arthrosis in her email.  
 
Taking together the examination of the instances in which tutors addressed issues 
about which the tutees had voiced false beliefs, the qualitative analysis can be summed 
up as follows: Most of the time, the false beliefs are addressed in a very indirect man-
ner, that is, the experts only provide the correct knowledge, without further reference to 
the lay email text. A more direct way was chosen with considerably less frequency, 
hereby the experts’ answers contained references to the email query and to the false 
beliefs uttered in that query. 
It needs to be pointed out that only one of the experts, and only once, provided the 
layperson with (metacognitive) feedback on the fact that she had uttered a false belief: 
With regard to the layperson’s confusion of arteriosclerosis and arthrosis, expert no. 6 
wrote:  
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[…] Arteriosclerosis is an illness of the arteries, not of the joints. What you 
probably meant was arthrosis. […] 
 
Hereby, from the phrase what you probably meant was, the layperson is provided with 
the information that he had been wrong with something in her email. 
6.4 Discussion 
In study II of this dissertation, medical experts assessed the knowledge of a fictitious 
lay email interlocutor in a questionnaire. The results showed that when false beliefs 
were displayed in the layperson’s query, the experts rated the layperson’s knowledge on 
issues related to these beliefs lower than when no or correct beliefs were displayed (cf. 
chapter 5). Against the background of the structural parallels between expert-layperson 
communication in informal counseling settings and tutor-tutee-communication in 
more formal learning settings, the results were compared to studies from tutoring re-
search in which tutors’ mental representations of uttered tutee errors had been investi-
gated: Hereby, experts in the email counseling setting seemed to detect and represent 
uttered lay errors more easily than tutors in formal face-to-face tutorial dialogues. 
These results were explained with the characteristics of the conversational setting of 
email health counseling, which tend to make communication less ‘automatic’ and thus 
foster experts’ inferences on the layperson’s knowledge (cf. chapter 5.4).   
Tutors in face-to-face tutoring however do not only have problems in representing 
their tutee’s knowledge, they also do not adapt their explanations to their individual 
tutee interlocutors. Thus, studies in tutoring research have described that tutors fre-
quently do not correct a tutee’s errors, and tutor rather in a standardized way, without 
adapting very much to their individual tutee collocutor (see introduction of this chap-
ter).  
Consequently, the question arises of whether experts in email health counseling do 
not only have less difficulties in representing uttered erroneous knowledge than in face-
to-face tutoring (as demonstrated in study II), but do also adapt more to their individ-
ual lay interlocutors.  
In order to address this question, the same paradigm than in study II was used in 
study III: Medical experts were asked to answer one version of a lay email query. Fol-
lowing the same paradigm than study II, the email versions were identical other than 
the fact that the first version contained some false beliefs related to central concepts of 
the query, the second one contained a number of correct beliefs, while in the third ver-
sion, no such beliefs were uttered by the layperson. Through this experimental manipu-
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lation, the nature of a lay kind of conceptual understanding (i.e., the fact that layper-
sons often hold false beliefs) was apparent to a different degree in the query versions 
(or, in other words, only the false-belief version contained a hint to it). Thus, the an-
swers produced by the experts provide evidence of how the experts adapt to such 
knowledge display in the context of online health counseling. Hereby, the notion of 
adaptation was differentiated. On the one hand, the experts’ answers were analyzed for 
an addressing of the knowledge deficits in the false-beliefs condition. On the other 
hand, the answers were analyzed for further adaptations to a conversational partner 
with a low level of understanding.  
The analyses of the experts’ answers in the three conditions provided the following 
results: A content analysis in which the experts’ answers were analyzed for an elabora-
tion of contents related to the manipulated beliefs showed that the experts were more 
likely to elaborate on these issues when answering a query in which false beliefs had 
been uttered. However, they did not cover all beliefs, but only two out of five false be-
liefs were addressed on average.  
With regard to features that condition whether an explanation is likely to be under-
stood by someone with a low, lay knowledge background, the analyses did not provide 
any evidence of further adaptations to the display of beliefs. Thus, on a content level, 
the experts did not provide more extensive explanations in the false-beliefs condition. 
Also, the answers did not differ in length, in the use of medical technical terminology, 
nor in the use of examples.  
Even though the results need to be interpreted with a certain caution, because an in-
ferential statistical test cannot directly affirm a null hypothesis, they make a strong 
point for assuming that apart from locally addressing (and thus ‘repairing’) the beliefs 
in the false-beliefs condition, the experts did not adapt their answers any further to a 
display of a low level of understanding.  
Thus, in light of the results, the experts’ answering behavior can be described in 
terms of a local error correction. Hereby, the false beliefs in the query function as a sort 
of “red traffic light”: If the beliefs are false, more elaboration is dedicated to them; the 
experts ‘repair’ them. More precisely, however, they do only address 36 percent of 
them. For a proper answer to the query, nonetheless, they would have to address all of 
the beliefs. By way of example: In the false-beliefs version of the query, it is quite obvi-
ous that the layperson confuses the concepts of arthrosis and arteriosclerosis. At the 
end of the query, then, the layperson asks for an explanation of the relations between 
diabetes and arteriosclerosis. If the expert now explains these relations, she first needs 
to clarify the meaning of the word arteriosclerosis to the layperson, because if the latter 
continues to think about arteriosclerosis as worn-out joints, she cannot understand the 
explanations of the expert or else will understand them in the wrong way.  
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In a supplementary qualitative analysis, the answers that were given to the false-
beliefs query were scrutinized for the ways in which false beliefs were addressed by the 
experts. The results of this analysis showed that the experts addressed the beliefs 
mostly in a rather indirect fashion. Thus, only in one third of the times that a belief was 
addressed, did the experts provide a reference to the false belief in the query. These 
references were given by entrainment of the layperson’s phrase formulation, through 
the use of certain marker words or through explicit mentioning of the query. In the rest 
of the cases, however, the addressing was limited to that the experts provided the cor-
rect knowledge, without any reference to the related false belief. Only one expert made 
a remark that informed the layperson on a metacognitive level about the fact that she 
had held a false belief. As tutoring research has shown, however, it is very important 
that the layperson is informed about the fact that she had held a false belief, because 
without this explicit information, laypersons likely integrate the experts’ explanations 
into their knowledge without noticing the contradictions between their own knowledge 
and the new knowledge. However, to ‘translate’ the more indirect references that the 
experts make to the query (and to the false beliefs contained in it) into this metacogni-
tive information, is supposedly a too demanding task for the laypersons. For instance, 
when the experts entrain the layperson’s phrase formulation when negating the false 
belief, the layperson still has to recognize the formulation as her own false belief that 
she had uttered. Above all in the context of written health counseling, where there is 
only one chance to correct a false belief, a more direct way of addressing is absolutely 
necessary.  
 
In sum, considering the outcomes of both studies II and III, it needs to be pointed 
out that even though in net-based health counseling, experts process uttered errors 
more than in face-to-face tutorial dialogue, they – just like in face-to-face tutoring - 
frequently do not address these errors and if they address them, than in a rather indi-
rect way. Apart from that, they do not adapt their answers linguistically or with regard 
to the contents to the individual tutee. Such an experts’ conversational behavior is det-
rimental to the layperson’s understanding, as (i) the layperson needs to be made aware 
of the fact that she had held a false belief, as well as being provided with the correct 
knowledge and as (ii) the expert should react to the display of false beliefs with further 
supportive actions in order to help the layperson understand the explanations. While in 
tutoring research, one reason that is provided for the fact that tutors often do not ad-
dress the tutee’s uttered errors is that they do not recognize them, the results of studies 
II and III suggest that there needs to be an additional reason for why the medical ex-
perts do show that little and only local adaptation to their email lay collocutor.  
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Why do the experts not correct the errors and adapt their explanations in other ways 
as a consequence of the display of errors, if these errors are recognized? One suggestion 
for an answer to this question comes from tutoring research itself, and that is the no-
tion by Person et al. (1995), who pointed out the impact of ordinary conversational 
principles on tutorial dialogue. One of these principles is the linguistic principle of po-
liteness, according to which conversational partners try to save their interlocutor’s so-
called face when conversing with them. Based on analyses of protocols of tutorial dia-
logues in formal learning settings, Person et al. (1995) describe different ways in which 
tutors try to attenuate the impositions on their tutees by means of a polite way of con-
ducting their tutorial moves: Thus, for instance, tutors often do not give appropriate 
feedback on errors; for instance by merely providing the correct knowledge or by letting 
a tutee’s erroneous answer pass as an adequate alternative. As will be shown, the char-
acteristics of doctor-patient email communication call for a use of politeness in this 
conversational setting. In study IV of this dissertation (described in the upcoming 
chapter 7), the question will be addressed of whether an abidance of the conversational 
principle of politeness is also a relevant factor for explaining the conversational behav-
ior of the medical experts that was shown in study III.  
 
Apart from the results that were central to the research questions of Study III and 
that have been the focus of the discussion up to now, there was also the additional re-
search question of whether an overall assessment item would be answered differently 
right after the experts answered the lay query than it was answered in Study II (in 
which there is no query answering). Hereby, the pattern of results for this item in study 
II is difficult to interpret (cf. 5.4). However, the fact that the pattern is identical in stud-
ies II and III suggests that the act of answering the query does not impact on the subse-
quent answering of an overall knowledge item. For studies within the same paradigm 
(see section 5.1 and 6.1), it is thus plausible to consider conducting experiments on ex-
perts’ knowledge assessment and on their answering behavior within the same experi-
ment. This aspect will be further discussed in chapter 8. 
 
 
 
 
 7 Study IV: Politeness in email health counseling 
7.1 Introduction 
When interlocutors communicate in a conversational setting, they often adapt their 
utterances to their conversational partner. According to Grice (1975), hereby, a speaker 
follows certain maxims that help create an utterance that is understandable, meaning 
that in a concrete situation, and for a concrete addressee, their utterances have the 
right degree of informativity, are formulated as clear as possible, avoiding prolixity and 
obscurity. As a result, these conversational contributions allow for efficient communi-
cation.  
However, this cooperative principle (cf. section 2.3.1) is not the only principle that 
interlocutors follow when producing an utterance; on the contrary, the Gricean maxims 
are frequently violated in utterance production. In order to account for this phenome-
non, another important conversational principle was formulated: The principle of po-
liteness. Following the widely received politeness account proposed by Brown and Lev-
inson (1987, cf. section 2.3.2), this principle can be described as follows: Every person 
has a public-self image, the so-called ‘face’, that she wants to maintain. This face con-
sists on the one side of the want of freedom of action and freedom from imposition (so-
called negative face), and on the other side of the want to be appreciated and approved 
of (so-called positive face). These two aspects of face are basic wants which every con-
versational partner has and knows the other one to have and which in general the con-
versational partners are inclined to satisfy. However, speakers often have to do speech 
acts that potentially threaten their interlocutor’s face, like for instance disapproval, 
criticism, and disagreement. In these instances, politeness is used in order to attenuate 
the face-threat of the speech act.  
According to Brown and Levinson’s (1987) account, the degree to which a speech act 
is a face-threat depends on the social distance and on the power distribution between 
the interlocutors, as well as on the culturally determined weightiness of the speech act. 
From the constellation of these factors, the weightiness of a face-threatening utterance 
results; the heavier the face-threat, the more the communicator will use politeness in 
order to cushion its blow. Hereby, speakers use numerous politeness strategies (for a 
detailed description, see section 2.3.2).  
While thus, as described, instances of politeness serve the need of an interlocutor to 
maintain a positive relationship with her conversational partner by acknowledging 
their face, a polite way of formulation often impacts negatively on the clearness and 
comprehensibility of a message. This is pointed out by Person et al. (1995), who deline-
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ate the ways in which politeness strategies are commonly employed by tutors in one-to-
one tutorial interactions: Tutors frequently have to do face-threatening acts; thus, for 
instance, they have to correct a tutee’s errors and point them out to the tutee. While 
this is important to foster effective learning, negative feedback on errors has a face-
threatening potential in that it might challenge the self-image of the tutee. This poten-
tial face-threat is often faced by tutors with formulating the speech act in a polite way: 
Thus, when tutees utter an error, tutors often do not give appropriate feedback nor cor-
rect the error. Instead, they often just provide correct knowledge without correcting or 
mentioning the errors, or else they let the tutee’s answer pass as an adequate alterna-
tive, despite its being wrong, and suggest the correct answer just as an alternative (cf. 
section 2.3.2).  
The conversational behavior of the medical experts in study III of this dissertation 
(cf. chapter 6) resembles this: In study III, the medical experts were confronted with 
one version of a lay query, into which either false beliefs, no beliefs or correct beliefs 
had been inserted. When confronted with the layperson’s false beliefs, the experts ad-
dressed these beliefs, elaborating more on beliefs-related issues than those who re-
sponded to the other two query versions. However, less than half of the tutee’s uttered 
errors were addressed, and the addressing was done in a rather indirect way, by just 
providing the correct information or by hinting rather vaguely at the query text instead 
of pointing out explicitly that the layperson had uttered an error. The errors that the 
layperson utters are central issues with regard to what the layperson wants to know 
about. However, apart from the described (partwise) correcting of the errors, the ex-
perts did not adapt their answers any further to a low level of understanding, for in-
stance they did not provide examples nor did they explain more relevant contents. 
Taken together, the medical experts in study III show conversational behavior that is 
similar to what Person et al. (1995) describe a polite disguise of tutoring actions for 
tutors in formal, face-to-face tutorial settings. Thus, taking into account that a non-
detection of the errors is an explanation which in email counseling accounts even less 
for the experts’ behavior than in face-to-face tutoring (cf. chapter 5), politeness seems a 
relevant variable to be considered for the explanation of the experts’ conversational 
behavior in study III.  
As a result of the up-to-now described considerations, the following research ques-
tion can be formulated for study IV:  
 
Is there a relationship between the conversational behavior of medical experts in 
email health counseling and politeness aspects?  
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This research question will be addressed in study IV with the help of the following para-
digm: Medical experts will have to answer a lay email query. This lay query will contain 
the same false beliefs than those that were displayed in the FB version of the email 
query from studies II and III (cf. chapter 5 and 6). Before answering the query, the ex-
perts will be instruction with one of two instruction versions. Hereby, one of these two 
instructions (which will henceforth be called metapragmatic instruction) will aim at 
making the experts aware of the tutorial character of the counseling setting (while in 
the other condition, the experts will be instructed with a control instruction). This para-
digm is based on the following considerations: The email health counseling setting is an 
informal learning setting, and the medical experts are not trained pedagogically; conse-
quently, it is plausible to assume that they do not conceive of the counseling setting as 
an instructional, tutorial setting. Thus, conversational mechanisms that interlocutors 
abide by in everyday conversations should impact on the expert-layperson dialogue in 
the counseling setting even more than in the tutorial setting (in which they have an 
impact, as Person et al. (1995) have pointed out). One of these principles that interlocu-
tors follow is the politeness principle. 
In addition, according to the parameters formulated by Brown and Levinson (1987) 
in their politeness theory, email health counseling is a conversational setting that calls 
for an attenuation of speech acts with the help of politeness (cf. section 2.3): Thus, doc-
tor-patient communication is a communicational situation rich in face-threatening 
speech acts on part of the physician (cf. Aronsson & Rundström, 1989). The medical 
experts frequently have to elaborate on issues which are unpleasant to the patient, 
making the patient feel hazarded in her autonomy or making her sense an implicit cri-
tique in the physician’s utterance. Also, the social distance between medical expert and 
layperson is likely to be evaluated as high. Her expertise gives the physician a higher 
status; this status does not have to be negotiated during interaction but is predefined by 
the institutional frame in which doctor-patient communication takes place (Fetzer, 
2000; Aronsson & Rundström, 1989). Also, they frequently do not know each other. 
Furthermore, with regard to the power distribution, there is a power asymmetry, as the 
patient depends from the doctor and her expertise. In addition to these parameters, 
which make the use of politeness likely in health counseling, it becomes even more 
likely when taking into account that in email communication, the expert has time to 
compose her answer and might thus have more opportunity to realize a polite version 
of speech than if communicating synchronously, for instance via chat (cf. Duthler’s 
(2006) study, described in section 2.3.2, who showed that in comparison to oral 
speech, the use of politeness is even fostered in email communication).  
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Taken together, we can hypothesize that experts in informal learning settings follow 
the conversational principle of politeness when formulating their utterances. If this was 
the case, their utterances in this setting would be shaped by politeness. In the following, 
the characteristics of the conversational utterances that were analyzed in study III will 
be scrutinized from this perspective. Hereby, I will also reason on concrete politeness 
strategies (as formulated by Brown and Levinson, 1987, as described in section 2.3.2) 
that might underlie the ways in which the experts answer the lay email. 
On the one hand, the experts in study III might follow the politeness strategy “avoid 
disagreement” when answering the lay email query (which is described by Person et al., 
1995, for formal tutors), which would account for the fact that they addressed the lay-
person’s uttered errors only to some extent, and if, then in rather indirect ways. With 
regard to the fact that the tutors do not adapt their answers more to the displayed false 
and low understanding, this might be based on the politeness strategy “presuppose 
common ground” (also described by Person et al., 1995, for formal tutors): In everyday 
conversation, it is ‘impolite’ not to acknowledge the addresse’s knowledge and conver-
sational wants. Thus, it would be impolite to provide lengthy explanations, explain a lot 
of different contents, avoid certain terms in favor of simpler terms, and use many ex-
amples in order to illustrate one’s point, because it makes the interlocutor feel “taught”. 
The abidance of this politeness strategy would explain why the experts do not adapt 
their answers more to the layperson.  
Against this background, the reasoning of study IV works as such: If politeness is in-
deed relevant for explaining how experts answered the lay email in study III, an in-
struction that aims at informing the experts about the necessities of the conversational 
setting should result in ‘less polite’, and thus, instructionally more apt expert explana-
tions. This approach is inspired by the plea of Person et al. (1995) who suggest that tu-
tors need to be provided with an awareness of the costs and benefits of polite conversa-
tional behavior for the effectiveness of tutoring. In the metapragmatic instruction, pro-
vided in study IV, the medical experts are informed about the tutorial character of the 
counseling setting, that is, the importance of directness for knowledge communication 
and the fact that this directness does also entail speech acts which might be unpleasant 
for the patient. The experts are also told that through this directness, a better under-
standing on part of the patient can be achieved, and that this is also in the interest of 
the patient who wrote the query. Thus, without labeling it in such abstract terms, the 
experts are encouraged to ‘teach’, i.e., to ignore the conversational principle of polite-
ness in favor a more effective knowledge communication.  
An impact of the metapragmatic instruction in the described way would make a 
strong point for the impact of politeness on the experts’ conversational behavior.  
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In study IV, the answers obtained from those experts instructed with the metaprag-
matic instruction will be compared to the answers from experts instructed with a con-
trol instruction (see section 7.2.2, for a detailed description of the instructions). 
 
As research on politeness points out, the degree to which a speech act is attenuated 
through politeness depends on the speaker’s evaluation of the imposition of the speech 
act (cf., section 2.3.2). The metapragmatic instruction aims at reducing the amount of 
imposition that the experts assume with regard to their explanations. If the experts had 
attenuated their utterances through politeness before and thus, through the instruc-
tion, ’obtain the permission’ to behave teacherlike, they should produce utterances that 
are less attenuated through politeness and therefore address the layperson’s uttered 
errors more and in a more direct way, as well as support the layperson’s understanding 
by an (‘impolite’ but comprehension fostering) adaptation of their answers.  
Against this background, the following hypothesis can be formulated:   
 
• Politeness hypothesis:  
The metapragmatic instruction will impact on the experts’ answers in such a way 
that they will show less polite, but instructionally more valid counseling behavior 
than in the control instruction condition. Concretely, false beliefs that are uttered 
in a layperson’s email will be addressed more frequently and more directly. Also, 
the answers should be longer, should contain more explanations of contents, 
more examples and less medical technical language. 
 
The politeness hypothesis will be investigated in study IV.  
7.2 Method 
7.2.1 Participants 
Eighty-five medical students from a German university participated in the experiment. 
They were recruited in lectures and on the university’s Medical Campus and were com-
pensated with € 6 for their participation. The same 15-item diabetes knowledge ques-
tionnaire than in studies II and III was administered to the experts in order to test their 
knowledge in the domain of diabetes. Two participants answered less than 10 items 
correctly and were therefore excluded from the analyses. Proficiency in German was 
essential for participation in the study, and the proficiency criterion was to speak Ger-
man for at least 15 years. In study IV, no participant spoke less than 15 years of Ger-
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man. However, six participants had to be excluded who were not at the end, but only in 
the middle of their university medical training and who had participated by mistake. 
Finally, due to technical problems, the data sets of two participants had to be excluded. 
The remaining 70 medical students were in their fifth year of university medical 
training (M = 4.27, SD = 1.74 semester after First State Examination); the mean age 
was M = 24.91 years (SD = 3.03). Of the seventy participants, 49 were female. Sixty 
experts spoke German as their first language, while the other ten spoke German since 
childhood respectively at least for 15 years. They answered an average of 12.74 out of 
the 15 diabetes items correctly (SD = 1.36). In terms of counseling experience, 87.14% 
said that they at least sometimes explained medical contents to medical laypersons.  
The participants used computers with a mean of 13.27 (SD = 7.85) hours a week (for 
a description of the questionnaire on computer, Internet and text-processing software 
use, see section 6.2.2). This included an average of 3.43 hours of using text-processing 
software (SD = 3.91) per week and 9.63 hours (SD = 7.32) on the Internet. All experts 
used the Internet, with 95.71% (N=61) having Internet access at home. Sixty of the sev-
enty experts stated that they used email.  
Preliminary analyses revealed no significant differences between the experimental 
conditions with regard to domain knowledge (as manifested in the diabetes knowledge 
questionnaire), years of medical training, age, computer use, Internet use, text-
processing software use, and counseling experience (all t(68) < 1.31, ns.). Also, there 
were no differences with regard to gender, the Internet services the participant used 
and if they had Internet access at home (all χ2(1) < 1.87, ns.). Therefore, these variables 
were not considered further.  
7.2.2 Materials 
Instruction versions 
As already pointed out in the introductory section of this chapter, the experimental 
manipulation of study IV consisted in providing the medical experts with one of two 
instruction versions at the beginning of the experiment. In the following, the two in-
struction versions will be described in more detail. 
Both instruction versions consisted of a part that was identical in the two conditions, 
and a part in which the manipulation was realized. With regard to the latter, the aim of 
the manipulation was to provide a neutral instruction in one of the conditions (control 
instruction condition). In the other condition, however, the instruction contained 
metapragmatic information about the conversational setting of email health communi-
cation: The physicians were told that in order to promote the layperson’s understand-
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ing of medical issues, it was important for them to communicate knowledge as directly 
and clearly as possible. They were also told that when patients write an email query 
they do so because they want to understand medical issues better, and that these pa-
tients should not be ashamed of their little knowledge. And that experts in this setting – 
in order to communicate knowledge as effectively as possible – have to take the risk of 
patients feeling ashamed of their little knowledge and not avoid being clear just to 
avoid making the patient feel unpleasant (metapragmatic instruction condition).  
 
The instruction was given directly before the experts had to answer the lay query. 
Thus, the metapragmatic instruction aimed at fostering the experts’ awareness of the 
‘learning setting’-like character of the counseling situation. The instruction aimed at 
supporting the experts in formulating answers that were ‘less polite but more instruc-
tional’ (cf. section 7.1).  
When constructing the instruction versions, it was taken into account that scruti-
nized closely, the metapragmatic instruction contains the information that (i) the ex-
pert should accept the patient’s eventual uneasiness for the sake of effective knowledge 
communication and that (ii) patients know little. In order to be able to trace eventual 
effects of the metapragmatic instruction back to the first of these two aspects (i.e., the 
one related to politeness), the information that patients generally do not dispose of 
much pre-knowledge and that experts therefore have to formulate their information in 
an understandable way, was inserted into both instruction conditions and thus did not 
constitute part of the manipulation.  
 
In figure 7-1, the parts of the instruction that were identical in both conditions are 
displayed. The three asterisks mark the part of the instructions in which the manipula-
tion was realized.  
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 Figure 7-1. Identical parts of instruction versions (English translation) 
 
The text that was inserted into the instruction versions at that part where the aster-
isks are is displayed in table 7-1. For the original German versions of the instructions, 
see appendix D1. 
Table 7-1. Experimental manipulation (English translation) 
Control instruction condition Metapragmatic instruction condition 
Within the wide range of health service  
offers, the direct email contact with a physi-
cian is a very frequently used service, along-
side other services such as dictionaries for 
special diseases and symptoms or newslet-
ters. The queries are sent directly via an  
e-mail form. With some delay, the medical 
layperson then receives the physician’s  
answer.  
 
Hereby, it does not help when the physician 
avoids everything that could be unpleasant 
for the patient. For instance, a patient does 
not need to be ashamed for not knowing  
everything. Patients who use the “Ask the  
doctor”- option on the Internet do want to get 
a better idea of medical issues. The  
physician needs to take the risk that his  
utterances might make the patient feel  
exposed in his lack of knowledge and needs 
to clearly tell what he thinks to be important. 
Only by this means, he can accomplish a  
better understanding on part of the patient. 
Dear participants of the study,  
 
In public and in private life, the Internet is getting more and more important and also 
health-related Internet pages are visited by an increasing number of people. Hereby, more 
and more frequently, medical laypersons also use the possibility provided by different 
health services to send an email to a medical expert and obtain an answer.  
Patients mostly lack the prior knowledge that is needed to evaluate and understand medical 
issues. As a consequence, the physicians need to formulate the information that they give in 
a way that the patients are able to understand it. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* * * 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In our study, this type of email conversation is emulated. On the next page, you will find a 
typical query from the Internet. Please answer the patient’s query in your function as health 
expert.  
 
Click “continue” to get to the inquiry. 
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Patient email query 
A slightly modified version of the false-beliefs query version (FB version) from  studies 
II and III was used, which did, however, contain the same false beliefs than in studies II 
and III. The query is displayed in figure 7-2. For the original, German version of the 
query, see appendix D2.  
 
Diabetes questionnaire 
The same diabetes questionnaire than in study II and III was administered to the par-
ticipants (for a detailed description of the questionnaire, see section 5.2.2.). With this 
questionnaire, it was ensured that the participants’ knowledge level was sufficiently 
high specifically with regard to the thematic field of diabetes. The questionnaire items 
can be viewed in their English translation in table 5-2 (p. 96). For the original German 
questionnaire, see appendix B1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 7-2.  (Fictitious) lay query (English translation) 
 
Computer, Internet, & text processing software use questionnaire 
The experts in this study also had to answer questions about their computer experience. 
This was done with the help of a slightly shortened version of the computer, internet, & 
text processing software use questionnaire from Study III (cf. section 6.2.2).  
 
Hello,  
 
I am 55 years old and I am suffering from adiposity (87 kg, 1meter70), which is not a 
problem for my health per se. I have never had any seriours health problems, but now I 
went to a routine health check up and my doctor found that my blood sugar level was too 
high. I’d had a chocolate tart the day before, though. The doctor told me that I have type 2 
diabetes. My mother also has it, what a coincidence. Now I have to go see a diet advisor, 
engage in physical activity and lose weight. I find that hard, because my job leaves me 
hardly any time.  
I was told that physical activity and weight loss are also necessary to prevent arteriosclero-
sis, and I really don’t want worn-out joints. I asked my doctor why I can’t just inject insu-
lin, but he told me that I had enough insulin in my blood, seems like my insulin intake 
with food is sufficient.  
I know what I am supposed to do, but I still would like to ask you the following questions: 
Why am I suffering from this disease even though I apparently have enough insulin in my 
blood? And in which way do diabetes and arteriosclerosis have to do with each other? 
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Table 7-2. Computer, Internet, & text processing software use questionnaire (English translation) 
How frequently do you use a computer?   ___ hours per week 
How frequently do you use the Internet?   ___ hours per week 
How frequently do you work with text processing software?   ___ hours per week 
Do you have internet access at home?    YES  NO 
Which Internet services do you use?   
World Wide 
Web (WWW) 
 
Email 
 
Chat 
 
Telnet 
 
FTP 
 
Others 
 
None 
 
 
As experts are also influenced in how they communicate via email by their experiences 
with the medium, the questionnaire helps ensure that the experimental groups do not 
differ with regard to their experiences concerning computer use, use of the Internet and 
of text processing software. The questionnaire is displayed in table 7-2. For the original 
German version, see appendix D3. 
7.2.3 Design and Procedure 
The experiment was conducted online using an Internet browser. With the help of an 
online survey tool, the experimental environment was created, the study run and the 
data stored. The experimental environment consisted of nine web pages that could only 
be viewed in a predetermined sequence (for a screenshot of the experimental environ-
ment, see figure 7-3, which depicts the instruction page of the environment). On the 
query web page, the participants typed their answers into a text field that was located 
below the query text. 
134  Chapter 7 
 
Figure 7-3.  Screenshot from the experimental environment (English translation; metapragmatic 
instruction condition) 
 
Using a 1x2 design with the type of instruction as independent factor, participants 
were assigned randomly to one of the two experimental conditions (between-subject 
design; see table 7-3).  
 
Table 7-3. Experimental conditions and number of participants  
 N 
Control instruction (CI)  35 
Metapragmatic instruction (MI)   35 
 
First, the participants were thanked for their participation in the study and told to 
read the instructions on the following page attentively and carefully. After reading the 
instructions, the participants answered the patient’s query. Once they had completed 
and sent off their answer to the query, they were no longer able to review or edit it. Af-
ter answering the query, the experts answered the diabetes knowledge test and the 
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questionnaire on computer, Internet and text-processing software use. The experiment 
ended with the demographic questions. The medical experts participated in computer 
rooms of the Medical Campus; the average participation time was 40 min. For a sche-
matic overview of the experimental procedure, see figure 7-4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 7-4. Experimental procedure of Study IV. 
7.2.4 Data analyses 
Intercoder agreement 
Group of trained coders analyzed the text corpus. Intercoder agreement was assessed 
by providing two coders with the same randomly selected subset of the text corpus (10 
answers) for analyses. The similarity of their codings on this subset was determined by 
assessing reliability. For quasi-interval data, the intra-class coefficient (ICC2-way, unjust) is 
reported (cf., Shrout & Fleiss, 1979; Wirtz, 2006). For categorical data, kappa (κ) statis-
tics reported. Hereby, it needs to be considered that κ is drastically lowered by an im-
balance in the cross table’s marginal totals. Since for some of the dependent variables, 
cross tables of intercoder concordance have quite asymmetrically distributed marginal 
totals, the informational value provided by the κ coefficients was enriched with reports 
of the percentage of agreement of the respective variables. Reliability statistics are re-
ported below, in line with the description of the respective dependent variable. 
 
Dependent measures  
The answer emails of the medical experts were analyzed with regard to two aspects:  
Firstly, the analyses were concerned with how the experts responded to the dis-
played erroneous understanding of the layperson. Hereby, the analysis of the ways in 
which the lay false beliefs from the query were addressed consisted of two parts: In a 
first part, those instances were counted in which a false belief was addressed (focus on 
quantity of addressing). In a second part, the directness with which this addressing was 
done was analyzed (focus on quality of addressing). Also, commentaries of the experts 
suited to reduce the layperson’s embarrassment with regard to her little understanding 
were analyzed.  
 
 
 
 
Diabetes test  
 
 
Read &  
answer  
query 
 
Instruction version CI 
 
Instruction version MI 
CIT questionnaire & 
demographics  
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Secondly, the adaptation of the emails to a low level of understanding by means of 
various characteristics that foster understanding, was analyzed. For this aim, the same 
variables than study III were used.   
The two aspects of analyses will be introduced in the following consecutively.  
 
Addressing of false beliefs – quantity analysis.  The answer emails of the experts were 
submitted to the same content analysis than in study III. Hereby, the answers were 
analyzed for contents which are essential for a comprehensive answer of the lay query 
(see section 6.2.4 for a more detailed description). Five of the relevant fifteen contents 
were issues related to the false beliefs that are displayed in the lay query (the other ten 
aspects were not related to the beliefs and will be described below, see ‘extensiveness of 
expert explanation’). For instance, in the email query the layperson described it as a 
coincidence that her mother was suffering from diabetes as well. Thus, the analysis 
would look at whether or not the expert would elaborate on the role of heredity in her 
answer. For a listing of all five issues, see table 6-3, p. 110. For each of the five issues, 
the experts were given a point when they elaborated on the issue in their answer. Raters 
agreed on the coding of the manipulation-related issues with an unweighted Cohen's 
kappa of .79 (with a percentage agreement of 92%).  
 
Addressing of false beliefs – quality analysis. In addition to analyzing the addressing 
of the layperson’s uttered false beliefs, an analysis was undertaken which aimed at as-
sessing the impact of the instruction on the directness with which the experts ad-
dressed false beliefs. For this purpose, the instances in which the experts addressed the 
false-beliefs-related issues were analyzed with regard to the manners of addressing that 
had been identified in the qualitative analysis of Study III (see section 6.3.2). In that 
analysis, three ways of error addressing had been identified:  
 
• Mere knowledge provision 
The way of addressing that was chosen by most experts of study III was a very in-
direct one, that is, the experts merely provided the correct knowledge without fur-
ther reference to the lay email query text.  
• Reference to lay belief 
A more direct way was chosen with considerably less frequency by study III’s ex-
perts: Hereby, the experts’ answers contained references to the email query, re-
spectively to the false beliefs uttered in the query. These references were made in 
different ways, which can be reviewed in more detail in section 6.3.2. In short, the 
experts made references by means of entrainment of the layperson’s phrase for-
mulation, use of markers or explicit reference to the lay query. By phrasing their 
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explanations in one of these ways, the medical experts hinted to the displayed er-
roneous understanding in the lay query when explaining on the beliefs-related is-
sues. 
• Metacognitive feedback.  
Only one of the experts from study III had, in one occasion, made it explicitly 
clear to the layperson that she had been wrong and had held a false belief by mak-
ing a related meta-cognitive feedback commentary.  
 
The instances in which false beliefs are addressed in the experts’ answers in study IV 
were allocated to one of these three ways of addressing (mere knowledge provision, 
reference to lay belief or metacognitive feedback). Raters agreed on the assorting of 
the instances to one of the ways of addressing with an unweighted Cohen's kappa of .87 
(with a percentage agreement of 93%). 
 
Embarassment reduction comments. In the metapragmatic instruction, the experts 
were told that they had to communicate medical knowledge as clearly as possible, de-
spite the possibility that the lay email author might feel ashamed of knowing rather 
little. This instruction, thus, contained the information that patients sometimes feel 
rather ashamed of their little knowledge. When conducting the above-described con-
tent analysis of the experts’ answers, it became apparent that the experts used reassur-
ing comments apt to reduce a possible uneasiness and embarrassment of the patient 
with regard to her deficient understanding. Thus, these commentaries might be called a 
‘redressive action’ in Brown and Levinson’s (1987) terms, because giving these com-
mentaries is an action that attempts to counteract a potential face-damage of a speec 
act by clearly indicating that no face-threat is intended or desired (cf., section 2.3.2).  
An analysis was conducted that measured the degree to which these comments were 
used in the answers. Five types of comments were found in the answers; all answers 
were then analyzed with regard to these types of comments (depicted in table 7-4). In 
each answer, it was checked for each type of comment whether it was made; for each 
comment made, a point was given. 
Raters agreed on the coding of the embarrassment reduction comments with an un-
weighted Cohen's kappa of .85 (with a percentage agreement of 98%).  
As already remarked, the experts’ answers were also analyzed with regard to the ad-
aptation of the emails to a layperson’s low level of understanding. For this aim, the an-
swers were submitted to analyses with regard to variables that foster understanding of 
explanations. This analysis used the same variables from psycholinguistics as well as 
instructional psychology than study III. The variables are described in short in the fol-
lowing, for a more detailed description see section 6.2.4.   
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Table 7-4. Types of embarrassment reduction comments 
The expert praises/reinforces the layperson for informing herself. 
Example: ‘It is good that you are interested in your illness and that you want to know more 
about it.’ 
The layperson’s questions are labeled as valid questions. 
Example: ‘You are asking valid questions, because… ‘  
The expert points out her task (i.e., inform, not expose). 
Example: ‘I will gladly try to answer all your questions.’ 
The expert emphasizes the existing knowledge of the layperson. 
Example: ‘As you have already pointed out correctly, …’ 
The expert labels knowledge contents as difficult to understand.  
Example: ‘These things are often not easy to understand…’ 
 
 
Number of words. The length of the answers was assessed by counting the total 
number of words with the help of a text processing software.  
 
Extensiveness of expert explanation. In the content analysis (see above), the experts’ 
answers were analyzed with regard to which contents the experts explained in order to 
answer the layperson’s questions posed at the end of the query. In order to handle the 
explanation task successfully, that is, to answer the questions at the end of the query, 
the experts had to explain certain issues and processes related to type 2 diabetes. Ten 
different aspects which (in addition to the five issues related to the false beliefs) were 
essential for a comprehensive explanation of the relevant issues and processes (and 
thus a comprehensive answer to the patient questions) were identified. In table 6-4 (p. 
111), all ten issues are outlined.  
For these ten issues, the number that was treated in the answers was assessed, thus 
obtaining a measure of the extensiveness of the experts’ answers. Raters agreed on the 
coding of the manipulation-related issues with an unweighted Cohen's kappa of .67 
(with a percentage agreement of 84%).  
 
Use of difficult medical technical language (MTL) terms. In German, many medical 
concepts can be named in different kinds of ways: In a technical term with a Greek or 
Latin origin or in a (non-technical) German translation term, which is commonly used 
by laypeople. This is significant in the current research context, because thus, the use of 
(non)technical language signals whether a lay perspective was used. Use of MTL terms 
was assessed by counting all words which are listed in the German reference book for 
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medical terms, and which are not listed in the general German dictionary. This ap-
proach excludes non-technical language concepts (like stomach). Each word was 
counted only once even if it occurred more often within one single text unit. The inter-
rater reliability for identifying MTL terms was high with an intraclass coefficient of .96, 
p< .001.  
 
Use of examples. The number of times that experts provided one or more examples 
to illustrate their point were counted, such as naming neuropathy as an example of a 
complication of diabetes. The raters agreed in counting how many times examples were 
given with an intraclass coefficient of .92, p <.001.  
7.3 Results  
In the following, all significances are reported two-tailed unless specified otherwise; 
hereby, (p < .05) is defined as significant and (p < .10) as a trend. With the aim of being 
able to draw (however tentative) conclusions from finding no statistically significant 
differences between the experimental conditions, an alpha-level of >.25 was taken as a 
basis for interpretation. This procedure indirectly minimizes the beta-error by enlarg-
ing the alpha-error (cf., Bortz, 1993).  
With Cohen (1988), the effect sizes will be interpreted as follows: ηp² < .06 as small 
effect, ηp² between .06 and .13 as medium effect and ηp² >.13 as large effect; d <.5 as 
small effect, d between .5 and .8 as medium effect, and d >.8 as large effect.   
 
Addressing of false beliefs – quantitative analysis 
A sum score was calculated for the number of issues related to the false beliefs from the 
query that were addressed by an expert; this sum score was compared for the answers 
in the control instruction condition (M = 1.91, SD = 1.25) and in the metapragmatic 
instruction condition (M = 1.94, SD = 1.41). A t-test for independent samples did not 
reveal any differences between the two conditions, t(68) = -.09, p > .25.  This result 
stands in contrast to the politeness hypothesis, which had predicted the addressing of 
false beliefs to be more frequent in the metapragmatic instruction condition. The re-
sults are displayed graphically in figure 7-5, alongside the results of the analysis of the 
extensiveness of the experts’ answers, see below.  
In table 7-5, the number of answers in which an issue was elaborated is displayed 
separately for the two experimental conditions. As the table demonstrates, all five dis-
played false beliefs are addressed by a considerable number of experts (at least by 17 % 
of the experts).  
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Table 7-5. Frequencies of elaborations on false-beliefs related issues  
 
Experimental  
conditions 
 
Issues related to beliefs CI (n=35) MI (n=35) ∑ 
Adiposity as health risk 18 16 34 
Relation of nutrition and blood sugar level 4 8 12 
Role of hereditary factors in diabetes 15 13 18 
Characteristics of arteriosclerosis 9 11 20 
Insulin production 21 20 41 
 
 
Addressing of false beliefs – qualitative analysis 
The addressing of false beliefs analysis as just described was followed by a qualitative 
analysis of the identified instances in which issues related to the layperson’s false be-
liefs were elaborated upon in the experts’ answers. Hereby, the instances in which false 
beliefs were addressed were allocated to one of three ways of addressing. Thus, the ad-
dressing was done using metacognitive feedback, reference to lay query/belief or mere 
knowledge provision. 
Only six of the 70 experts made a metacognitive feedback commentary, informing 
the layperson that she had held a false belief. Four of these commentaries were made by 
experts who had read the control instruction, two by experts who had read the 
metapragmatic instruction. Due to the rarity of this type of addressing of false beliefs 
(4% of all addressings), no statistical testing for differences was done for this variable. 
It is just to be stated that metacognitive feedback commentaries were made very 
scarcely in both experimental conditions.  
With the help of the allocation of the rest of the addressings to either the ‘mere 
knowledge provision’- way (38% of addressings) or the ‘reference to lay belief’-way 
(58% of addressings), the impact of the metapragmatic instruction on the directness 
with which the lay false beliefs were addressed was investigated as follows: For both 
ways, a sum score was calculated for the amount of times that a false belief had been 
addressed in the ‘reference’ way. The resulting sum variable was then divided by the 
total number of addressings in one of the two ways and multiplicated by 100; by pro-
ceeding this way, a percentage variable resulted that reflected the proportion of the 
‘reference’ way of addressing on all times that a false belief was addressed. Thus, a dif-
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ference between the experimental conditions on this variable indicates that the experts 
in one condition chose this way of addressing instead of mere knowledge provision 
more frequently. The difference between the two conditions was tested with a t-test for 
independent samples, which did not reveal a significant difference, t(58) = 1.12, p > .25. 
Thus, there is no indication of differences with regard to the way in which experts ad-
dressed errors after reading the metapragmatic instruction or the control instruction. 
This result stands in contrast to the politeness hypothesis, which had predicted the ad-
dressing of false beliefs to be more direct in the metapragmatic instruction condition. 
 
In sum, with regard to the first aspect of analysis of the experts’ answers, i.e., the 
impact of the metapragmatic instruction on the ways that experts responded to the dis-
played erroneous understanding of the layperson, the results do not support the polite-
ness hypothesis: The addressing of the displayed false beliefs was neither more fre-
quent nor more direct when the experts had read the metapragmatic instruction than 
when they had read the control instruction. 
 
Embarassment reduction comments 
A sum score was calculated for the number of comments that the experts made in order 
to reduce the patient’s potential uneasiness about being little knowledgeable. The ex-
perts gave between a minimum of zero and a maximum of two embarrassment reduc-
tion comments. A t-test for independent samples revealed a significant difference be-
tween the two experimental conditions, t(68) = -2.01, p<.05, d = .49; small to medium 
effect). Descriptive statistics are displayed in table 7-6. 
 
Table 7-6. Means and standard deviations for the embarrassment reduction comments.  
 M SD 
Control instruction .11 .32 
Metapragmatic instruction  .34 .59 
 
Thus, after reading the metapragmatic instruction, the experts were more likely to 
make comments that could reduce an embarrassment about one’s own little knowledge 
for the patient than after reading the control instruction. Since the comment analysis 
was integrated into the analyses as a result of the observation of this type of comments 
in the answers (see section 7.2.4), it is not directly relatable to the politeness hypothe-
sis, but rather constitutes an additional analysis. 
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Number of words 
The lengths of experts’ answers varied considerably, ranging from a minimum of 57 to a 
maximum of 643 words. A t-test for independent samples indicated a tendency for a 
difference between the two conditions, t(68) = -1.76, p = .084, d = .42, small effect; for 
descriptive statistics see table 7-7.  
 
Table 7-7. Means and standard deviations for number of words.    
 M SD 
Control instruction 233.26 144.58 
Metapragmatic instruction 293.69 143.27 
 
Thus, the experts that were instructed with the metapragmatic instruction wrote 
longer answers than the experts that were instructed with the control instruction. This 
result is in line with the politeness hypothesis.  
 
Extensiveness of expert explanation 
A sum score was calculated for the number of issues that experts elaborated on in order 
to answer the layperson’s questions (out of the list of ten arguments). Hereby, a mini-
mum of one issue and a maximum of eight issues were elaborated on by the experts. A 
t-test for independent samples revealed a significant difference between the two ex-
perimental conditions, t(68)=-2.05, p<.05, d = .49, small to medium effect; for descrip-
tive statistics, see table 7-8.  
 
Table 7-8. Means and standard deviations for extensiveness of expert explanation.   
 M SD 
Control instruction 4.03 1.32 
Metapragmatic instruction 4.80 1.80 
 
Thus, when instructed with the metapragmatic instruction, the experts explained 
more relevant contents to the layperson than when instructed with the control instruc-
tion, which is in line with the politeness hypothesis.  
  
The results of the content-related analyses (i.e., both the number of explained issues 
that related to the false beliefs and the number of other explained issues) are depicted 
graphically in figure 7-5.  
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 Figure 7-5. Content-related analyses 
 
Use of MTL terms 
Technical medical terms were identified with the help of a medical and a general Ger-
man reference book. The experts used a minimum of two and a maximum of 25 techni-
cal terms in their answers. With regard to the technicality of language in the tutors’ 
answers, there were no significant differences between the answers in the control in-
struction condition (M = 9.80, SD = 4.82) and in the metapragmatic instruction condi-
tion (M = 10.70, SD = 4.17), t(68) =.82., p >.25. This is a surprising result, because ac-
cording to the politeness hypothesis, the medical experts in the metapragmatic instruc-
tion condition were expected to use less MTL terms than in the control instruction con-
dition.  
 
Use of examples 
The experts provided a minimum of zero and a maximum of seven examples in their 
answers. A t-test for independent samples indicated a tendency for a difference be-
tween the two conditions, t(68) = -1.67, p < .10, d = .40, small effect; for descriptive 
statistics see table 7-9.  
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Table 7-9. Means and standard deviations for number of provided examples.    
 M SD 
Control instruction .89 .96 
Metapragmatic instruction 1.40 1.54 
 
Thus, the experts that had read the metapragmatic instruction used more examples 
in their explanations than those who had read the control instruction. With regard to 
the politeness hypothesis, this result goes in line with the hypothesis.  
 
In sum, with regard to the second aspect of analysis of the experts’ answers, i.e., the 
impact of the metapragmatic instruction on the adaptation of the experts’ answers to a 
low level of understanding, the results do mostly support the politeness hypothesis: 
Apart from the use of MTL terms, all investigated understanding-fostering variables 
differed between the two experimental conditions in that the answers in the metaprag-
matic instruction condition were more designed for low understanding: The experts 
that had read the metapragmatic instruction wrote longer answers, explained more 
relevant contents, and used more examples than the experts that had read the control 
instruction.  
7.4 Discussion 
In email health counseling, medical laypersons turn to physicians online, asking for 
information and explanations on medical issues that are relevant to them and that they 
want to understand better. In this conversational scenario of informal learning, both 
interlocutors are faced with a speech partner with a very divergent knowledge back-
ground. Hereby, the expert has the difficult task of adapting her explanations as good 
as possible to the individual lay interlocutor (cf., section 2.1.3). In study III, this adap-
tation of experts’ answers was investigated, focusing specifically on the adaptation to a 
displayed low level of understanding. Concretely, this displayed low understanding 
consisted in several false beliefs that the layperson had uttered in her email in one of 
the research conditions (while in the other two research conditions, no such false be-
liefs respectively correct beliefs had been uttered; cf., chapter 6). As study II has shown, 
medical experts do process the display of such false beliefs in lay email queries quite 
specifically (cf., chapter 5). The false beliefs displayed in the query were central to the 
topic about which the layperson wanted to know more about.  
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An adaptation of the experts’ answers to such displayed erroneous understanding of 
central issues can consist in an addressing and correction of the displayed erroneous 
knowledge. Furthermore, however, experts can also adapt by providing an answer that 
is as understandable as possible for a layperson with such (displayed) erroneous 
knowledge. These facets of adaptation are addressed in study III. As the results show, 
the experts adapt locally by correcting the false beliefs; albeit in a rather indirect (and 
thus inadequate) fashion. Apart from these local corrections, no further adaptations to 
the experts’ answers were found. 
Considering these results from studies II and III, the following research question 
arises: If the layperson’s false beliefs are processed by the experts, why do they show 
only such insufficient adaptation? In the current chapter, a study (study IV) was pre-
sented that tried to answer this question by considering the conversational principle of 
politeness as a relevant factor for explaining the described conversational behavior of 
the medical experts: According to the politeness theory by Brown and Levinson (1987), 
a speaker tries to formulate an utterance that might be unpleasant for the interlocutor 
in a way that saves the interlocutor’s ‘face’. Thus, for instance, they often do not correct 
errors directly, but only in more indirect ways. In the introductory section of this chap-
ter, the idea was formulated that conversational moves that are instructionally advan-
tageous in order to foster the understanding of interlocutors with little knowledge are 
often those moves which are impolite in a linguistic sense. Thus, for instance, it is a 
potential face-threat to an interlocutor to get one’s utterances marked as errors. There-
fore, in order not to be impolite, speakers might only provide the correct information 
and not correct the error, thus attenuating the potential face-threat of the speech act. 
Or, to provide another example, it might be instructionally relevant to provide longer 
explanations; in everyday conversation, however, this speech act contains a potential 
face threat, because the interlocutor might feel “taught”.  
As has been delineated in section 7.1, it is very plausible to assume that also in the 
conversational setting of email health counseling, the medical experts are likely to be 
influenced in their tutorial behavior by the conversational principle of politeness. This 
hypothesis is based on the one hand on the fact that according to the characteristics of 
conversational settings formulated by Brown and Levinson (1987), the conversational 
setting of email health counseling is a setting that triggers the use of polite conversa-
tion. Also, polite behavior becomes very plausible when taking into account the notions 
by Person et al. (1995), who have described how tutors use politeness in formal tutorial 
settings. For the informal learning setting of email health counseling, it was assumed 
that the medical tutors should also use politeness and that they might use politeness 
even more, because the tutorial character (and thus the necessity for efficient instruc-
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tional behavior) is even less obvious than in tutoring; expert-layperson counseling re-
sembles more everyday conversation than tutorial dialogue.  
As a consequence of the foregoing considerations, study IV aimed at investigating 
the relationship between the conversational principle of politeness and email health 
counseling. For this aim, medical experts were instructed with (i) a control instruction 
or (ii) a metapragmatic instruction that provided information about the necessities of 
the conversational setting (i.e., the fact that the physician needed to give the relevant 
information as clearly as possible, even if this meant that a patient might feel exposed 
in her lack of knowledge, and that patients do not need to be ashamed for not knowing 
everything). The experts then answered a patient email query into which several false 
beliefs had been inserted. 
 
An analysis of the experts’ answers that focused on how the experts responded to the 
displayed erroneous understanding of the layperson showed that the experts addressed 
the errors rather little and in an inadequate fashion in both research conditions, be-
tween which no differences were found. Thus, the experts addressed less than half of 
the five false beliefs from the query. In addition, a qualitative analysis of the instances 
in which errors were addressed showed that metacognitive feedback commentaries 
(i.e., telling the layperson that she had been wrong about a certain issue) were hardly 
given; on the contrary, errors were addressed only in a rather indirect fashion. Also in 
this analysis, there were no differences between those answers that were provided by 
experts that had read the control instruction and those that were provided by experts 
that had read the metapragmatic instruction.  
However, an additional analysis of comments apt to reduce a possible uneasiness 
and embarrassment of the patient with regard to her little knowledge showed that the 
experts that were instructed with the metapragmatic instruction gave more reassuring 
comments than those instructed with the control instruction.  
The experts’ answers were also analyzed with regard to the audience-design of the 
answers, that is, the adaptation of the emails to a low level of understanding. For this 
aim, various characteristics that foster the understanding of explanations on part of 
interlocutors with little knowledge were examined. These analyses showed for most of 
these variables that those experts who had been instructed with the metapragmatic 
instruction gave answers that were more apt to a low lay level of understanding than 
the experts which had been instructed with the control instruction. Thus, in the 
metapragmatic instruction condition, the experts wrote longer answers than in the con-
trol condition; also, they explained more relevant issues and used more examples. Only 
with regard to the use of medical technical language, no differences were found be-
tween the conditions. 
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In light of these results, it can be stated that the metapragmatic instruction impacts 
on the experts’ answers in that these are formulated in an instructionally more apt way 
with regard to a variety of characteristics. In section 7.1, it was reasoned that the 
metapragmatic instruction aimed at making the tutors aware of the costs and benefits 
of polite conversational behavior, and that hence, the information provided by the in-
struction should result in ‘less polite’ behavior, thus indirectly making a strong point 
for the relationship between politeness and the tutorial behavior of the medical experts. 
The results of study IV strongly point to the existence of such a relationship, given that 
the fact that the politeness-related instruction impacts so clearly on the experts’ an-
swers.  
At this point, one could argue that since the frequency and directness of error cor-
rection was not affected by the metapragmatic instruction, the deficient error correc-
tion on part of the experts could have nothing to do with politeness aspects. This is not 
very likely however, since the analysis of the embarrassment instruction has shown that 
also with regard to error correction, experts are sensitive to aspects of face-threat and 
politeness. Hereby, the instruction impacted in such a way that the experts used more 
comments when instructed with the metapragmatic instruction.  
 
In sum, the politeness hypothesis that was formulated in section 7.1 and that as-
sumed that the experts would show less polite, but more instructionally valid counsel-
ing behavior in the metapragmatic instruction condition can be largely confirmed. As a 
consequence, study IV makes a strong point for the relationship between the conversa-
tional behavior of the medical experts in email health counseling and politeness, thus 
confirming the research question posed in section 7.1.  
 
While these conclusions seem quite compelling, future research studies will have to 
investigate the impact of politeness on (informal as well as formal) expert-layperson 
communication further. Hereby, for the context of email health counseling, other para-
digms than the one used in study IV (i.e., two instruction versions) will need to be used; 
these paradigms might allow for a more direct investigation of the relation between 
politeness and the experts’ conversational behavior than the investigation that was un-
dertaken in study IV. In addition, further research needs to find out whether a less sub-
tle metapragmatic instruction than the one used in study IV can impact on the error 
correction of the experts. In study IV, a very subtle intervention was realized, with the 
metapragmatic instruction differing only in a few sentences from the control instruc-
tion. In study IV, the experts seem to be sensible to metapragmatic information about 
the conversational setting, which the analysis of the embarrassment reduction com-
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ments has shown; they are, however, not able to translate the provided information 
into a more direct and more frequent error addressing. An instruction which points 
more directly to the necessity of an addressing of false beliefs when answering a lay 
query might provide different results and should thus be tested.  
 
Further implications of the research results from study IV as well as from studies I 
through III presented in this dissertation will be discussed in more detail in the general 
discussions and conclusion section of this dissertation, coming up in the next chapter.  
 
 
 8 General discussion and conclusions for future research 
The conversational setting that is investigated in this dissertation is the communication 
of medical experts and laypersons via email. Laypersons are frequently confronted with 
situations in which they need to consult an expert in order to obtain explanations on 
issues that interest them or affect them in a current situation. More and more, this con-
sultation is done via email.  
In expert-layperson communication, both expert and layperson are confronted with 
an interlocutor with a very divergent knowledge background; hereby, the experts dis-
pose of an extensive and efficiently structured knowledge base, while the laypersons – 
albeit disposing of some knowledge – often hold erroneous assumptions and theories. 
As a consequence, experts have to communicate in a certain way in order to make their 
utterances understandable to their lay interlocutor. Concretely, hereby, the experts 
have to adapt to the low level of lay knowledge. For this aim, the experts need to ‘trans-
late’ their knowledge, as well as support the understanding of the layperson ‘didacti-
cally’, for instance by providing examples.  
The ways in which medical experts communicate with laypersons were analyzed in 
this dissertation under consideration of the following question: What role do conversa-
tional principles from everyday conversation play in the specific conversational context 
of email expert-layperson communication (with its high knowledge divergence, as de-
scribed above)? On the one hand, in everyday conversation, speakers often adapt to 
their addressee’s needs by taking into account the other’s specific knowledge back-
ground when formulating an utterance. At other times, however, the knowledge of the 
interlocutor is disregarded.  On the other hand, in everyday conversation, a speaker 
takes into account the interlocutor’s need to be appreciated and not humiliated by her 
conversational partner. What impact do these principles have on the communicational 
behavior of the medical experts in email health counseling? To address this question 
was one of the main aims of this dissertation.  
With regard to the experts’ communicational behavior, the dissertation focused spe-
cifically on how experts reacted to a display of erroneous understanding in the lay 
email. Tutoring research has shown that both an addressing of errors as well as a feed-
back on the fact that an error has been made are important for the tutee’s learning. Also 
the conversational setting of this dissertation can be described as a type of informal 
tutoring. In order to support this claim, a parallel was drawn between expert-layperson 
counseling and tutorial dialogue in formal learning settings (like for instance universi-
ties) which pointed out the structural similarities of the two settings. As a consequence 
of this parallel, the research results of this dissertation can also enrich tutoring re-
search.  
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In the following, the results from the studies that are presented in this dissertation 
will be discussed from different theoretical as well as research-oriented perspectives. 
For this aim, the remainder of this chapter on general discussion and conclusions for 
future research is divided into five sections. First, the key empirical results from studies 
I through IV will be summarized (section 8.1). Hereby, the outline will be confined to 
those results that are most relevant in the context of the subsequent discussion sec-
tions. A discussion of all research results can be found in the discussion sections of 
chapters 4 through 7.  For the sake of the presentation of the key results, section 8.1 will 
also describe the characteristics and aims of the respective studies in short. For a more 
detailed depiction, see the method sections of chapter 4 through 7.  
After the summary of the main results, the discussion part will begin with a discus-
sion of the results against the background of tutoring research (section 8.2). There-
upon, section 8.3 will discuss the results from a psycholinguistic vantage point, reflect-
ing on the role of communication principles from everyday conversation in online 
health counseling. From these more theoretically oriented sections the focus will then 
shift towards a more application-oriented perspective. Thus, section 8.4 will discuss the 
role of metapragmatic instruction for the facilitation of expert-layperson communica-
tion. In section 8.5, then, the chapter concludes with an outlook on directions for future 
research. 
8.1 Summary of main results  
The aim of the first of the studies presented in this dissertation (i.e., study I), was to lay 
the foundations of the three ensuing studies II through IV in that lay understanding for 
important concepts from the field of the metabolic syndrome was investigated, which 
had been chosen as broad thematic field for the empirical research presented in this 
dissertation. Hereby, concretely, beliefs were assessed that laypersons had with regard 
to frequently used medical concepts from the thematic field of the metabolic syndrome. 
For an assessment of the beliefs, a questionnaire was administered which measured the 
prevalence of correct and erroneous beliefs in the lay sample. The results of study I con-
firm research from medical literature which demonstrates that laypersons frequently 
hold erroneous beliefs with regard to common medical concepts. In addition, a high 
disparity of knowledge was found in the relatively homogenous sample (cf. section 4.3).  
 
Parting from these findings from study I, different versions of a lay email query were 
constructed. In the query, a fictitious patient described her medical situation and asked 
for explanations of certain medical issues in order to understand her situation better. 
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In one of the query versions, the characteristic deficiency of lay understanding was 
made apparent in that the layperson uttered several false beliefs in her email. From the 
two other versions of the query, one version did not contain such beliefs, while in the 
other version, correct beliefs were uttered by the layperson. Apart from this variation in 
the display of beliefs, the query versions did not differ from each other (cf. section 5.2).  
In study II, the three described query versions were used to investigate whether a 
display of erroneous lay understanding as described above impacted on the mental rep-
resentation that the expert had of the lay query author’s knowledge. The experts read 
one of the query versions. Thereafter, they rated the knowledge of the lay email author 
with regard to several knowledge pieces. As such, a differentiated knowledge assess-
ment was done in that the experts had to rate the amount of the layperson’s knowledge 
on both beliefs-related prior knowledge as well as on other topic-related knowledge 
that was not related to the displayed beliefs. By proceeding like this, the impact of the 
beliefs display on the experts’ knowledge assessment on a local level could be separated 
from a more generalizative impact.  
The results of study II showed that the experts processed the displayed beliefs quite 
specifically: In the false-beliefs condition, beliefs-related prior knowledge was rated 
lower than in the other conditions, in the correct-beliefs condition, it was rated higher. 
For the other (not beliefs-related) topic knowledge, there were no differences in ex-
perts’ knowledge assessment between the conditions. Thus, the results confirm the spe-
cific impact hypothesis which, against the background of the special characteristics of 
email health counseling, had predicted a specific, but no generalizative impact of the 
display on the assessment (cf. chapter 5.3). This overruled the concurring generaliza-
tive impact hypothesis, which had predicted that experts would assume a less knowl-
edgeable lay email author in the false-belief condition also with regard to other issues 
than the beliefs-related ones. Also, the second concurring hypothesis, the disregard 
hypothesis, was overruled which – drawing on research results from formal tutoring 
research - had argued that the experts would have difficulties in acknowledging the 
erroneous knowledge and had thus predicted no differences between the assessments 
in the three conditions.  
 
While thus, study II focused on the impact of a display of erroneous beliefs on the 
experts’ knowledge assessment, study III used the same query versions in order to in-
vestigate the experts’ answers to the query. Hereby, the focus laid both on an address-
ing of false beliefs in the false-beliefs condition as well as on the adaptation of the an-
swers to a low level of understanding. The experts were presented with one of the query 
versions that they read and answered (cf. section 6.2).  
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As the results of study III show, the experts explained more issues that were beliefs-
related contents in the false-belief condition than in the other conditions. With regard 
to the audience design of the queries, however, no differences were found between the 
conditions. The results provided some support in favor of the false-beliefs correction 
hypothesis, which had drawn on the results of study II as well as on the special charac-
teristics of the conversational setting of email health counseling. At the same time, due 
to the obtained results, the two concurring hypotheses were overruled: The compre-
hensive adaptation hypothesis, on the one side, had assumed that experts would not 
only do a correction of false beliefs but would also do a more comprehensive adaptation 
of their answers to a low level of understanding. This however, was not found as there 
were no differences in the content-related and linguistic indicators which had been 
used for measuring the audience design of the experts’ answers. Thus, the answers did 
not differ between the three conditions in length, in the amount of explained issues, of 
use of examples and of use of difficult terms. On the other side, the knowledge telling 
hypothesis had predicted – drawing on research results from formal tutoring research, 
that the experts would overlook the display of beliefs in the query and just tell their 
knowledge in all three conditions without adapting it to their lay addressee. Thus, this 
hypothesis did not predict any differences between the experimental conditions. The 
hypothesis needed to be refuted because with regard to the beliefs-related issues that 
were mentioned in the answers, differences between the three experimental conditions 
were found, as described above (cf. section 6.3). 
In addition to the described analyses, also an exploratory, qualitative analysis was 
undertaken in study III which scrutinized the instances in which experts addressed a 
false belief in the answers given in the false-beliefs condition. The results of this analy-
sis pointed out that the experts chose rather indirect ways to address the layperson’s 
errors; thus, they merely provided the correct knowledge or made some kind of refer-
ence to the lay query. 
 
Such indirect ways of addressing uttered erroneous knowledge had also been re-
ported for formal expert-layperson tutorial dialogue by Person et al. (1995), who had 
ascribed this to the impact of politeness on the tutors’ answers. As the informal tutorial 
setting of email counseling is also a conversational setting that triggers the experts’ use 
of politeness (cf. section 2.3.2), the research aim of study IV was to test whether polite-
ness could provide an (at least partial) explanation for the conversational behavior of 
the medical experts in study III. For this aim, an instruction was introduced and tested 
which aimed at fostering instructional (and thus less polite) communication on part of 
the experts. For this aim, in the so-called metapragmatic instruction, the experts were 
informed about the importance of direct communication in the setting and were en-
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couraged to leave out potential feelings of uneasiness on part of the patient in favor of 
effective knowledge communication (cf. section 7.2). As formulated in the politeness 
hypothesis, the metapragmatic instruction was supposed to impact on the experts’ an-
swers in such a way that they would show less polite, but instructionally more valid 
counseling behavior when instructed with the metapragmatic instruction than when 
instructed with the control instruction. Thus, for instance, it was expected that the ex-
perts would address uttered false beliefs more directly and more frequently and that 
experts would write longer answers and provide more explanations. The experts were 
instructed with one of the two instructions (metapragmatic instruction or control in-
struction) and then answered a lay query which displayed false beliefs.  
The results of study IV show partial support for the politeness hypothesis in that the 
metapragmatic instruction indeed lead to experts’ answers that were less polite and 
more apt for a low level of understanding with regard to several of the investigated 
variables. Thus, the experts in the metapragmatic instruction condition wrote longer 
answers, explained more relevant issues and used more examples than in the control 
condition. With regard to the directness and frequency of false belief addressing, how-
ever, no differences were found between the two conditions (cf. section 7.3). 
8.2 Discussion of results against the background of tutoring research  
In this dissertation, the two conversational settings of expert-layperson communication 
and of tutorial dialogue have been introduced as structurally parallel conversational 
settings. For this aim, the structural similarities of the two settings were described (cf. 
section 2.2.1) and two points were made: First, it was stated that tutorial dialogue is a 
form of expert-layperson communication due to the fact that tutors are subject-matter 
experts who converse with their lay tutees who approach dialogue from a naïve per-
spective on the subject-matter. Second, the conversational activities of the counseling 
experts can be called tutoring, even if this one-to-one tutorial interaction does not take 
place within the frame of an institutional learning context.  
As a result of this parallelism, the applied research paradigms as well as the obtained 
results from this dissertation can also enrich tutoring research. Thus, for instance, with 
regard to the tutors’ estimation of their lay tutee’s knowledge, the reasoning behind the 
research methodology that was used in study II of this dissertation could fruitfully be 
transferred to tutoring research: Studies from tutoring research (as described in chap-
ter 2.2) had deduced from the observed tutors’ conversational behavior whether tutors 
had detected uttered tutee errors. This is a rather indirect way of assessment, however. 
In study II, a more direct methodology was used in order to assess the medical experts’ 
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knowledge assessment via a questionnaire. As suggested in chapter 5.4, also for tutor-
ing research with its focus on face-to-face conversation, a paradigm could be found in 
order to separate the impact of uttered tutee errors on (i) the representation of tutee 
errors and on (ii) the reaction to tutee errors. Thus, for instance, several tutor partici-
pants of a study could be confronted with the same errors which could be uttered by a 
confederate tutee in a tutorial session. After the tutorial session, the tutors could rate 
the tutee’s knowledge with regard to different knowledge aspects, both related and un-
related to the uttered errors (cf. Chapter 5.4).  
 
When taking together the research results from study II and III, it becomes evident 
that even though in the investigated setting of online health counseling, the uttered 
errors were processed quite specifically, they were only addressed rather little and in-
frequently by the medical experts. In study IV then, evidence for the supposition that 
the experts did not only not react to the errors because they did not detect them, but 
also due to considerations of politeness was gathered. If the tutors’ representation of 
tutee errors would be investigated more directly in tutoring research, results would 
possibly show that a failure of detection of the errors would be less frequent than 
thought up to now, but that the tutors are also ‘holding back’ an addressing of the er-
rors due to an abidance of the conversational principle of politeness: While Person et al. 
(1995) have already pointed out the impact of politeness on tutorial dialogue, this no-
tion needs further and also experimental research.  
While thus, a general point is made for a greater consideration of politeness on tuto-
rial dialogue, it has to be kept in mind that the specific characteristics of the conversa-
tional settings impact greatly on tutorial dialogue. Thus, for instance, as pointed out in 
section 2.4.2, the characteristics of online health counseling have a somewhat facilitat-
ing effect on the medical experts’ assessment of their interlocutor’s knowledge. Hereby, 
the lack of feedback possibilities and the fact that there is usually a single conversa-
tional turn make an initial assessment of the tutee’s knowledge more important; at the 
same time, the fact that the email is visible and reviewable makes it is easier to detect a 
tutee’s uttered erroneous knowledge than in face-to-face communication where utter-
ances are ephemeral. Research studies on face-to-face tutoring should describe tutoring 
in different conversational settings under consideration of the characteristics, influ-
ences, possibilities and limits of the respective tutorial settings. 
  
In addition to the already discussed points, one important remark needs to be made: 
The counseling tutors that were focused on in this dissertation showed tutorial behav-
ior that was not very optimal with regard to ensuring successful knowledge communi-
cation, which applies specifically to studies III and IV, in which the tutors answered lay 
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queries. Thus, the tutorial behavior is not pedagogically adequate; this goes in line with 
the notion of Chi et al. (2oo1) who had pointed out that tutors’ effectiveness should not 
just tacitly be assumed (cf. section 2.2) and that as a consequence, it was not a good 
research approach for tutoring research to simply describe the tutors’ behavior and 
assume that this was what caused the efficiency of tutoring. On the contrary, the com-
municational behavior of tutors needs not only to be described and observed (for tuto-
rial settings with different characteristics, see above), but also analyzed critically with 
regard to which tutorial moves are detrimental and which are beneficial to the tutoring 
aims. Hereby, also experimental studies can be helpful as for instance the study of Cor-
bett and Anderson (1991; cf. section 2.2) which experimentally showed the usefulness 
of error feedback as tutorial move with the help of a computer tutor.  
8.3 On the role of pragmatic principles in online health counseling  
In the previous section 8.2, reflections were made about the impact of politeness on 
tutorial dialogue; behind these considerations stands the more general idea of conver-
sational principles from ordinary conversation being influential also in specific conver-
sational situations. In the following, the impact of the conversational principles that 
have been introduced in section 2.3 of this dissertation will be discussed for the applied 
setting of email health counseling. When experts communicate with laypersons in 
email health counseling, this conversational situation diverges from everyday conversa-
tion. As human beings, however, experts are very experienced in everyday conversa-
tion. Also, they are not trained with regard to instructional dialogue. As a consequence, 
it can be deemed quite likely that the pragmatic principles that shape human everyday 
conversation also play a role in expert-layperson communication.  
One important conversational principle that has been described is that speakers in a 
conversation try to design their conversational contributions in a way that makes them 
understandable to their addressee and thus enables efficient communication (cf. sec-
tion 2.3.1). This notion is contained in the Gricean account of the cooperative principle. 
Based on this notion, the communicational theory proposed by Herbert Clark focuses 
on the adaptation of a speaker to the supposed knowledge background of the addressee. 
Hereby, the account describes cognitive processes which underlie the adaptation of the 
conversational contributions. According to the account, speakers use certain heuristics 
in order to estimate the shared knowledge background with the interlocutor. Then, the 
utterances are adapted to the supposed needs of the addressee.  
While ample research supports this notion of adaptation, there has also been a sub-
stantial amount of empirical evidence of instances in which speakers do not consider 
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their addressees but leave out the perspective of the interlocutor on utterance produc-
tion (cf. 2.3.1). Rather, the utterance production takes place from an egocentric per-
spective, and is influenced by the accessibility of terms and contents rather than by the 
understandability of these terms and contents on part of the addressee. Recent psycho-
linguistic accounts try to reconcile these diverging empirical results by assuming that 
both adaptation and accessibility impact on the speech production process (for a more 
detailed depiction of the accounts, see section 2.3.1). Hereby, the question of when and 
under which circumstances the perspective of the respective other is taken into account 
in utterance production is not yet sufficiently clarified.  
While the just described accounts are concerned with the impact of adaptation and 
accessibility in utterance production, and thus with under which circumstances utter-
ances are adapted to the knowledge of the interlocutor, another important principle in 
conversation focuses on the adaptation of a speaker not to the knowledge of her ad-
dressee, but to the wants of the conversational partner with regard to not being both-
ered and to be appreciated and approved of. As depicted in the politeness account de-
scribed by Brown and Levinson (1987), speakers often have to do speech acts (e.g., dis-
approval, criticism) that potentially threaten their interlocutor’s ‘face’; in these in-
stances, politeness is used in order to attenuate the face-threat of the speech act. The 
degree to which a speech act is a face-threat depends on the social distance and on the 
power distribution between the interlocutors, as well as on the culturally determined 
weightiness of the speech act (cf. section 2.3.2). 
 
In the research project at the University of Muenster (cf. chapter 1), the impact of 
adaptation and accessibility has been shown for the informal tutorial setting of email 
health counseling. Thus, for instance, Jucks, Bromme, and Runde (2oo3) have shown 
that medical experts gave linguistically and semantically differing answers when an-
swering the same question to a medical layperson vs. to a physician of a different exper-
tise domain. This shows that experts in this setting do adapt to their addressees. How-
ever, also accessibility plays a role in the setting. Thus, Jucks, Becker, and Bromme (in 
press) have shown that experts adapt to the word choices of their addressees, but also 
adapt to words proposed by an illustration. The fact that the encodings of the illustra-
tion, even though not available to the addressee, impacted on word choices, makes a 
point for the impact of mere word accessibility on the experts’ utterance production.  
While this dissertation does not focus primarily on the differentiation of the role of 
adaptation and accessibility for the setting, the results from studies II and III point to-
wards the role of both adaptation and automatization in net-based health counseling: 
While the experts show adaptation of their explanations in that they address and cor-
rect some of the layperson’s erroneous knowledge in the false beliefs condition, the ex-
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planations in general are uttered rather in a standardized way, as no further adapta-
tions were found. This might be due to a rather automatized telling of knowledge that is 
driven mainly by accessibility. Future research will need to shed further light on the 
role of adaptation and accessibility in net-based counseling.  
In addition to adaptation and accessibility, also the conversational principle of po-
liteness plays a role in email health counseling. After an analysis of the role of polite-
ness for netbased health counseling (cf. section 2.3.2) pointed towards the impact of 
politeness also in this informal tutorial setting, the results of study IV suggest that ex-
perts are sensitive to the role of face-threat in the expert-layperson email dialogue (cf. 
chapter 7).  
 
For the described principles, it needs to be considered that while in everyday conver-
sation, these mechanisms are in general beneficial to an effective knowledge communi-
cation, they can impact negatively on expert-layperson communication. Thus, the adap-
tation of one’s conversational contributions is more difficult in expert-layperson com-
munication (both for experts and laypersons), due to the systematic knowledge diver-
gence between the interlocutors in this setting. Thus, laypersons cannot anticipate the 
experts’ perspective because they have not gone through the formation which has 
shaped that perspective. Experts, on the other hand, also have difficulties in anticipat-
ing the layperson’s perspective. Since in everyday conversation, the knowledge assess-
ments of one’s interlocutors are usually successful, the experts might overestimate the 
quality of their knowledge assessment also in the expert-layperson setting and thus try 
to adapt but not adapt their contributions well to their addressee. In sum, the adapta-
tion according to an estimated knowledge is often not a useful strategy for effective ex-
pert-layperson communication.  
Also the mechanism of producing utterances according to accessibility, which is usu-
ally effective and economic in everyday conversation, might be problematic in expert-
layperson communication. For instance, the experiment of Jucks, Becker and Bromme 
(in press; see above) has shown that the experts’ lexical alignment to the word choices 
of the layperson seems to be due rather to an automatic process of accessibility than to 
adaptation to the needs of the layperson. However, as also the results from study I 
show, laypersons often hold false beliefs with regard to technical terms of a domain. If 
the expert now uses the same terms (which for her have a different meaning), expert-
layperson communication is hazarded, because experts and laypersons use the same 
terms to label different things, thus the risk of (also unnoticed) miscommunication is 
high.  
Last, also the use of politeness is potentially detrimental to expert-layperson com-
munication: While serving the experts’ need to maintain a positive relationship with 
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their lay interlocutors by acknowledging their face, a polite way of formulation often 
impacts negatively on clearness and comprehensibility of a message. As the results 
from study IV suggest, the experts try to avoid instructionally more valid conversational 
behavior in order not to threaten their lay interlocutors’ face (cf. chapter 7). As expert-
layperson communication is an informal learning setting, however, experts should be-
have ‘teacher-like’ in a certain sense (e.g., by giving explanations and using examples) 
in order to make their utterances as understandable as  possible for their lay interlocu-
tors.  
 
While a consideration of the above-discussed principles of ordinary conversation for 
the context of email health counseling can help understand the experts’ communica-
tional behavior in this applied setting better, the considerations that have been made 
up to now in this section 8.3 do also call for expansions of the psycholinguistic accounts 
themselves. Thus, Herb Clark describes the cognitive processes that underlie the adap-
tation of an interlocutor to the supposed knowledge of her addressee. While the ac-
count contains important notions on how an adaptation to an interlocutor is accom-
plished, it does not elaborate on the notion that two communication goals of a speaker 
consist side by side in a conversation, that is, effective communication on the one side, 
and maintaining a positive relationship with the addressee on the other side. For the 
latter, speaker often attenuate their utterances by means of politeness, thus reducing 
the face-threatening value of an utterance. In order to be able to interpret the commu-
nicational behavior of a speaker, both goals need to be considered. As a consequence, 
Clark’s account should acknowledge politeness as a conversational principle. Depend-
ing on the face-threatening value of a concrete speech act, one or the other goal of 
communication will have a greater impact on utterance production. 
While Clark’s theory should be expanded with regard to politeness, the politeness 
account does not need to be expanded with regard to the goal of efficient communica-
tion, because it was formulated as a response to the notion of cooperation, stating that 
when an utterance is face-threatening, it is often attenuated by means of politeness. If 
the utterance does not contain a face-threat, however, it is likely to be communicated in 
a more direct and efficient way. Thus, the account does already explicitly include the 
cooperative principle.  
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8.4 Metapragmatic instruction and its potential for fostering formal and 
informal tutoring  
In their analysis based on tutoring protocols from different tutorial settings, Person et 
al. (1995) describe the impact of everyday conversational mechanisms on tutorial dia-
logue. As a consequence of their considerations, Person et al. (1995) draw the following 
conclusions: In order to foster tutorial dialogue, tutors and tutees need to be made 
aware of the conversational conventions of the tutorial interaction, this entails that the 
‘normal’ rules of conversation may be violated.  
As described in section 7.1, an instruction that provided information on such neces-
sities of communication in expert-layperson tutorial interaction was developed and 
used in study IV of this dissertation. This so-called metapragmatic instruction aimed at 
making the experts aware of the tutorial character of the email counseling setting. 
When experts were provided with this information in the instruction, they produced 
instructionally more valid answers with regard to an audience design to a low level of 
understanding. Also, they reinforced the laypersons in that there question asking was 
good and important. While these results strongly indicated the role of politeness for the 
counseling setting (to investigate this role was the aim of study IV), they showed that 
the conversational behavior of the experts can be favorably influenced by means of a 
metapragmatic instruction. Hereby, it needs to be pointed out that the instruction of 
study IV was rather subtle (in that it only differed from the control instruction in only a 
few sentences).  
In sum, the results provide evidence for the minimal intervention of only a few 
metapragmatic sentences in the instruction causing a sensitivization of the experts for 
both adaptation and face-related aspects. This evidence points towards the role of 
metapragmatic information as a means of helping experts to leave aside the conversa-
tional principle of politeness in favor of a more direct and effective knowledge commu-
nication. However, future research will need to address the question of how the impact 
of conversational principles can be altered by metapragmatic instruction, and hereby 
differentiate between diverse formal and informal tutorial settings. If successful, such a 
metapragmatic instruction could constitute a less costly and resource-consuming way 
of fostering expert-layperson communication than for instance the use of software tools 
who are also a promising intervention for fostering effective expert-layperson commu-
nication (see, for instance the Concept Revision Tool (CRT), which helps experts revise 
their own answer with regard to technical concepts that they used, thus fostering a bet-
ter audience design of the answers; cf. Jucks, Schulte-Löbbert, & Bromme, 2007).  
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Tutoring research has shown tutoring in formal settings to be a very effective way of 
instruction compared to other forms of instruction. Hereby, tutoring is effective even 
though the instructional moves of the tutors are often suboptimal. It seems very likely 
that the medical laypersons in the informal tutorial context of email health counseling 
also benefit from experts’ explanations, even though the experts’ explanations are not 
optimal either (as studies III and IV of this dissertation have shown). Thus, it is a 
worthwhile effort to work on ways to foster email health counseling. This becomes even 
clearer when comparing email health counseling to other ways in which laypersons can 
obtain medical information on the Internet. As described in section 2.4, for these less 
personalized sources of information like web pages or medical journals the technical 
quality of information is often not very transparent for the layperson. And even if the 
quality is high, the information is often not apt for laypersons. In light of these consid-
erations, it becomes evident that email health counseling is an important way of lay 
information-seeking and that it is thus a worthwhile endeavor to foster its efficiency.  
8.5 Further research questions  
In the preceding section of this general conclusion chapter, the empirical results of the 
dissertation’s research studies were discussed from various viewpoints. Hereby, several 
directions for future research were outlined, both with regard to the expansion of theo-
retical accounts and with regard to future empirical research questions. In this last sec-
tion of the chapter, these suggestions for further research will be complemented with 
some additional directions.  
 
Examination of transferability of results to other populations 
In order to discuss the transferability of the obtained research results to other popula-
tions than the investigated ones, a distinction needs to be made between study I which 
was conducted with a lay sample and studies II through IV which were conducted with 
each one expert sample.  
In study I, the relatively narrow lay population of students enrolled in other course 
than the natural sciences were chosen in order to investigate lay beliefs in the thematic 
field of the metabolic syndrome. Thus, the population that was chosen was likely to be 
more educated than the general population. It is especially interesting to note that also 
in such a population, there are many widespread false beliefs as well as a high disparity 
of knowledge within the sample and it is likely that these outcomes will be even 
stronger in other lay populations. Future research studies, thus, should choose other 
lay populations in order to investigate lay knowledge both on the topic of the metabolic 
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syndrome as well as on other topics. This is important for two reasons: First, these 
studies should be conducted in order to provide further support for the claim of study I 
that medical laypersons often hold erroneous beliefs; second, because it is of practical 
relevance for practitioners to know lay knowledge for as many topics and as many dif-
ferent lay populations as possible, since this is helpful for their dialogues with their 
patients.  
 
In studies II through IV, medical studies at the end of their academic formation were 
chosen as medical expert participants. This choice of a relatively homogenous sample 
had the advantage of avoiding a high disparity of the sample which could have obscured 
the effects of the experimental manipulation of the respective studies. Such effects for 
instance could have been caused by a high disparity with regard to years since academic 
formation was finished, patient contact or the chosen specialty within the medical do-
main. Despite these advantages, future studies should also investigate the impact of a 
display of lay erroneous understanding on experts’ assessment and adaptation also with 
other samples of medical experts, for instance with practitioners in general or specifi-
cally with physicians who do health counseling on the Internet.  
 
Future research within the paradigm of display of beliefs 
In studies II and III, the impact of a display of lay erroneous understanding on the 
knowledge assessment and answering behavior of medical experts in email health 
counseling was investigated. For this aim, a research paradigm was developed and in-
troduced which allowed for the comparison of experts’ knowledge anticipations for 
cases in which the lay nature of the email author’s understanding of medical concepts 
was evident in the email to a different degree. In this paradigm, the medical experts are 
provided with a lay email query that was realized in three different versions; in the first 
version, the layperson uttered several false beliefs. These false beliefs do not only in-
form on the layperson’s concrete misunderstanding, but also point to the fact that there 
is a general deficiency to lay term understanding. In the second version, correct beliefs 
are uttered by the layperson; obviously, if a correct belief is uttered, the expert is not 
made aware of the fact that laypersons often have false beliefs; on the contrary, it rather 
obscures the nature of lay knowledge). In the third version, there are no specific beliefs 
displayed in the query (cf. section 5.2.2).  
There are many thinkable and relevant further research questions which could 
promisingly be addressed with the paradigm. Thus, for instance, it would be a fruitful 
endeavor to analyze the impact of a belief display on the conversational mechanism of 
lexical alignment in email counseling. As Jucks, Becker, and Bromme (in press) have 
shown, experts align to lexical suggestions from previous conversation. This alignment 
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seems to be a rather automatic mechanism of conversation, as the experts align to the 
suggested wording no matter whether it has been introduced into conversation by their 
lay addressee or by a not-shared illustration. It would constitute an interesting research 
question to investigate the impact of a display of lay false beliefs in the query on lexical 
alignment to the addressee’s word choice in the lay query. Do experts entrain to the 
technical terminology of the patient even if it is evident in the query that the patient 
does not have a correct understanding of the term? Or does the display interrupt this 
stable conversational pattern of lexical alignment which has already been shown for the 
conversational setting of email health counseling in a variety of research studies? The 
experts’ alignment and other answering behavior could then be compared to the cor-
rect-beliefs and no beliefs display conditions. These and other research questions could 
well be addressed with the paradigm of display of beliefs. 
 
When thinking about future research that could be conducted using the paradigm, 
one remark needs to be made: In this dissertation, the paradigm was used in two differ-
ent studies: In study II, the experts’ knowledge assessment was investigated, while 
study III investigated the experts’ answering behavior. Hereby, the aspects of knowl-
edge assessment and answering were investigated purposely in two separate studies 
with two separate expert samples in order to avoid an influence of the answering activ-
ity on the assessment. In study III, however, in which the same query versions than in 
study II were used, the holistic knowledge assessment item from study II was adminis-
tered exploratorily to the experts. The pattern of results on this item in study III was 
the same than in study II. From this, we can tentatively conclude that the act of answer-
ing the lay query might not impact on the experts’ assessment of how much the layper-
son knew when answering the query. However, this impression needs to be supported 
through future research, which also needs to investigate whether a more specific and 
differentiated knowledge assessment is influenced by a prior answering of the query or 
not.  
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Appendix A1. German questionnaire items in thematic order  
 
 
Diabetes [Diabetes] 
Es gibt Untergruppen von Diabetes. 
Erbliche Faktoren spielen für die Entstehung von Diabetes eine große Rolle.  
Ein häufiges Symptom von Diabetes ist gesteigerte Wachheit. 
Für die Entstehung von Diabetes spielen erbliche Faktoren nur eine geringe 
Rolle. 
Schwangere erkranken seltener an Diabetes. 
Eine Folgeerkrankung von Diabetes sind Augenerkrankungen. 
Manche Diabetiker sollten kein Insulin erhalten. 
Diabetiker dürfen als Süßigkeiten nur Diabetiker-Süßigkeiten essen. 
Bei Diabetes gelangt zu wenig Zucker in die Zellen. 
Ein häufiges Symptom von Diabetes ist Appetitlosigkeit. 
Bei Diabetes gelangt zuviel Zucker in die Zellen. 
Schwangere haben ein erhöhtes Diabetesrisiko. 
Ein häufiges Symptom von Diabetes ist häufiges Wasserlassen. 
Wenn man an Diabetes erkrankt ist, muss man Insulin spritzen. 
Eine Folgeerkrankung von Diabetes ist Arterienverkalkung. 
Bei Diabetes kann der Zucker sich nicht im Blut auflösen. 
Fettleibigkeit [Adiposity] 
Fettleibige haben ein erhöhtes Herzinfarktrisiko. 
Neben der Ernährung hängt die Entstehung der Fettleibigkeit auch von anderen 
Faktoren ab. 
Zu fette und kalorienreiche Ernährung ist der einzige Faktor, der Fettleibigkeit 
bedingt. 
Die Begriffe Fettleibigkeit und Übergewicht sind synonym zu gebrauchen. 
Eine mögliche Folge von Fettleibigkeit sind Atemaussetzer im Schlaf. 
Fettleibige haben ein genauso hohes Schlaganfallrisiko wie Nicht-Fettleibige. 
Bei Fettleibigen verkalken die Adern schneller. 
Zur Behandlung von Fettleibigkeit ist Fettabsaugung eine Therapie der Wahl. 
Fettleibigkeit kann chirurgisch behandelt werden. 
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Bluthochdruck [Hypertension] 
Bluthochdruck ist auch Veranlagungssache. 
Warum ein Patient an Bluthochdruck leidet, lässt sich meist an einer Ursache 
festmachen. 
Schwangere bekommen nicht so schnell Bluthochdruck. 
Wenn der Blutdruck medikamentös gesenkt wurde, können die  
blutdrucksenkenden Medikamente in der Regel wieder abgesetzt werden. 
Bei Personen mit Bluthochdruck verkalken die Gefäße genauso schnell wie bei 
Personen mit normalem Blutdruck. 
Schwangere bekommen genauso schnell Bluthochdruck wie Nicht-Schwangere. 
Bei Personen mit Bluthochdruck verkalken die Gefäße langsamer. 
Hoher Blutdruck kann Schwindel hervorrufen. 
Bluthochdruck entsteht auch als Folge von Schilddrüsenerkrankungen. 
Eine Folgeerkrankung von Bluthochdruck sind Nierenschäden.  
Eine Folgeerkrankung von Bluthochdruck sind Augenerkrankungen.  
Bluthochdruck entsteht auch als Folge eines Hirntumors. 
Erhöhter Cholesterinspiegel [High blood cholesterol] 
Eine cholesterinarme Diät kann die Therapie des hohen Cholesterinspiegels  
unterstützen. 
Ein erhöhter Cholesterinspiegel kann mit Medikamenten behandelt werden. 
Ein erhöhter Cholesterinspiegel verursacht akut keine Beschwerden.  
Ob man einen erhöhten Cholesterinspiegel hat, ist von erblichen Faktoren  
unabhängig. 
Ein erhöhter Cholesterinspiegel begünstigt Arterienverkalkung. 
Ein erhöhter Cholesterinspiegel macht sich durch Müdigkeit bemerkbar. 
Arterienverkalkung [Arteriosclerosis] 
Wenn man an Arterienverkalkung leidet, bekommt man eher einen Schlaganfall. 
Ein Symptom von Arterienverkalkung sind Beinschmerzen. 
Bei einer Arterienverkalkung sind die Adern aufgeweicht.   
Arterienverkalkung kann völlig geheilt werden. 
Bei einer Arterienverkalkung ziehen sich die Adern zusammen.   
Bei einer Arterienverkalkung sind die Adern weniger elastisch. 
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Wenn man an Arterienverkalkung leidet, sinkt häufig der Blutdruck. 
Wenn man an Arterienverkalkung leidet, steigt häufig der Blutdruck. 
Bluthochdruck und Arterienverkalkung sind voneinander unabhängig. 
Bei Arterienverkalkung kann zur Stabilisierung der Arterie eine Stütze in die 
Arterie eingebracht werden. 
Das Risiko, an Arterienverkalkung zu erkranken, wird nicht vererbt.   
Arterienverkalkung kann die Niere schädigen. 
Bei einer Arterienverkalkung lagern sich Blutplättchen an der Arterienwand ab. 
Bei einer Arterienverkalkung lagert sich Fett an der Adernwand ab. 
Bei Personen mit hohem Blutdruck verkalken die Gefäße schneller. 
Mit medikamentöser Behandlung können Arterien vom Kalk befreit werden. 
Bei einer Arterienverkalkung sind die Adern brüchig.   
Schlaganfall [Stroke] 
Bei einem Schlaganfall ist das Gehirn betroffen. 
Ein Schlaganfall hat, wenn er überlebt wird, meist keine dauerhaften Folgen. 
Eine mögliche Folge eines Schlaganfalls ist eine bleibende Sprachstörung. 
Nach einem Schlaganfall macht oft das Gedächtnis Probleme. 
Es gibt verschiedene Typen von Schlaganfall. 
Ein Schlaganfall entsteht durch die Verstopfung von Adern. 
Trotz Schlaganfalls bleibt die Nährstoffversorgung des Gehirns in der Regel  
erhalten. 
Ein Schlaganfall ist gekennzeichnet durch einen plötzlichen Funktionsverlust  
des Herzens. 
Ein Schlaganfall entsteht, wenn übererregte Zellen zuviel Elektrizität 
produzieren. 
Ein Schlaganfall kündigt sich häufig durch Brustschmerzen an. 
Ein Schlaganfall kündigt sich häufig durch Sprachprobleme an. 
Diabetiker bekommen eher einen Schlaganfall. 
Herzinfarkt [Heart infarction] 
Rauchen ist als Risikofaktor für Herzinfarkt von untergeordneter Bedeutung. 
Bei einem Herzinfarkt kann der Schmerz in die Arme ausstrahlen. 
Die Sauerstoffversorgung des Herzens ist bei einem Herzinfarkt nicht  
beeinträchtigt. 
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Das Risiko einen Herzinfarkt zu bekommen kann vererbt werden. 
Nach einem Herzinfarkt werden Medikamente zur Blutverdünnung gegeben. 
Ein Herzinfarkt entsteht durch Fehlsteuerung des Herzens aus dem Hirn. 
Ein Herzinfarkt kündigt sich häufig durch Atemnot an. 
Ein Herzinfarkt entsteht über den Verschluss einer Arterie. 
Durch einen Herzinfarkt entstandene Schäden bilden sich nach einiger Zeit  
wieder zurück. 
Nach einem Herzinfarkt können Teile des Herzmuskels absterben. 
Ein Herzinfarkt muss operativ behandelt werden. 
Bei einem Herzinfarkt stirbt Herzmuskelgewebe ab. 
Diabetes ist ein Risikofaktor für einen Herzinfarkt. 
Häufige Folgen eines Herzinfarktes sind Lähmungserscheinungen. 
Bei einem Herzinfarkt kann der Schmerz in den Magen ausstrahlen. 
Ursache eines Herzinfarktes ist das Versagen einer oder mehrerer Herzklappen. 
Ein Herzinfarkt kündigt sich durch Gefühllosigkeit und Taubheit an. 
Ein Herzinfarkt kann sich durch Übelkeit und Erbrechen ankündigen. 
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Appendix B1. German version of diabetes questionnaire 
 
Zum Abschluss der Untersuchung wollen wir Ihnen noch einige medizinische Wissens-
fragen zu dem oben angesprochenen Themenbereich stellen. Bei den folgenden Fragen 
geht es um Ihr Wissen. Alle von Ihnen gemachten Angaben werden selbstverständlich 
anonym ausgewertet, so dass kein Rückschluss auf Ihre Person möglich ist.  
 
 Stimmt 
Stimmt 
nicht 
Weiß 
nicht 
Bei Diabetes wird vermehrt Glukose in die Zellen  
absorbiert. 
   
Ein häufiges Symptom von Diabetes ist  
Appetitlosigkeit.. 
   
Eine Überdosis Insulin ist eine Ursache von  
Hypoglykämie. 
   
Polydipsie ist ein Symptom von Diabetes.    
Der Test auf Früherkennung von diabetesbedingten  
Nierenschäden heißt Makroalbuminurie-Test. 
   
Der HBA1c-Wert gibt Aufschluss über die  
Blutzuckereinstellung der letzten drei Monate. 
   
Von einem klinisch manifesten Diabetes spricht man ab 
Nüchtern-Blutzuckerwerten von 20 mmol/l. 
   
Diabetes Typ II ist durch absoluten Insulinmangel  
gekennzeichnet. 
   
Eine Spätkomplikation von Diabetes ist Retinopathie.    
Die meisten Typ II Diabetiker sind übergewichtig.    
Insulin wird in konstanten Mengen ausgeschüttet.    
Insulin sorgt dafür, dass Zucker sich im Blut auflöst.    
Eine Spätkomplikation von Diabetes ist  
Arteriosklerose. 
   
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Bei einigen Diabetikern vom Typ II ist die  
Insulinsekretion erhöht. 
   
Ab einem BMI von 25 spricht man von Adipositas.    
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Appendix B2. German query versions  
 
CB version of query 
Guten Tag,  
ich bin 55 Jahre alt und bin fettleibig (87 kg bei 1,70 m), und ich weiß, dass Fettleibig-
keit wirklich schlecht für die Gesundheit ist. Ich hatte noch nie ernsthafte gesundheitli-
che Probleme, aber vor einer Woche stellte mein Hausarzt bei einer Routineuntersu-
chung einen erhöhten Blutzuckerspiegel fest, da war wohl nicht nur die Schokoladen-
torte am Tag zuvor schuld. Er hat gesagt ich hätte Diabetes Typ 2. Diabetes hat meine 
Mutter übrigens auch, wahrscheinlich war ich deshalb auch mehr gefährdet. Jetzt soll 
ich mich mit einer Diätassistentin treffen und mich viel bewegen. Das sei auch nötig, 
um einer Arteriosklerose vorzubeugen, und verstopfte Adern will ich auch wirklich 
nicht haben. Ich habe meinen Arzt gefragt, warum ich nicht einfach Insulin spritzen 
kann. Aber er hat gesagt, ich hätte genug Insulin im Blut, scheinbar produziere ich also 
genug.  Dabei sagt man doch immer, dass man bei Diabetes Insulin spritzen soll, das 
hat mich schon gewundert.  
Ich weiß zwar, was ich zu tun habe, aber habe noch folgende Fragen an Sie: 
Wieso habe ich diese Krankheit, wenn ich doch genug Insulin im Blut habe? Wofür ist 
Insulin eigentlich gut? Und auf welche Weise hat Diabetes etwas mit Arteriosklerose zu 
tun? 
 
 
FB version of query 
Guten Tag,  
ich bin 55 Jahre alt und bin fettleibig (87 kg bei 1,70 m), aber Fettleibigkeit ist ja an sich 
nicht schlecht für die Gesundheit. Ich hatte noch nie ernsthafte gesundheitliche Prob-
leme, aber vor einer Woche stellte mein Hausarzt bei einer Routineuntersuchung einen 
erhöhten Blutzuckerspiegel fest, ich hatte aber auch am Tag zuvor Schokoladentorte 
gegessen. Er hat gesagt ich hätte Diabetes Typ 2. Diabetes hat meine Mutter übrigens 
auch, das ist schon ein Zufall. Jetzt soll ich mich mit einer Diätassistentin treffen und 
mich viel bewegen. Das sei auch nötig, um einer Arteriosklerose vorzubeugen, und ver-
schlissene Gelenke will ich auch wirklich nicht haben. Ich habe meinen Arzt gefragt, 
warum ich nicht einfach Insulin spritzen kann. Aber er hat gesagt, ich hätte genug Insu-
lin im Blut, scheinbar nehme ich also genug Insulin mit der Nahrung auf. Dabei sagt 
man doch immer, dass man bei Diabetes Insulin spritzen soll, das hat mich schon ge-
wundert.  
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Ich weiß zwar, was ich zu tun habe, aber habe noch folgende Fragen an Sie:  
Wieso habe ich diese Krankheit, wenn ich doch genug Insulin im Blut habe? Wofür ist 
Insulin eigentlich gut? Und auf welche Weise hat Diabetes etwas mit Arteriosklerose zu 
tun? 
 
 
NB version of query 
Guten Tag,  
ich bin 55 Jahre alt und bin fettleibig (87 kg bei 1,70 m). Ich hatte noch nie ernsthafte 
gesundheitliche Probleme, aber vor einer Woche stellte mein Hausarzt bei einer Routi-
neuntersuchung einen erhöhten Blutzuckerspiegel fest. Er hat gesagt ich hätte Diabetes 
Typ 2. Diabetes hat meine Muter übrigens auch. Jetzt soll ich mich mit einer Diätassis-
tentin treffen und mich viel bewegen. Das sei auch nötig, um einer Arteriosklerose vor-
zubeugen. Ich habe meinen Arzt gefragt, warum ich nicht einfach Insulin spritzen kann. 
Aber er hat gesagt, ich hätte genug Insulin im Blut. Dabei sagt man doch immer, dass 
man bei Diabetes Insulin spritzen soll, das hat mich schon gewundert.  
Ich weiß zwar, was ich zu tun habe, aber habe noch folgende Fragen an Sie:  
Wieso habe ich diese Krankheit, wenn ich doch genug Insulin im Blut habe? Wofür ist 
Insulin eigentlich gut? Und auf welche Weise hat Diabetes etwas mit Arteriosklerose zu 
tun? 
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Appendix B3. English query versions 
 
CB version of query 
Hello,  
I am 55 years old and I am suffering from adiposity (87 kg, 1meter 70), and I am aware 
that that is a health risk. I have never had any serious health problems, but last week I 
went to a routine health check up and my doctor found that my blood sugar level was 
too high. This was surely not only due to the chocolate tart that I’d had the day before. 
The doctor told me that I have type 2 diabetes. My mother also has it, which probably 
made me more vulnerable for it. Now I have to go see a diet advisor and engage in 
physical activity. I was told that this was also necessary to prevent arteriosclerosis, and 
I really don’t want jammed arteries. I asked my doctor why I can’t just inject insulin, 
but he told me that I had enough insulin in my blood, seems like I produce enough in-
sulin. That kind of surprised me, as people always say that you have to inject insulin 
when you have diabetes.  
I know what I am supposed to do, but my questions to you are: 
Why am I suffering from this disease even though I apparently have enough insulin in 
my blood? What does insulin do in the body? And in which way do diabetes and arte-
riosclerosis have to do with each other? 
 
 
FB version of query 
Hello,  
I am 55 years old and I am suffering from adiposity (87 kg, 1meter 70), which is not a 
problem for my health per se. I have never had any serious health problems, but last 
week I went to a routine health check up and my doctor found that my blood sugar level 
was too high. I’d had a chocolate tart the day before, though. The doctor told me that I 
have type 2 diabetes. My mother also has it, what a coincidence. Now I have to go see a 
diet advisor and engage in physical activity. I was told that this was also necessary to 
prevent arteriosclerosis, and I really don’t want worn-out joints.. I asked my doctor why 
I can’t just inject insulin, but he told me that I had enough insulin in my blood, seems 
like my insulin intake with food is sufficient.  That kind of surprised me, as people al-
ways say that you have to inject insulin when you have diabetes.  
I know what I am supposed to do, but my questions to you are: 
Why am I suffering from this disease even though I apparently have enough insulin in 
my blood? What does insulin do in the body? And in which way do diabetes and arte-
riosclerosis have to do with each other? 
 
Appendix B3  187 
NB version of query 
Hello,  
I am 55 years old and I am suffering from adiposity (87 kg, 1 meter 70). I have never 
had any serious health problems, but last week I went to a routine health check up and 
my doctor found that my blood sugar level was too high. The doctor told me that I have 
type 2 diabetes. My mother also has it. Now I have to go see a diet advisor and engage 
in physical activity. I was told that this was also necessary to prevent arteriosclerosis. I 
asked my doctor why I can’t just inject insulin, but he told me that I had enough insulin 
in my blood. That kind of surprised me, as people always say that you have to inject 
insulin when you have diabetes.  
I know what I am supposed to do, but my questions to you are: 
Why am I suffering from this disease even though I apparently have enough insulin in 
my blood? What does insulin do in the body? And in which way do diabetes and arte-
riosclerosis have to do with each other? 
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Appendix B4. German version of knowledge assessment questionnaire 
 
Wie viel weiß der Patient, der diese Anfrage verschickt hat, darüber… 
 Sehr  
wenig 
Wenig 
Eher 
wenig 
mittel 
Eher 
viel 
Viel 
Sehr 
viel 
…was unter Fettleibigkeit zu 
verstehen ist? O O O O O O O 
… welche verschiedenen Arten 
von Insulinpräparaten es gibt? 
O O O O O O O 
… welche Vorgänge bei Arte-
rienverkalkung ablaufen? 
O O O O O O O 
…welche unterschiedlichen Ty-
pen von Diabetes es gibt? 
O O O O O O O 
…welche Blutzuckergrenzwerte 
gelten? O O O O O O O 
…welche Faktoren die  
Entstehung von Diabetes Typ 2 
beeinflussen? 
O O O O O O O 
… welche Funktion Insulin im 
Körper hat? O O O O O O O 
… welche Rolle erbliche Fakto-
ren bei Diabetes spielen? O O O O O O O 
… wie die Blutzuckerregulation 
funktioniert? O O O O O O O 
… wie Insulin produziert wird? O O O O O O O 
… welche Folgen Fettleibigkeit 
haben kann? O O O O O O O 
… wie der Zusammenhang  
zwischen Diabetes und 
Arterienverkalkung beschaffen 
ist? 
O O O O O O O 
… was Diabetes für eine Er-
krankung ist? 
O O O O O O O 
…wie Diabetes über die Ernäh-
rung beeinflusst werden kann? O O O O O O O 
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… wodurch sich die Diabetes-
Typen unterscheiden? O O O O O O O 
… wie Diabeteserkrankungen 
therapiert werden? 
O O O O O O O 
… wie der Zusammenhang zwi-
schen Fettleibigkeit und Arte-
rienverkalkung beschaffen ist? 
O O O O O O O 
… welche Symptome Diabetes 
hat? 
O O O O O O O 
… in welchem Lebensalter die 
verschiedenen Typen von Dia-
betes vermehrt auftreten? 
O O O O O O O 
… welche Rolle Diabetes in der 
Schwangerschaft spielen kann? 
O O O O O O O 
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Appendix B5. English version of knowledge assessment questionnaire 
 
How much does the patient that wrote the inquiry know about… 
 Very 
little 
Little 
Rather 
little 
Medium 
Rather 
much 
Much 
Very 
much 
…what adiposity ist? O O O O O O O 
… which different types of dia-
betes medication exist? 
O O O O O O O 
… the processes that happen in 
arteriosclerosis? 
O O O O O O O 
…which different types of diabe-
tes exist? 
O O O O O O O 
…critical blood sugar levels? O O O O O O O 
…which factors influence the 
development of diabetes type 2? O O O O O O O 
… which function insulin serves 
in the body? O O O O O O O 
… the role of heredity in diabe-
tes? O O O O O O O 
… the functioning of blood sug-
ar regulation? O O O O O O O 
… how insulin is produced? O O O O O O O 
… the sequelae that adiposity 
can have? O O O O O O O 
… the relation of diabetes and 
arteriosclerosis? 
O O O O O O O 
… what kind of illness diabetes 
is? 
O O O O O O O 
…how diabetes can be influ-
enced nutriutionally? 
O O O O O O O 
… what distinguishes the differ-
ent types of diabetes? 
O O O O O O O 
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… the treatment options of dia-
betes? O O O O O O O 
… the relations between adipos-
ity and arteriosclerosis? 
O O O O O O O 
… the symptoms of diabetes? O O O O O O O 
…at what age levels the different 
types of diabetes are likely to 
appear? 
O O O O O O O 
… the possible role of diabetes 
in pregnancy? 
O O O O O O O 
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Appendix C1. German version of computer, Internet, & text processing software use 
questionnaire 
 
Wie häufig nutzen Sie einen Computer?   ___ Stunden pro Woche 
Wie häufig nutzen Sie das Internet?   ___ Stunden pro Woche 
Wie häufig arbeiten Sie mit einem Textverarbeitungspro-
gramm?   
___ Stunden pro Woche 
Haben Sie einen Internetzugang zu Hause?    JA  NEIN 
Welche Internetdienstleistungen nutzen Sie?   
World Wide 
Web (WWW) 
 
Email 
 
Chat 
 
Telnet 
 
FTP 
 
Sonstige 
 
Keine 
 
Wie viel Prozent Ihrer Freunde und Bekannten nutzen das In-
ternet (inkl. Email) regelmäßig?    
___ % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C2   193 
Appendix C2. German version of email answers of expert no. 75 and expert no. 5 
(spellchecked) 
 
Answer from expert no. 75 
Man braucht Insulin, um Zucker in die Zellen aufzunehmen. Zusätzlich gibt es Rezep-
toren an den Zellen, diese sind von Fett bei fettleibigen Pat. besetzt, deshalb kann kein 
Zucker mittels Insulin aufgenommen werden. Bei Diabetes kommt es zu einer Ablage-
rung von Stoffen in den Gefäßen, so hat man ein erhöhtes Risiko Arteriosklerose zu 
bekommen  und an z. B. einem Herzinfarkt oder einem Schlaganfall zu erkranken.  
 
Answer from expert no. 5 
Guten Tag,  
 
Ihr behandelnder Arzt hat mit dem, was er ihnen erklärt hat vollkommen recht! Insulin 
haben sie genug. Doch insulin allein genügt nicht, um im menschlichen Körper den 
Zucker, den wir ja mit einer Mahlzeit zu uns nehmen, aus dem Blut in die Körperzelle 
zu transportieren. Der Zucker muss in die Zelle, weil er lebensnotwendig für jede ein-
zelne Zelle unseres Körpers ist - also auch für uns. Sie nehmen also Zucker auf (natür-
lich auch noch andere Nährstoffe, aber die lassen wir jetzt mal beiseite), er gelangt in 
die Blutbahn und so auch zu ihrer Bauchspeicheldrüse. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt (Zucker ist 
an der Bauchspeicheldrüse angelangt) fängt diese jetzt an das Insulin auszuschütten, 
auch in die Blutbahn. Unser Ziel ist ja: Zucker in die Zelle! Aber wie kommt es in die 
Zelle? Einfach so geht das nicht, aber mit Insulin, von dem auch sie genug haben. Die 
Zellen sind mit bestimmten Rezeptoren ausgestattet, an die das Insulin bindet. So wird 
der Zelle das Signal gegeben, Transportmoleküle bereitzustellen, die den Zucker aus 
dem Blut in die Zelle aufnehmen können. Hier nun, zur Vereinfachung ein Vergleich:  
Stellen sie sich vor das Insulin ist so was wie ein Bote, der an die Tür (unser Rezeptor) 
klopft und der Zelle sagt, sie solle eine andere, spezielle Tür (unser Transportmolekül) 
für den Zucker aufmachen. Erst dann kann er auch in die Zellen gelangen. Bei ihnen ist 
nun nicht das Insulin das Problem, sondern, die Anzahl der "Türen" an die das Insulin 
tritt um der Zelle zu sagen: Bitte Tür für Zucker aufmachen! Sie haben zwar die gleiche 
Anzahl Türen, wie jemand ohne Diabetes Typ 2, aber sie haben eine viel größere Kör-
permasse zu versorgen und das bei gleich gebliebener Anzahl an "Türen" für Insulin. So 
nehmen Ihre Zellen viel weniger Zucker auf, als z.B. die eines Normalgewichtigen und 
Gesunden. Können sie ihr Gewicht reduzieren, so müssen die gleichgebliebene Anzahl 
von "Türen auch wieder" weniger mMasse versorgen, und der Zucker kann wieder adä-
quat in die zellen aufgenommen werden. Was hat das jetzt mit Arteriosklerose zu tun?  
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Dadurch, dass sich der Zucker ja nun in ihrem Blut befindet und auch nicht mehr der 
komplette Zucker, den sie essen, in die Zelle gelangt, verbleibt ein Teil im Blut. Je meht 
Zucker sich nun in der Blutbahn befindet um so mehr steigt auch die Wahrscheinlich-
keit, dass sich kleine Mikrozuckerkristalle in der Blutbahn bilden und an ihren Gefäß-
wänden haften bleiben. Dieser Vorgang kann irgendwann dazu führen, dass so ein Ge-
fäß langsam verschließt. 
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Appendix D1. German instruction versions  
 
Control instruction  
Liebe TeilnehmerInnen,  
die Bedeutung des Internet nimmt im öffentlichen wie im privaten Leben immer weiter 
zu, und von Privatpersonen werden immer häufiger auch gesundheitsbezogene Inter-
netseiten aufgesucht. Hierbei nutzen medizinische Laien verstärkt das Angebot ver-
schiedener Gesundheitsdienste, medizinischen Experten eine Email zu senden und 
Antwort auf ihre Fragen zu erhalten. Patienten fehlt meist das Vorwissen, um medizini-
sche Zusammenhänge einschätzen und verstehen zu können. Für Mediziner heißt das, 
dass sie ihre Informationen so formulieren müssen, dass Patienten diese auch verste-
hen können.  
Innerhalb des breiten Angebotes der Gesundheitsdienste ist der direkte Kontakt mit 
einem Mediziner per Email (neben anderen Angeboten wie z.B. Lexika zu spezifischen 
Krankheiten und Symptomen oder Newsletter) ein häufig genutzter Service. Die Anfra-
gen werden direkt über ein Email-Formular versendet. Mit einiger Verzögerung erhält 
dann der medizinische Laie die Antwort des Arztes.  
 
Unsere Untersuchung besteht darin, einen solchen Emailaustausch nachzustellen.  
Auf der nächsten Seite finden Sie eine typische Anfrage aus dem Internet. Bitte beant-
worten Sie als Fachfrau / Fachmann für Medizin dem Patienten seine Fragen. 
 
Klicken Sie auf WEITER um zur Anfrage zu gelangen 
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Metapragmatic instruction  
Liebe TeilnehmerInnen,  
die Bedeutung des Internet nimmt im öffentlichen wie im privaten Leben immer weiter 
zu, und von Privatpersonen werden immer häufiger auch gesundheitsbezogene Inter-
netseiten aufgesucht. Hierbei nutzen medizinische Laien verstärkt das Angebot ver-
schiedener Gesundheitsdienste, medizinischen Experten eine Email zu senden und 
Antwort auf ihre Fragen zu erhalten. Patienten fehlt meist das Vorwissen, um medizini-
sche Zusammenhänge einschätzen und verstehen zu können. Für Mediziner heißt das, 
dass sie ihre Informationen so formulieren müssen, dass Patienten diese auch verste-
hen können.  
Dabei hilft es nicht, wenn der Arzt alles vermeidet, was dem Patienten unangenehm 
sein könnte. Ein Patient braucht sich zum Beispiel nicht dafür zu schämen, dass er viele 
Dinge nicht weiß. Patienten, die die „Frage den Arzt“- Option im Internet nutzen, wol-
len ja gerade medizinische Sachverhalte besser verstehen. Die Gefahr, dass sich der 
Patient durch Äußerungen des Arztes in seiner Unwissenheit bloßgestellt fühlt, muss 
der Arzt das in Kauf nehmen und das, was er wichtig findet, klar sagen. Nur so kann er 
dem Patienten zu einem besseren Verständnis verhelfen.  
 
Unsere Untersuchung besteht darin, einen solchen Emailaustausch nachzustellen.  
Auf der nächsten Seite finden Sie eine typische Anfrage aus dem Internet. Bitte beant-
worten Sie als Fachfrau / Fachmann für Medizin dem Patienten seine Fragen. 
 
Klicken Sie auf WEITER um zur Anfrage zu gelangen.  
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Appendix D2. German version of patient query  
 
Guten Tag,  
ich bin 55 Jahre alt und wiege 87 kg bei 1,70m, aber Fettleibigkeit ist ja an sich nicht 
schlecht für die Gesundheit. Ich hatte noch nie ernsthafte gesundheitliche Probleme, 
aber nun hat mein Hausarzt bei einer Routineuntersuchung einen erhöhten Blutzu-
ckerspiegel festgestellt, ich hatte aber auch am Tag zuvor Schokoladentorte gegessen. 
Er hat gesagt ich habe Diabetes Typ 2. Diabetes hat meine Mutter übrigens auch, das ist 
schon ein Zufall. Jetzt soll ich mich mit einer Diätassistentin treffen, Sport machen und 
Gewicht abnehmen. Das finde ich schwierig, weil mir mein Beruf dazu kaum Zeit lässt.   
Sport und Abnehmen seien auch nötig, um einer Arteriosklerose vorzubeugen, und 
verschlissene Gelenke will ich auch wirklich nicht haben. Ich habe meinen Arzt gefragt, 
warum ich nicht einfach Insulin spritzen kann. Aber er hat gesagt, ich hätte genug In-
sulin im Blut, scheinbar nehme ich also genug Insulin mit der Nahrung auf.  
Nun frage ich Sie:  
Wieso habe ich diese Krankheit, wenn ich doch genug Insulin im Blut habe? Und auf 
welche Weise hat Diabetes etwas mit Arteriosklerose zu tun?  
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Appendix D3. German version of computer, Internet, & text processing software use 
questionnaire 
 
Wie häufig nutzen Sie einen Computer?   ___ Stunden pro Woche 
Wie häufig nutzen Sie das Internet?   ___ Stunden pro Woche 
Wie häufig arbeiten Sie mit einem Textverarbeitungspro-
gramm?   
___ Stunden pro Woche 
Haben Sie einen Internetzugang zu Hause?    JA  NEIN 
Welche Internetdienstleistungen nutzen Sie?   
World Wide 
Web (WWW) 
 
Email 
 
Chat 
 
Telnet 
 
FTP 
 
Sonstige 
 
Keine 
 
 
 
  
A CELL IS A CELL IS A CELL – LAY MEDICAL UNDER-
STANDING AND ITS ROLE IN ONLINE HEALTH TUTORING 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung der Dissertation 
Im Laufe ihres Lebens erwerben Menschen in Wissensbereichen, mit denen sie sich 
vertiefend beschäftigen, erweiterte Fähigkeiten sowie eine breite Wissensbasis; sie wer-
den zu Experten in einem Gebiet. Hierbei findet im Laufe mehrerer Jahre eine exper-
tenspezifische Restruktierung des bereichsspezifischen Wissens statt, die zu einer effi-
zienteren Art der Wissensorgansiation führt (Kapitel 2.1.1). In Bereichen, in denen kei-
ne intensive Beschäftigung stattfindet, verfügen Menschen über Laienwissen, welches 
durch eine laientypische Art der Wissensrepräsentation charakterisiert ist. Dieses Lai-
enwissen zeichnet sich meist nicht durch schlichtes Unwissen, sondern durch das Vor-
handensein naiver Annahmen und Theorien aus (Kapitel 2.1.2). Damit Erklärungen 
eines Experten nun für einen Laien verständlich sein können, muss der Experte sein 
eigenes Wissen ‚übersetzen’, und seine Erklärungen vom Wissen seines Adressaten 
ausgehend und daran anknüpfend verfassen, was hohe Anforderungen an den Experten 
stellt (Kapitel 2.1.3). 
Die Kommunikation von Experten und Laien findet in den verschiedensten Kontex-
ten statt. Zahlreiche Untersuchungen kommen hierbei aus dem Bereich der Tutoring-
forschung, in der die Kommunikation von Tutoren mit Laien (sog. Tutees) in formalen 
Lernkontexten untersucht wird. In der vorliegenden Dissertation wird eine Parallele 
zwischen der Experten-Laien-Kommunikation in formalen Lernsettings und der infor-
mellen Beratung von Laien durch Experten gezogen. Aufgrund der strukturellen Ähn-
lichkeiten der beiden Kommunikationssettings ist es somit möglich, die in dieser Dis-
sertation (im Bereich der Email-Gesundheitsberatung) gewonnenen Ergebnisse mit 
Forschungsergebnissen aus der Tutoringforschung in Bezug zu setzen und für diese 
‚fruchtbar’ zu machen. 
Studien aus dem Bereich der Tutoringforschung haben aufgezeigt, dass Tutoren sich 
häufig wenig an den individuellen Tutee anpassen, sondern eher ein standardisiertes 
Tutoringverhalten zeigen. Im tutoriellen Dialog von den Tutees geäußerte Fehlvorstel-
lungen werden häufig von den Tutoren übergangen, zudem haben sie Schwierigkeiten, 
das Wissen der Tutees korrekt einzuschätzen (Kapitel 2.2). In der vorliegenden Disser-
tation wurden das Erklärverhalten und die Einschätzung des Laienwissens von Exper-
ten für die medizinische Emailberatung untersucht. Hierbei wurden auch Ansätze aus 
der psycholinguistischen Forschung berücksichtigt, die untersuchen, inwiefern Konver-
sationsmechanismen aus der Alltagskommunikation (Kapitel 2.4) das Erklärverhalten 
der Experten beeinflussen. Zusätzlich wurden auch die speziellen Charakteristika des 
Gesprächssettings Email-Gesundheitsberatung (Kapitel 2.4) berücksichtigt.  
  
Studie I: Fragebogenuntersuchung zu medizinischen Annahmen von Laien (Kapitel 4) 
Für das thematische Feld der Dissertation wurde das Wissen einer studentischen Lai-
enstichprobe (N=100) mit Hilfe eines Fragebogens untersucht und deskriptiv beschrie-
ben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine hohe Prävalenz falscher Annahmen auf. Auf der 
Grundlage der Ergebnisse von Studie I wurden verschiedene Versionen einer fiktiven 
Laienanfrage entwickelt, in denen ein Laie entweder falsche Annahmen, keine Annah-
men oder korrekte Annahmen bei ansonsten gleichen Anfragen äußerte. Diese Anfra-
geversionen wurden in den Studien II und III eingesetzt.  
 
Studie II: Antizipation von Laienwissen durch Experten (Kapitel 5) 
Medizinische Experten (N=72 Medizinstudierende der Abschlusssemester) lasen die 
Anfrage in einer der Versionen und schätzten das Wissen des Laienverfassers in einem 
Fragebogen ein; diese Einschätzung bezog sich sowohl auf Wissen, welches sich inhalt-
lich auf die manipulierten Annahmen bezog als auch auf anderes Wissen. Die Ergebnis-
se zeigen eine spezifische Verarbeitung der geäußerten Annahmen durch die Experten 
auf. Über das annahmenbezogene Wissen hinaus wirkten sich die geäußerten Annah-
men nicht auf die Wissenseinschätzungen der Experten aus.  
 
Studie III: Beantwortung einer Laienanfrage durch Experten (Kapitel 6) 
Medizinische Experten (N=83 Medizinstudierende der Abschlusssemester) beantwor-
teten eine der Versionen der Laienanfrage. Ihre Antworten wurden hinsichtlich der 
Anpassung der Erklärungen an den Laienrezipienten untersucht. Zudem wurde für die 
Antworten in der ‚falsche Annahmen’-Bedingung im Rahmen einer qualitativen Analy-
se untersucht, wie die Experten auf die geäußerten falschen Annahmen eingingen. Die 
Ergebnisse der Analysen zeigen außer einer lokalen Fehlerkorrektur keine Anpassun-
gen an den Laien auf. Die Annahmen wurden zudem eher auf indirekte Art korrigiert 
(z.B. durch indirekte Anspielungen auf die geäußerten Fehler und Übermittlung der 
korrekten Information).  
 
Studie IV: Die Rolle von Höflichkeit in der medizinischen Emailberatung (Kapitel 7) 
Die vierte empirische Studie widmete sich der Frage, inwiefern die Berücksichtigung 
des Prinzips der Höflichkeit eine Erklärung für das Erklärverhalten der medizinischen 
Experten in Studie III darstellen kann. Hierzu wurden 70 medizinische Experten (Me-
dizinstudierende der Abschlusssemester) entweder mit einer Kontrollinstruktion in-
struiert oder mit einer metapragmatischen Instruktion, in der die Experten Informati-
onen bekamen über die Wichtigkeit direkter (und somit weniger höflicher) Kommuni-
kation mit den Laien. Die Ergebnisse zeigen deutliche Einflüsse der metapragmati-
 schen Instruktion auf die Expertenantworten, welche direkter (mehr ‘lehrerhaft’) und 
weniger höflich gestaltet wurden. Die Ergebnisse von Studie IV stellen indirekte, aber 
starke Hinweise auf eine Rolle von Höflichkeit für das untersuchte Setting dar.  
 
In einer abschließenden Gesamtdiskussion der Dissertation werden die Ergebnisse 
der empirischen Studien zunächst vor dem Hintergrund der Tutoringforschung disku-
tiert (Kapitel 8.2). Während in vielen Studien aus dem Bereich der Tutoringforschung 
indirekt aus dem Eingehen auf Fehler darauf geschlossen wird, ob Tutoren diese er-
kannt haben, wird mit dem in Studie II verwendeten Paradigma ein direkter Weg vor-
gestellt, den Einfluss von geäußerten Fehlern auf die Laienwissen-Repräsentation von 
Tutoren zu untersuchen. Eine derart direkte Untersuchung sollte auch im (zumeist 
face-to-face tutorielle Dialoge untersuchenden) Bereich der Tutoringforschung Anwen-
dung finden, hierzu wird eine mögliche Verfahrensweise vorgeschlagen. Als weitere 
Folgerung wird die Notwendigkeit des Einbeziehens des Prinzips der Höflichkeit für die 
Tutoringforschung hervorgehoben.  
Im folgenden Teil der Diskussion (Kapitel 8.3) wird der Einfluss pragmatischer 
Prinzipien der Alltagskommunikation auf das in der Dissertation untersuchte Setting 
der Email-Gesundheitsberatung diskutiert. Hierbei finden sowohl die empirischen Stu-
dien der Dissertation als auch weitere Untersuchungen zur Email-Gesundheitsberatung 
Berücksichtigung. In der Darstellung wird herausgearbeitet, dass die Konversations-
mechanismen in der Alltagskommunikation zu effizienter Kommunikation beitragen, 
allerdings bei großer Wissensdivergenz von Gesprächspartnern (Experten-Laien-
Kommunikation) erfolgreiche Verständigung gefährden können. Aus der Darstellung 
werden in einem weiteren Schritt Rückschlüsse für die psycholinguistischen Ansätze 
abgeleitet. 
Im vierten Abschnitt der Gesamtdiskussion (Kapitel 8.4) wird der Einsatz meta-
pragmatischer Instruktionen reflektiert und das Potential einer solchen Instruktion für 
die Verbesserung von Experten-Laien-Kommunikation in formalen und informalen 
tutoriellen Kontexten diskutiert.  
Die Dissertation schließt mit einem Ausblick auf weitere sich aus der Dissertation 
ergebende Forschungsfragen (Kapitel 8.5). Hierbei wird schwerpunktmäßig auf die 
Übertragbarkeit der Ergebnisse auf andere Stichproben sowie auf weitere mögliche 
Einsatzgebiete des für die Dissertation entwickelten Forschunsgparadigmas von Studie 
II und III eingegangen.  
 
 
  
